**Report of Investigation**

REPORT OF
COMMANDER-DIRECTED INVESTIGATION
PREPARED BY
LT GEN JAMES M. HOLMES
INVESTIGATING OFFICER
CONCERNING
ICBM TEST COMPROMISE AT
MALMSTROM AIR FORCE BASE, MONTANA
&
ASSESSMENT OF TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
ICBM TRAINING, EVALUATION, AND
TESTING CULTURE
26 FEBRUARY 2014

Table of Contents

Executive Summary

This commander-directed investigation (CDI) grew out of an Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) investigation into alleged drug use. In the process of investigating alleged drug use, AFOSI discovered evidence that implicated 98 junior officers in the potential compromise of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) combat crew knowledge test material at Malmstrom Air Force Base (AFB). The AFOSI retained 10 of the 98 cases because they included compromise of classified material. The other 88 cases were recommended for inclusion in this CDI because they involved the compromise of only unclassified test material. Lt Gen Stephen Wilson, commander, Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC), appointed Lt Gen James Holmes, vice commander, Air Education and Training Command, to conduct the CDI into these 88 cases.

The Malmstrom AFB test compromise involved officers sharing monthly knowledge test answers with other officers who had yet to take the tests. Based on AFOSI investigations, the CDI substantiated the allegations against 79 of the officers in seven categories. Evidence supports that 15 of the officers sent, received, and solicited test material; 13 officers sent and received test material; four officers only sent test material; nine officers solicited and received test material; the largest group, 30 officers, received test material; three officers solicited but did not receive test material; and five officers had direct knowledge that tests were being compromised and failed to report it to the command chain. The remaining allegations against nine of the Malmstrom officers were considered unsubstantiated due to lack of credible evidence. These 88 CDI investigations are considered closed and are forwarded for action as part of this report.

Lieutenant General Wilson also tasked Lieutenant General Holmes to examine the training and testing culture and leadership environment within Twentieth Air Force and the 341st Missile Wing (MW) to determine what role they may have played in test compromise events. The CDI team visited the operational missile wings at F. E. Warren AFB, Wyoming; Minot AFB, North Dakota; and Malmstrom AFB, Montana, and the ICBM Initial Skills Training Group at Vandenberg AFB, California. The team observed training and testing, administered surveys, and conducted focus group sessions with company-grade officer crew members, students, instructors, and evaluators. Finally, the team also interviewed squadron, group, and wing leadership at all four locations and considered evidence from past inspections and investigations.

The CDI adapted the "Reason Model of Human Error" to examine three systemic layers: organizational culture, leadership, and preconditions. Analysis identified factors in each of these overlapping layers which played a role in creating an environment where ICBM crew members could compromise or fail to report compromise of test material. The individual acts that compromised monthly ICBM knowledge testing in the 341st MW were also influenced in part by Air Force, AFGSC, and Twentieth AF organizational impacts on training and testing culture. Although there is no evidence that the 341st MW's leadership condoned or had specific knowledge about the sharing of monthly knowledge test material, leadership actions in the 341st Operations Group (OG) played a role in its occurrence.

The CDI team proposed recommendations in four areas that should be implemented across the enterprise: reforming organizational culture, empowering crew commanders, improving the quality and purpose of training, and reforming testing and evaluation.

Tab A

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND

MEMORANDUM FOR LT GEN JAMES M. HOLMES

FROM: AFGSC/CC
245 Davis Avenue East, Suite 200
Barksdale AFB LA 71110

SUBJECT: Commander-Directed Investigation (CDI) into ICBM Testing Culture, Malmstrom Air Force Base, MT and 20th Air Force

1. You are appointed to conduct a CDI into the circumstances and causes of the Malmstrom AFB test compromise, including, but not limited to:

   a. training and testing culture; and
   b. leadership environment and oversight (Malmstrom AFB and 20 AF).

2. This is your primary duty (no leave, temporary duty, or other duties) unless expressly discussed and permitted by me, until completion of this duty and submission of an acceptable report. You are authorized to interview personnel, take sworn statements or testimony and examine and copy any and all relevant Air Force records, files, and correspondence germane to this investigation.

3. In conducting the CDI, follow the guidance in the *Commander-Directed Investigation Guide*. Prepare and submit to me a report of investigation in the format it describes. Submit the report to me not later than 26 February 2014, unless I grant a written extension. Please include any recommendations you deem appropriate, in your report.

4. You may not release any information related to this investigation without my prior approval. This letter and the attached documents are marked FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY and contain information that must be protected under the Privacy Act.

5. Col (b)(6) is your designated legal advisor for purposes of this CDI. Other subject matter experts will be appointed as appropriate to support you throughout your investigation.

6. This letter supersedes previous letter, same subject, dated 27 Jan 2014.

//signed//

STEPHEN W. WILSON
Lieutenant General, USAF
Commander

To Deter and Assure

Tab B

Authority and Scope

Commanders have the inherent authority to conduct a commander-directed investigation (CDI) to investigate matters under their command, unless preempted by higher authority. Pursuant to this authority, Lt Gen Stephen W. Wilson, commander, Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC), appointed Lt Gen James M. Holmes, vice commander, Air Education and Training Command (AETC), on 30 January 2014 to conduct an investigation into the circumstances and causes that allowed the compromise of knowledge tests at Malmstrom AFB, Montana. The CDI was conducted from 31 January 2014 to 26 February 2014 at F. E. Warren AFB, Wyoming; Minot AFB, North Dakota; Malmstrom AFB, Montana; and Vandenberg AFB, California.

The investigating officer (IO) investigated the following issues:

ALLEGATION: Ninety-eight Malmstrom AFB company-grade officers (CGO) compromised monthly knowledge tests by sharing answers with other officers who had yet to take the monthly knowledge tests and/or by failing to report others for doing so.

OTHER FACTORS: The CDI also examined the training and testing culture and leadership environment and oversight within Twentieth Air Force and the 341st Missile Wing to determine what role they may have played in the compromise of test materials by ICBM crew members at Malmstrom AFB.

Tab C

Background

Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) is the major command that organizes, trains, and equips the Air Force's nuclear forces.[1] AFGSC exercises command of its ICBM nuclear forces through Twentieth Air Force.[2] Twentieth AF exercises Numbered Air Force control over all three ICBM wings: the 90th MW at F. E. Warren AFB, Wyoming; the 91st MW at Minot AFB, North Dakota; and the 341st MW at Malmstrom AFB, Montana.[3] As one of three missile wings subordinate to Twentieth AF, the 341st MW defends the United States with safe, secure, and effective nuclear forces.[4] It executes this mission by operating and maintaining 15 missile alert facilities capable of launching 150 Minuteman III ICBMs.[5] The 341st MW organizes its missile combat crews into three missile squadrons (MS) under the 341st Operations Group (OG): the 10th MS, 12th MS, and 490th MS. Training and testing of missile crew members are provided by the 341st Operations Support Squadron (OSS), which also falls under the 341st OG.[6]

Missile combat crew members (MCCM) begin their training at Vandenberg AFB, California, where they undergo initial skills training (IST).[7] This course consists of 100 days of instruction and includes classroom and simulator training sessions.[8] The course's objective is to provide students with a core understanding of how to operate the Minuteman III weapon system. Throughout training, students' performance is measured during four-hour simulator evaluations in which they respond to a diverse assortment of weapon system indications and wartime scenarios. Upon graduation, students are relocated to one of the three ICBM wings to receive final certification in operating the weapon system and to perform their operational mission.

Upon arriving at their respective missile wing, MCCMs receive mission qualification training (MQT) that validates their IST and provides final preparations for them to transition into their operational positions.[9] MQT consists of classroom training on local procedures, missile safety, and nuclear surety; orientation tours of a missile alert facility (MAF) and launch control center (LCC); and a minimum of three simulator sessions.[10] Each member receives weapon system, ICBM codes handling, emergency war orders (EWO), and Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) certifications, administered by the squadron commander or a subject matter expert (SME)

---

1. See G-120.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. See G-121.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. See G-131.
8. See G-134.
9. See G-62.
10. Ibid.

designee.[11] Following these events, MCCMs are able to perform operational nuclear alerts at active LCCs.[12]

This begins the MCCMs' initial four-year crew tour as a missile operations officer (referred to as a "missileer"). This crew tour is standardized across the three missile wings in Twentieth AF. All missileers spend approximately two years as a deputy missile combat crew commander (referred to as a "deputy"), with an opportunity for some to serve as a deputy instructor or evaluator during those two years. The last two years of a missileer's initial crew tour are typically spent as a missile combat crew commander (referred to as a "commander"), with another opportunity for some to serve as a commander instructor or evaluator. A few first-tour commanders are appointed as flight commanders or "senior" instructors or evaluators. The age of the missile crew force is typically 22–27.

After certification, a regular training cycle begins. All MCCMs receive periodic training to maintain the operational readiness required to perform their alert missions.[13] This training consists of classroom and simulator instruction and is given on a monthly basis.[14] Every month, a missileer must attend recurring classroom training in weapon system (T3), codes handling (T4), and EWO (T1).[15] Additionally, every month a missileer must take and pass a 20–30 question knowledge test in each of those three subjects—with a minimum passing score of 90 percent on each test.[16] Additional recurring missile safety and nuclear surety training and testing are required annually.[17] Finally, every missileer must complete a monthly simulator session.[18] Failure to meet these requirements results in the member being restricted from performing alert duty in operational LCCs.[19] Concepts which are taught in these training sessions are called job performance requirements (JPR).[20] There are more than 230 unclassified and 135 classified JPR tasks, and crew members must be trained on each task at least once over the course of a year.

Upon completion of a missileer's initial crew tour, some will cross-train into other career fields, while others will stay in the nuclear and missile operations career field. Of those who stay in the career field, a percentage will become code controllers, EWO instructors, or wing planners.

---

11. Ibid.
12. See G-56.
13. See G-58.
14. Ibid.
15. See G-59.
16. See G-57.
17. See G-55.
18. See G-57.
19. See G-56.
20. See G-59.

In August 2013, the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) opened an investigation into alleged drug use by a first lieutenant assigned to the military personnel flight and a second lieutenant assigned to the services squadron at Edwards AFB, California. A review of the officers' cell phones identified communication (text messages) from or to an additional 11 Air Force company-grade officers (CGO) assigned to various Air Force bases (Malmstrom AFB; F. E. Warren AFB; Vandenberg AFB; Los Angeles AFB, California; Schriever AFB, Colorado; and Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington). These communications detailed specific illegal drug use that included synthetic drugs, ecstasy, and amphetamines.[21]

Two of the 11 identified officers were assigned to Malmstrom AFB. AFOSI was able to determine both officers were communicating via personal cell phones, discussing both illegal drug activity and testing material. When AFOSI analyzed the images and text messages on the phones, they found monthly knowledge test data that was shared with more than a dozen officers within the 341st OG. The 341st OG/CC determined that one of the files shared included classified material. AFOSI obtained a search authorization for the additional officers' cell phones to determine if they also contained classified information. Ultimately, during the course of the AFOSI investigation, the number of Malmstrom CGOs identified by AFOSI who either sent monthly test questions/answers, received test questions/answers, solicited but did not receive testing material, or had knowledge of others sharing test material grew to 98.[22]

On 24 January 2014, Brig Gen Kevin J. Jacobsen, commander, AFOSI, notified Air Force senior leadership that, in his opinion, 88 of the 98 officers suspected of involvement in the sharing of unclassified test and/or unauthorized and/or "disqualifying" material would be better evaluated/documented in a CDI—vice an AFOSI criminal investigation. AFOSI retained the investigations addressing 10 officers involved in sharing/mishandling classified testing material because these offenses remain within AFOSI's investigative purview. Three of these 10 officers were also suspected of illegal drug involvement.[23]

On 27 January 2014, Lt Gen Stephen Wilson, commander, AFGSC, directed Lt Gen James Holmes to initiate a CDI into the circumstances and causes of the Malmstrom AFB missile test compromise to include the training and testing culture, leadership environment, and oversight at both Malmstrom AFB and Twentieth AF. AFOSI continued to provide investigative support to the CDI under the direction of Lieutenant General Holmes.

---

21. Information derived from AFOSI Investigation 806-D-092-A0-31450140411621.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.

Tab D

Allegation, Analysis, and Conclusion

Allegation

ALLEGATION: Ninety-eight Malmstrom AFB CGOs compromised monthly knowledge tests by sharing answers with other officers who had yet to take the monthly knowledge tests and/or by failing to report others for doing so.

All potential offenders were junior officers and MCCMs and worked in the 10th, 12th, or 490th missile squadrons, the 341st OSS, or the support functions on the 341st OG staff.[24] Of the 98 alleged offenders, 75 were 1st or 2nd lieutenants. The remaining 23 were captains. AFOSI maintains investigative control over 10 of the officers. The AFOSI investigations remain active at the time of the publication of this CDI and are focused on those officers who sent, received, or mishandled *classified* testing information. Three of the 10 officers AFOSI continues to investigate are also subject to illegal drug use/distribution allegations, unrelated to the test compromise.[25]

The remaining 88 officers allegedly compromised unclassified test material, and these investigations are documented in the investigative annex of this report. AFOSI continued to provide investigative assistance under the direction of the CDI IO. These 88 investigations are considered closed and ready for command action.

Analysis

To provide scope and context, the CDI ranked the offense categories from the most egregious to the least. In a case where the subject engaged in multiple forms of test compromise, his or her misconduct was placed into the most egregious conduct category for which it qualified. The CDI rank ordered offenses this way:

1. Sent test material (most egregious)

2. Solicited test material

3. Received test material

4. Did not receive test material but knew of others who did (least egregious)

---

24. See Investigative Annex, Sections 1–8.
25. Information derived from AFOSI Investigation 806-D-092-A0-31450140411621.

The CDI applied the "preponderance of the evidence" evidentiary standard, and the associated *UCMJ* punitive article is provided for each misconduct category. The preponderance of the evidence standard means substantiated misconduct "more likely than not" occurred.


Figure 1. Overview of test compromise offenses.

Part 1: Sending Compromised Test Material and Test Answers

The evidence shows that 32 MCCMs sent test information to other officers. The earliest test material transmitted to MCCMs was drawn from a 7 March 2012 monthly knowledge test. The latest test material sent to other MCCMs was 27 November 2013.[26] The greatest volume of material sent and received was drawn from a September 2013 test.[27]

The primary evidence in all 32 sending cases was text messages obtained by AFOSI after it exploited phones that were either volunteered by the officers or obtained via court order.[28] The text messages usually took one of two forms. Either the message contained the answers to the test in text form (e.g., "T3 abbccadacd"), or the text message contained images of test material.[29] In one case, text messages were the only evidence.[30] In the remaining 31 cases, there was some form of corroborating evidence, which could take the form of a confession to related misconduct (e.g., receiving test material), evidence that data was altered or deleted on cell phones, or witness statements implicating the subject in test compromise activities.[31]

Legal Analysis

It is arguable officers have a duty *not* to assist other officers in cheating on their monthly knowledge tests. Therefore, dereliction of duty under Article 92 of the *UCMJ* is a potential charge for any officer who distributed compromised test material to other officers. *Duty*, however, is usually defined by a "treaty, statute, regulation, lawful order, standard operating procedure, or custom of the service" (*Manual for Courts-Martial* [*MCM*], Sec. IV, Pt. 16, para. c3a). For a more detailed treatment of Article 92, please see the discussion under the "Received Compromised Test Material" section. Since the CDI could find no clear regulatory guidance prohibiting distribution of compromised test material, the IO believes conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman under Article 133 is a more appropriate way to describe the misconduct associated with distributing compromised test material.

Article 133, *UCMJ*, conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, requires proof of two elements:

    1. That an officer did or omitted to do certain acts; and

---

26. See Investigative Annex. Section 1, Tab M.
27. See Investigative Annex. Sections 1–3, Tab D.
28. Ibid.
29. See Investigative Annex. Section 3, Tabs A and B.
30. See Investigative Annex. Sections 1–3.
31. Ibid.

2. That, under the circumstances, these acts or omissions constituted conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.

As used in this article, *gentleman* includes both male and female commissioned officers, cadets, and midshipmen.

There are certain moral attributes common to the ideal officer and perfect gentleman, a lack of which is indicated by acts of dishonesty, unfair dealing, indecency, indecorum, lawlessness, injustice, or cruelty. Not everyone is or can be expected to meet unrealistically high moral standards, but there is a limit of tolerance based on customs of the service and military necessity below which the personal standards of an officer, cadet, or midshipman cannot fall without seriously compromising the person's standing as an officer, cadet, or midshipman or the person's character as a gentleman. Instances of violation of this article include knowingly making a false official statement, dishonorable failure to pay a debt, and cheating on an exam.

The act of sending compromised test material is an affirmative act. In every one of the 32 substantiated sending cases, the subject completed the activity by sending a text message where he or she either typed the answers to the test or attached an image of compromised test material to a text message.[32] The subject then took the further step of transmitting the unauthorized test material.[33]

The second element of Article 133 requires that "under the circumstances, the act constituted conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman." This is, understandably, a very subjective standard. However, the 2012 edition of the *Manual for Courts-Martial* clearly cites "cheating on a test" as an example of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman. This example fits well with the *MCM*'s explanation of the offense, wherein acts of "dishonesty" are described as anathema to the moral attributes expected of officers. If cheating on a test is a dishonest act that is inconsistent with the moral attributes of an officer, then facilitating the cheating of other officers must certainly qualify as such an act.

Although corroborating evidence existed for most of the offenders, the CDI concluded that the text messages alone were enough to substantiate this offense against all of the subjects. If record of a sent message was found on the sender's phone, it meant the sender had the test information

---

32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.

and attempted to send it to another officer. If the message was then found on a recipient's phone, it meant the subject was successful in sending compromised test material to that recipient.

Part 2: Solicited Compromised Test Material

The evidence shows that 12 MCCMs asked other MCCMs for unauthorized information concerning monthly test questions.[34] The earliest incident of someone requesting access to compromised test information was 1 November 2011, and the most recent incident was 19 November 2013.[35] Text messages supported all incidents involving the solicitation of compromised test information.[36] Typically, the officer asked for information about a specific variation of one of the three required monthly knowledge tests.[37] He or she either identified the desired test material by its acronym (e.g., "T1," "T3," or "T4") or by the descriptive name associated with the test (e.g., EWO, weapon system [WS], or codes).[38] At all times relevant to the allegations, Malmstrom proctors possessed two versions of each test.[39] All MCCMs were required to test on one of the two versions of each test (T1, T3, or T4) each month.[40] The same tests were offered throughout all four weeks of the same month, so it was possible for an MCCM who took the test earlier in the month to feed relevant information to an MCCM taking the same test later in the month.[41]

Legal Analysis

In the case of those who attempted to acquire compromised test material, the CDI viewed this as an attempt to cheat. An attempt to cheat equates to an attempt to commit conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman under Article 133 (see rule discussion in previous category). Attempt (under Article 80) is listed as a lesser included offense of Article 133 in the *MCM*.

Under Article 80, *UCMJ*, attempt requires proof of four elements:

1. That a subject did a certain overt act;
2. That the act was done with the specific intent to commit a certain offense under the code;
3. That the act amounted to more than mere preparation;

---

34. See Investigative Annex, Sections 4–6.
35. See Investigative Annex, Section 6, Tab A, and Section 4, Tab C.
36. See Investigative Annex, Sections 4 and 6.
37. Ibid.
38. See Investigative Annex, Section 4, Tabs A and F.
39. See Tab F, Interview 10.
40. See Tab G-21.
41. See Tab F, Interviews 9, 10, and 11.

    4. That the subject apparently intended to effect the commission of the intended offense.

> Preparation consists of devising or arranging the means or measures necessary for the commission of the offense. The overt act required goes beyond preparatory steps and is a direct movement toward the commission of the offense. The overt act need not be the last act essential to the consummation of the offense.

In this case, every one of the officers sent a text to another crew member requesting compromised test data. That act required the officer to affirmatively compose the message and then hit the send button on his or her cell phone. The CDI finds that this qualifies as an overt act.

In most cases, the officer did not state what he or she intended to do with the information. None of the officers confessed to soliciting compromised test material, and their confiscated text messages did not state what they intended to do with the information.[42] However, there was no legally justifiable reason why an MCCM should have advance access to missile combat crew monthly knowledge test information. Furthermore, all MCCMs at Malmstrom AFB took the same three monthly knowledge tests each month (with two versions of each test possible). The CDI finds the most likely reason these MCCMs solicited test material is so they could cheat on their monthly knowledge tests in violation of Article 133, conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.

The act of acquiring compromised test material was the last act necessary before actually using unauthorized test material to cheat. This goes beyond the mere preparation of figuring out who has already taken the test that month or scheduling a test later in the month to increase the opportunity for cheating.

The act of soliciting the test material also affected the commission of the offense. Without acquiring advance access to the test content, MCCMs could have asked other officers in the class for assistance or looked at other crew members' answer sheets. Both of these activities were easier to detect by test proctors. By acquiring advance and unauthorized test information, officers could cheat while appearing to be using their own work and knowledge.

Part 3: Received Compromised Test Material

Evidence shows that 30 officers received compromised test information but did not solicit or send the information.[43] Another 37 officers received test material and were also involved in

---

42. See Investigative Annex, Sections 4 and 6.
43. See Investigative Annex, Section 5.

sending and/or soliciting test material.[44] In all but one circumstance, discovery of text messages sent to the officer supported the case.[45] As in the discussion under Part 1 (Sending), compromised test information came in two forms: text messages with answers contained in the text (e.g., "Codes; abcdaccbd") or messages with attached images containing test material (e.g., a JPEG file).[46] In the only case not supported by a text message, the subject confessed to getting advance access to a T1 (EWO) test.[47]

In the majority of the cases in this category, there was corroborating evidence of test compromise misconduct. Forms of corroborating evidence included confessions to receiving test material, deleted message history, test images on cell phones, and evidence of a "thanks" text sent in response to receiving test material.[48]

Legal Analysis

All of the officers of this investigation were MCCMs subject to the Personal Reliability Program (PRP), a Department of Defense (DOD) program to "select and maintain reliable individuals to perform duties associated with nuclear weapons" (DOD 5210.42-R, para C 1.1.1). The PRP program has requirements about when to report such mundane life events as medical appointments or marital problems. All MCCMs are briefed on PRP duties—a "spirit and intent" briefing—when they assume alert status. Part of the briefing describes the duty to notify a supervisor if they are aware of potentially disqualifying information that would deprive them of their duty. MCCMs are required to report this disqualifying data whether it relates to their status or the PRP status of another MCCM.[49]

An officer who received compromised test material arguably used that material to cheat on one of his or her monthly knowledge tests. In such a case, the officer would be in violation of Article 133, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman, for cheating (see analysis under Distribution). However, there are two difficulties in applying that analysis to the case of officers who received test material. First, it is possible the officer who received the test material did so without wanting it. The CDI uncovered at least one example of that scenario during the course of its investigation.[50]

---

44. See Investigative Annex. Sections 1, 2, and 4.
45. See Investigative Annex. Section 5, Tab P.
46. See Investigative Annex. Section 5, Tabs A and B.
47. See Investigative Annex. Section 5, Tab P.
48. See Investigative Annex. Section 5, Tab A.
49. See Malmstrom, "Spirit and Intent Brief," slides 6, 7, 13.
50. See Investigative Annex. Section 8, Tab B.

Second, it is possible that a member initially wanted the information to use on an examination, but then later changed his or her mind and decided not to use it (for example, if a particularly vigilant test proctor was in the room for that particular test). Although a member who received test information may not have cheated under Article 133, he or she would be guilty of dereliction of duty under the PRP program for not reporting the misconduct of the other MCCM who sent the test information.

Article 92, *UCMJ*, dereliction in the performance of duties, requires proof of three elements:

1. That a subject had certain duties;
2. That the subject knew or reasonably should have known of the duties;
3. That the subject was willfully derelict in the performance of those duties.

A duty may be imposed by treaty, statute, regulation, lawful order, standard operating procedure, or custom of the service.

Actual knowledge need not be shown if the individual reasonably should have known of the duties. This may be demonstrated by regulations, training or operating manuals, customs of the service, academic literature, or testimony.

Willfully means *intentionally*. It refers to the doing of an act knowingly and purposely, specifically intending the natural and probable consequences of the act.

DOD Instruction 5210.42-R, *Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program (PRP)*, provides that

- C2.7.5 Individuals inform their supervisors or the certifying official when another individual in the PRP appears to be involved in situations that may affect reliability.
- C3.2.1.3 Good social adjustment, emotional stability, personal integrity, sound judgment, and allegiance to the United States are examples of Qualifying Criteria under PRP.
- C5.1.7 Poor attitude or lack of motivation as evidenced by an aberrant attitude or irrational behavior, inappropriate behavior or mood may be grounds for decertification.

Since each of the officers in this investigation was an MCCM, he or she had PRP responsibilities under DOD Instruction 5210.42-R para C 1.3.1. The duty to inform the supervisor or certifying officials when potentially disqualifying information (PDI) exists about another person is clearly stated in C2.7.5 of the regulation.

The officers should have known about the duty to pass PDI about others to supervisors from two sources. First, they were active MCCMs and lived under PRP restrictions every day. Second,

missile combat crew members get a "spirit and intent" briefing where they are told about the expectations for reporting PDI and what qualifies as PDI.[51] Every time subjects received compromised test material from a fellow MCCM, they were aware of potential PDI and should have reported it to the fellow crew member's supervisor or certifying official. An officer on PRP engages in potentially disqualifying PRP behavior for two reasons when he or she shares compromised test material. First, an officer has shown poor judgment and a lack of personal integrity by engaging in activity that helps a fellow Airman cheat. Second, an officer who facilitates cheating has demonstrated a poor attitude by engaging in inappropriate behavior. Rather than follow the required procedure of reporting compromised test material distributors, officers in the recipient category of test compromise misconduct chose to conceal PDI.

Part 4: Had Knowledge of Others' Misconduct with Advance Test Material

This category had the fewest subjects of the four categories, with only five officers identified as meeting the criteria (having knowledge of test compromise activity, but no evidence of ever participating in it).[52] The primary evidence for officers in this category was their confessions or text message traffic.[53]

Legal Analysis

The officers in this category are guilty of the same misconduct (dereliction of duty) as the officers in the previous category (received test material), and they are guilty for the same reasons. They had a duty to report their knowledge that other personnel engaged in PDI behavior, and they did not do so. Therefore, the dereliction of duty analysis employed in the previous section is adopted for this section as well.

Conclusion

After a careful review of the evidence collected during the course of this investigation, the CDI officer substantiated the allegations against 79 of the officers in varying degrees of culpability. Evidence supports that 15 of the officers sent, received, and solicited testing material; 13 officers sent and received testing material; four officers only sent testing material; nine officers solicited and received testing material; the largest group, 30 officers, only received testing material; three

---

51. See Malmstrom, "Spirit and Intent Brief," slide 5.
52. See Investigative Annex, Section 7.
53. Ibid.

<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 200px; height: 60px;"></div>

officers solicited but did not receive testing material; and five officers had direct knowledge that tests were being compromised and failed to report it to the command chain.[54]

The CDI officer unsubstantiated the allegations against the nine remaining Malmstrom officers due to lack of credible evidence.[55] In one case, the officer was a test proctor who allowed "group testing," but there was no evidence she actually forwarded test material or answers to other parties.[56] In four cases, there was evidence that test material was transmitted to the officer, but there was also evidence the officer never received the test material.[57] Finally, there were four officers against whom no evidence of test compromise existed, but they came forward because they knew of testing irregularities unrelated to test material compromise.[58]

ALLEGATION: Ninety-eight Malmstrom AFB CGOs compromised classified and unclassified monthly knowledge tests by sharing answers with other officers who had yet to take the monthly knowledge tests and/or by failing to report others for doing so. Seventy-nine of 88 cases are **SUBSTANTIATED**. Nine cases were **UNSUBSTANTIATED**. Ten cases remain under AFOSI investigation outside the scope of this CDI.

Factors Analysis

The CDI also examined the training and testing culture and leadership environment and oversight within Twentieth AF and the 341st Missile Wing to determine what role they may have played in the compromise of test materials by ICBM crew members at Malmstrom AFB. To accomplish this task, the CDI employed human error analysis to better understand the larger factors (organizational culture, leadership, preconditions) that played a role in enabling widespread misconduct to occur.

Reason Model of Human Error

In an effort to place the specific allegations of misconduct at Malmstrom AFB within a larger framework that incorporates the roles culture and leadership played in the sharing of test material, the CDI utilized the Reason Model of Human Error.[59] Although this model was developed to provide a systematic way to look at accident prevention, the CDI team found it also provides a useful model for examining the impact of organizational culture and leadership on missile crew misconduct. Essentially, this systemic approach to accident prevention relies on

---

54. See Investigative Annex. Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7.
55. See Investigative Annex. Section 8.
56. See Investigative Annex. Section 5, Tab S, and Section 8, Tab A.
57. See Investigative Annex. Section 8, Tabs C, E, I, and G.
58. See Investigative Annex. Section 8, Tabs B, D, G, and H.
59. James Reason, *Human Error* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

overlapping layers of defenses and safeguards to prevent an accident from occurring. However, an accident can occur when the flaws in each layer align, creating conditions that limit the effect of preventive measures. The individual acts that compromised monthly ICBM knowledge testing in the 341st MW were also influenced in part by Air Force, AFGSC, and Twentieth AF organizational impacts on training and testing culture and leadership actions in the 341st OG.

This analysis examines three systemic layers: organizational culture, leadership, and other preconditions. Taken together, the flaws in each of these overlapping layers played a role in creating an environment in which Malmstrom AFB ICBM crew members decided to distribute, receive, or solicit test material, or decided against reporting compromise of test material to their chain of command. During the investigation, the CDI visited all three Twentieth AF missile wings—the 90th MW at F. E. Warren AFB, the 91st MW at Minot AFB, and the 341st MW at Malmstrom AFB—and AETC's 381st Training Group (TRG) at Vandenberg AFB. The team observed training and testing; interviewed all squadron, group, and wing leaders; and conducted focus groups with missile crews and, separately, with instructors and evaluators at each of Twentieth AF's three wings. The team also observed testing and training and conducted focus groups at Vandenberg with IST students and, separately, with their instructors. All CGOs at the three wings were also invited to participate in a survey that asked a series of questions focusing on testing, training, and evaluation. In short, the CDI not only attempted to understand the specific problems at Malmstrom AFB but also endeavored to look for ways to improve the training, testing, and evaluation environment across Twentieth AF to prevent such a situation from occurring again—anywhere within the missile force.

Organizational Culture

Analysis

As David Gebler writes, "An organization's culture isn't something that's created by senior leadership and then rolled out. A culture is an objective picture of an organization, for better or worse. It's the sum total of all the collective values and behaviors of all employees, managers, and leaders."[60] Undoubtedly, organizational culture plays an important role in shaping the

---

60. David Gebler, "Creating an Ethical Culture: Values-Based Ethics Programs Can Help Employees Judge Right from Wrong," *Strategic Finance Magazine*, May 2006, 29–34. *Organizational culture* has also been defined as "the pattern of beliefs, myths, and sentiments shared by the member of an organization." Robert W. Stanley, "Reviving a Culture of Disciplined Compliance in Air Force Nuclear Operations" (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University, 2011), 2.

performance of any organization.[61] For the Twentieth AF and its three missile wings, organizational culture is perhaps even more significant because of the nature of the mission performed by missileers. Built on a culture of rigorous compliance that dates to the earliest days of ICBM operations under Strategic Air Command (SAC), the current training, testing, and evaluation aspects of the larger missile culture (the CDI's purview) have largely remained unchanged for decades.[62]

Based on previous studies and the interviews, focus groups, and survey conducted by the CDI, we identified six characteristics within AFGSC and Twentieth AF organizational cultures that affect ICBM testing, training, and evaluation.

First, senior leaders have frequently emphasized their desire for an unrealistic and unobtainable "zero defect" nuclear culture, where "perfection is the standard."[63] This ideal would require the complete elimination of human error in America's nuclear enterprise. An unrealistic emphasis on perfection drives commanders at all levels to attempt to meet the zero-defect standard by personally monitoring and directing daily operations and imposing an unrelenting testing and evaluation regimen on wings, groups, squadrons, and missile crew members in an attempt to eliminate all human error.[64] In reality, the day-to-day missile environment also employs the redundancy, standardized procedures, and teamwork of a systems approach to mitigate or "capture" individual errors before they can threaten nuclear surety or create doubt about the reliability of our deterrent. In this more realistic approach, missile crews, maintenance crews, and security forces have the opportunity to aid and support one another in execution of their primary mission—providing "perfect execution in the field through teamwork."

As shown in figure 2, organizational systems can be constructed to allow errors to be exacerbated, missed, mitigated, or captured. Since human errors are unavoidable, even in the nuclear enterprise, the goal of the nuclear enterprise should be to construct a system that ensures human errors are mitigated and captured. The fundamental tenets of such a system have been identified in response to aviation accidents and include establishing trust; adopting a credible, nonpunitive policy toward error; demonstrating commitment to taking action to reduce error-

---

61. Ali Sadeghi Gogheri, Khaled Nawaser, Seyed Mahdi Vesal, Asghar Afshar Jahanshahi, and Roshan Kazi, "Which Organizational Culture Moves towards Organizational Excellence?," *Asian Social Science* 9, no. 11 (2013): 221–36.

62. See Raymond E. Ebbs, "SAC Needs a Few Good Men and Women: A Guide to ICBM Operations Duty," Research Report no. 88-0825 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Command and Staff College, 1998).

63. Headquarters USAF, "US Air Force Communications Background Sheet on the Nuclear Enterprise," 2009. See also "Perfection isn't the goal, it is the standard," and "Regardless of the size of the nuclear enterprise we are entrusted with, the standard—perfection—remains the same" (ibid.).

64. See CGO survey, tables 5 and 6, G-15–16. See instructor/evaluator focus group responses to question 10, G-45.

inducing conditions; collecting data that show the nature and types of errors occurring; providing training in threat and error management strategies for crews; and providing training and reinforcing threat and error management for instructors and evaluators.[65]


Figure 2. Crew response to human error. (*Image from* Robert L. Helmreich and Ashleigh C. Merritt, "Safety and Error Management: The Role of Crew Resource Management," in *Aviation Resource Management: Proceedings of the Fourth Australian Aviation Psychology Symposium*, eds. Brent J. Hayward and Andrew Lowe [Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2000], 109.)

Second, higher headquarters' emphasis on near-continuous external inspections and evaluations leads ICBM leaders and crews to believe self-evaluation and self-identification of errors are counterproductive.[66] As the CDI focus groups and surveys suggest, this is the result of an organizational culture that viewed training (EWO, weapon system, codes, and MPT training) as an opportunity to test and evaluate crew members.[67] Crew members saw monthly training as a monthly certification process that was not particularly relevant to their alert duties and an arena where errors could result in restriction from mission ready status or disqualify them for coveted promotions to the OSS or the standardization and evaluation shop (OGV).[68] In short, continuous evaluation eliminated the separation between crew member training and evaluation required in

65. Robert L. Helmreich, James R. Klinect, and John A. Wilhelm, "Models of Threat, Error, and CRM in Flight Operations," in *Proceedings of the Tenth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology* (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University, 1999), 678. See also Shaine Thrower, "ICBM Crew Resource Management: Managing Human Error in a Zero-Defect Culture" (Nellis AFB, NV: US Air Force Weapons School, 2010).

66. Air Force Nuclear Task Force, *Reinvigorating the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise* (Washington, DC: Headquarters USAF, 24 Oct 2008), 2.

67. See instructor/evaluator responses to questions 9 and 10, G-44–45.

68. CGO survey and focus group indicate that a clear majority of respondents do not view monthly testing as an accurate assessment of missileer competency, G-27–28. Instructor/evaluator focus group responses to questions 9 and 10 also substantiate this view, G-44–45.

healthy training environments. As a result, some crew members became numb to the training but feared the tests because of the consequences of failure.

Third, this unrealistic expectation of perfection and a relentless schedule of high-stakes outside inspections can bring out the worst in leaders, who may be tempted to try to eliminate errors by imposing oppressive oversight, inspection, and testing regimes on organizations and personnel. Senior leaders who are afraid a single error committed by a junior Airman may lead to a failed evaluation, or the loss of their jobs and reputations, may choose to restrict decision making at lower levels, to make all decisions themselves, and to leave their subordinates feeling underused and undervalued.[69] However, the cyclical record of inspection success and failure in Twentieth AF missile wings suggests that this centralized approach is not sustainable. Aggressive, centralized oversight, inspection, and testing regimes can produce results in the short term, but these measures rely on the will of leaders to sustain the pressure and the capacity of followers to endure it. If the system rewards leaders for achieving short-term results at the expense of long-term unit health and leader development, it teaches the following generations of leaders to adopt successively harsher approaches—further increasing the alienation and dissatisfaction of subordinates.

Fourth, there is a gap between field-grade squadron leadership and first-assignment company-grade crews because missile squadrons are not organized to provide experienced mid-grade supervisors as assistant directors of operations or as flight commanders. Currently, the squadron commanders and operations officers are often the only officers in the tactical squadrons who are *not* in their first assignment. This makes effective mentoring and leadership challenging and can lead to company-grade crews perceiving an us-against-them environment, where they express their primary loyalty to each other instead of to the organization[70] and feel responsible to ensure they survive as a group.[71] This us-against-them culture is not unique to missile wings, but the increased percentage of junior officers in ICBM units exacerbates the situation. The lack of experienced mid-grade leaders also contributes to authoritarian leadership styles; experienced mid-grade leaders provide a mirror that helps keep senior leaders accountable and balances focus on mission *and* people.

---

69. See Claire E. Steele, "Zero-Defect Leaders: No Second Chance?," *Military Review* 84, no. 5 (September/October 2004). See also Shane Thrower, "ICBM Crew Resource Management: Managing Human Error in a Zero-Defect Culture" (Nellis AFB, NV: US Air Force Weapons School, 2010). CGO survey and focus group indicate that a majority of respondents view their squadron leadership as overly involved in day-to-day operations in the missile field. Instructor/evaluator focus group responses to questions 8–10 substantiate this view, G-44–45.

70. This point was substantiated by CGO survey and focus group responses, G-23, G-34, G-44–45.

71. See instructor/evaluator responses to questions 10 and 11, G-40.

Fifth, the current organizational culture and career development flow in missile wings incentivize new missileers to score extremely well on monthly tests (100 percent) so that they can get "off the line" and become an instructor or evaluator in the OSS or OGV as quickly as they can, while performing the fewest number of alerts possible.[72] Deputy crew commanders compete for instructor and evaluator deputy crew commander positions in the OSS and the operations group before returning to missile squadrons as crew commanders. Crew commanders again compete to return to the OSS and Group OGV as instructor or evaluator crew commanders. Instructors and evaluators perform fewer alert tours and have more predictable schedules. This creates a perverse incentive structure that minimizes the incentive to perform well in the field, while maximizing the incentive to perform well on classroom tests seen as the key to instructor or evaluator jobs—tests viewed as poor measures of operational expertise and crew ability to perform while on alert.[73]

Finally, AFGSC and Twentieth AF failed to articulate, distribute, and teach clear guidance on academic integrity and testing expectations.[74] Crew members believed it was acceptable to help their junior teammates make a 100 percent on monthly testing by reviewing their tests and suggesting they "take another look at question seven" or "read question five a little closer."[75] In some cases, instructors provided "free tests" at Christmas or in exchange for help with tedious work like posting changes to technical orders.[76] This cultural emphasis on helping weaker teammates improve their scores blurred the line between acceptable help and unacceptable cheating.[77] Although most crew members believed sharing of actual test questions and answers was wrong, the line between help and cheating became indistinct for some.

Conclusion

The elements of AFGSC, Twentieth AF, and missile wing organizational culture listed below contributed to the 341st MW test compromise incidents:

---

72. A majority of CGO survey and focus group respondents believed that scoring poorly—less than 100 percent—on a test or evaluation would negatively affect career progression. This view was also substantiated by instructor evaluator responses to question 10, G-16 and G-44.
73. See responses to CGO focus group questions 11 and 12, G-27–28. See also responses to instructor/evaluator focus group question 10, G-45.
74. Responses to instructor/evaluator focus group question 3 suggest that instructors had very little clarity on any academic integrity policy, G-41.
75. Instructor/evaluator focus group responses to questions 3, 10, and 11 reflect this view, G-41 and G-45–46.
76. Responses during the CGO focus groups identified these activities, G-22 and G-29.
77. While CGO survey and focus group results suggest that all wings viewed collaboration on testing as acceptable, respondents from the 341st MW indicated a strong penchant for viewing the sharing of test answers as acceptable. Instructor/evaluator focus group responses also substantiated this view, G-19, G-24, G-41–42.

- An unrealistic emphasis on eliminating human error in nuclear operations drives higher headquarters to emphasize near-continuous external inspections and evaluations.
- An overreliance on external inspections and evaluations leads ICBM leaders and crews to believe self-evaluation and self-identification of errors are counterproductive.
- Unrealistic expectations and constant external inspections drive ICBM leadership styles that emphasize centralized oversight, inspection, and testing regimes that alienate subordinates and make them feel less responsible for their own training and development.
- Missile squadron manning and organization drive a gap between field-grade squadron leaders and company-grade crews that contributes to an us-against-them mind-set.
- The crew member career progression model devalues daily alert operations and emphasizes getting off the line to perform instructor or evaluator duty.
- A lack of clear AFGSC and Twentieth AF testing guidance, combined with a cultural emphasis on helping junior crew members score well, blurs the line between acceptable help and unacceptable cheating.

Based on a preponderance of the evidence, the CDI has determined that organizational culture within the AFGSC, Twentieth AF, and the 341st MW played a role in the test compromise activities of ICBM crew members at Malmstrom AFB.

Leadership

Analysis

From the perspective of a young company-grade officer looking up the chain of command, leadership has delivered conflicting messages concerning the need to achieve high test scores and the need to maintain integrity in the classroom.[78] Senior leaders valued extremely high test scores as a measure of their units' preparedness for external inspections and applied significant pressure on units to achieve them, while tacitly condoning the actions of crew commanders and proctors who "take care of" junior crew members.[79]

Crew members also believed training and testing were not administered fairly.[80] In the 90th and 341st MWs, squadron leaders took the monthly tests as a group one month ahead of the monthly cycle. These leaders believed taking the test early allowed them to review and evaluate the questions for reasonability and fairness.[81] However, crew members viewed this approach as

---

78. Instructor/evaluator focus group responses to question 10 identified such conflicting messages, G-45. See also G-49.
79. Ibid.
80. See G-19.
81. See G-50.

unfair. The crew members' view, that leaders do not "practice what they preach" by participating in the same training, testing, and evaluation process they do, contributed to the alienation between crew members and leaders and fostered an us-against-them mentality.[82]

The OSS executes the training and testing process, and evaluators assigned to the OG conduct the evaluations. Missile squadron commanders rarely observed the OSS-directed test environment because they believed their presence in the classroom was disruptive and preferred to observe mission-procedures training sessions in the ICBM simulator.[83] Since almost all ICBM crew members are junior officers serving in their first operational assignment, training and testing were, and still are, delivered by junior officers serving as instructors in the OSS to other junior officers with whom they likely served in a missile squadron. The lack of separation between those administering the test and those taking the test, and the resulting peer pressure, can make it difficult to maintain a proper test environment in all three missile wings.[84] Leadership interviews and instructor focus groups indicate that the 91st MW sought to mitigate this issue by making significant changes to its testing procedures after testing poorly during its March 2013 CUI.[85] While crew members in the 90th MW were more likely than their counterparts in the 341st MW to believe that proper test procedures were regularly followed, the 90th MW's testing procedures were, in reality, similar to those of the 341st MW. What set these two wings apart was the behavior of combat crew members. In the end, leaders from the 341st OG, particularly the 341st OSS commander and his leadership team, failed to provide the oversight required to maintain a proper monthly knowledge testing environment. Eighty-nine crew members chose to exploit that failure by sharing classified or unclassified material. At least 40 of the 89 officers served as instructors at some point, and 20 are currently assigned to the OSS.[86]

However, the 341st OG/CC did not ignore the possibility of corrupted testing environments. After the 91st OG crews scored lower than expected during a March 2013 CUI, a review showed that their extremely high monthly test average did not correlate with their CUI test results. As a result, group leadership refocused its efforts to improve test preparation resources and enhanced test integrity by introducing multiple versions of tests and enforcing stricter proctoring procedures. Leaders of the 341st OG conducted a site visit to Minot AFB, reviewed the 91st OG incident, and determined that the high scores they earned in a September 2012 CUI did, in fact, correlate with their monthly test scores. Because of this correlation, 341st OG leaders did not

82. See F-4.
83. See G-48
84. See instructor/evaluator focus group responses for questions 9–11, G-44–46.
85. See G-24.
86. See Investigative Annex, Section 5, Tab 5.

believe they had a test environment problem.[87] The 341st OG commander did begin to question his group's near-perfect monthly scores in December 2013, but his instructors assured him that he did not have a problem.[88] By January 2014, an AFOSI investigation into drug use by two 341st OG crew members had expanded to include widespread compromise of test materials.

The CDI found that crew perceptions were often consistent across Twentieth AF, but survey data suggested some statistically significant differences in the perceptions of ICBM crew members across the three wings.[89]

Compared to missile crews in the 90th OG (F. E. Warren AFB) and 91st OG (Minot AFB), 341st OG missile crews at Malmstrom were:

- Less likely to completely agree that "prior to the Malmstrom incident, I think monthly knowledge tests were administered in accordance with the rules."[90]
- Less likely to completely disagree that "prior to the Malmstrom incident, sharing monthly test questions was a commonplace practice."[91]
- Less likely to completely disagree that "prior to the Malmstrom incident, the reward for sharing test answers was greater than the consequences."[92]
- Less likely to completely disagree that "my squadron commander values high test scores even at the expense of ethics."[93]

It is difficult to accurately measure the impact of any one individual leader or group of leaders on an organization. Leadership effects are cumulative over time, with each missile wing having its own culture and traditions that persist after leaders depart. CDI witness testimony indicates that leadership responsibility for test compromise activity at Malmstrom should be shared among the current OG leadership team and its predecessors.

---

87. See F-3.

88. See F-3–4.

89. To gain a better understanding of crew members' perceptions about testing, training, and evaluation, the CDI employed a survey and focus groups to sample the perceptions of all three missile wings. The response size and variance allow for 85 percent confidence that the reported percentages reflect the population percentages with a margin of error of ±10 percentage points. To improve our understanding of training, testing, and evaluation across the wings, we also employed focus groups to provide greater context and reliability. The survey is, however, limited in its utility by limited participation at Malmstrom. We attribute lower participation to concerns surrounding the ongoing AFOSI investigation. It is also important to note that the ongoing events at Malmstrom also shaped crew member perceptions—limiting our ability to draw conclusions on differences in perception at the three wings. Survey results are discussed in detail in Tab G.

90. See G-19.

91. Ibid.

92. Ibid.

93. Ibid.

Conclusion

Although there is no evidence that the 341st MW's leadership condoned or had specific knowledge of monthly knowledge test material sharing, the actions of 341st OG leaders contributed to the test compromise at Malmstrom through the following factors:

- ICBM crew members perceived mixed messages from their leaders concerning the need to achieve high test scores and the need to maintain integrity in the classroom.
- Missile squadron commanders in the 341st OG were not actively involved in the OSS-directed monthly currency training and testing process, which prevented their presence in the classroom from deterring some forms of misconduct.
- The 341st OG commander, the 341st OSS commander, and their leadership teams did not provide the oversight required to ensure integrity in monthly knowledge testing.
- Crew members across the Twentieth AF believed training and testing were not administered fairly.
- Crew members in the 341st OG had less confidence in the test environment and the ethics of their commanders than crews from the 90th and 91st OGs.

Based on a preponderance of evidence, the CDI has determined that 341st MW leadership played a role in the compromise of test materials by ICBM crew members at Malmstrom AFB.

Preconditions Related to ICBM Crew Member Training, Testing, and Evaluation

In addition to the effects of organizational culture and leadership, the CDI also examined ICBM training, testing, and evaluation processes in order to recommend ways to deliver a more relevant approach while maintaining surety and the reliability of the ICBM deterrent. Based on our research, several additional preconditions came to light.

Missile Wing Training, Testing, and Evaluation

First, leaders and crews viewed monthly currency training and testing as a monthly certification of squadrons and individual crew members.[94] In short, the separation needed between training and evaluation to facilitate a healthy training environment has been lost.

Second, as discussed in the organizational culture portion of the report, an emphasis on external evaluation makes ICBM personnel less likely to self-identify errors. When combined with a monthly currency training and testing process that is administered by instructors at the OSS,

---

94. See G-23--25.

ICBM crews have become passive receivers of training who are not given enough responsibility for individual and crew training.

Third, both leaders and missile crew members value the MQT delivered to new crew members at missile wings, and they believe the monthly training process (study packet, practice test, and classroom session) adequately prepares crew members to pass monthly tests with the required minimum score of 90 percent.[95] However, crew members believe that monthly knowledge tests are not relevant measures of their operational proficiency and that, because test scores provide an easy quantitative way for leadership to discriminate between crew members, commanders place too much importance on them.[96]

The stakes are high for crew members who fail monthly tests. Currently, crew members face 36 monthly tests a year covering three subjects, plus a monthly MPT training session and an annual evaluation. Failure in any of these roughly 50 events leads to embarrassing restriction from mission-ready status until the crew member is retrained and reevaluated. However, very few crew members fail monthly tests. All three wings maintain a test average above 98 percent.

Fourth, monthly test scores take on exaggerated importance because of two factors: leadership pressure to show a very high unit average (to stay prepared for inspections), and the ICBM career progression model that emphasizes moving quickly from operational deputy crew commander to instructor or evaluator deputy crew commander.[97] Since crew members believe their leaders place too much emphasis on monthly test scores in that selection process, they believe they must make a 100 percent on every test to remain competitive.[98]

Fifth, crew training is focused on individual skills during classroom sessions and crew skills during MPT sessions. However, crews conduct daily alert operations—and would conduct their wartime mission—as part of a team that includes five crews (one crew in a squadron command post and four crews in LCCs), facility managers, chefs, security forces teams, and maintenance teams. Current ICBM training aids support little to no team training. ICBM crews do not train the way they operate or the way they would fight.[99] The Crew Resource Management principles developed in response to aviation incidents can provide a starting point for ICBM team training.

Finally, monthly currency training delivers the same content to missile crew commanders and deputy crew commanders and requires them to take the same tests. In reality, there is a great deal

---

95. See G-48.
96. See G-28.
97. See G-16, 23, and 25.
98. See G-49.
99. Ibid.

of difference in the knowledge and ability of a first-year deputy crew commander and a fourth-year crew commander. As a result, training is either too challenging for new crew members or not challenging enough for experienced crew members.[100] The experience mismatch discourages deputy crew commanders from asking questions and adds extra pressure on crew commanders to help their deputies during testing.[101]

In summary, the missile wing training preconditions listed below were factors in the compromise of test materials by ICBM crew members at Malmstrom AFB:

- There is not enough separation between ICBM training and evaluation processes.
- Crew members are not encouraged to take responsibility for their own training.
- ICBM crews do not train the way they operate daily or the way they would fight.
- Crew members across Twentieth AF do not believe monthly knowledge tests provide an accurate measure of a crew member's operational skills and performance.[102]
- Crew members across Twentieth AF believe leadership overemphasizes receiving a 100 percent on monthly test scores for individual progression and squadron assessment.[103]
- Requiring crew commanders and less-experienced deputy crew commanders to participate in identical training and take identical tests does not reflect the reality of their relative experience and knowledge levels.

Initial Skills Training (IST) Conducted at Vandenberg AFB

The 381st TRG conducts a 100-day training course that delivers motivated and capable missile crew members to Twentieth AF missile wings. The course was expanded from 69 to 100 training days in 2013 and provides officership, weapon system, codes, and EWO training in the classroom and the mission procedures trainer. Twentieth AF is an active participant in IST syllabus development and recognizes the course's final MPT evaluation as a Twentieth AF mission evaluation.

Students receive instruction on the AETC academic integrity policy, and tests are conducted in accordance with policy. CDI focus groups did reveal evidence that instructors at Vandenberg conditioned some students to expect help on tests when they arrived in Twentieth AF missile wings and to expect pressure to score a 100 percent on monthly tests.

---

100. See G-30.
101. See G-23 and 45.
102. See instructor/evaluator focus group responses to questions 4 and 12, G-42 and G-46.
103. See instructor/evaluator focus group responses to questions 8–10, G-44–45.

Air Force Precommissioning Training

ICBM crew members are drawn from all three Air Force commissioning sources: the US Air Force Academy (USAFA), Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), and Officer Training School (OTS). All three sources employ honor codes that prohibit lying, stealing, or cheating or toleration of those who engage in such activities. All three sources commit training time to explain and teach their codes.[104] The ICBM crew members who chose to compromise test materials at Malmstrom were also trained at all three commissioning sources.

Why did nearly 100 young officers decide to break the prohibition against cheating, which is proscribed by these honor codes and Air Force core values? Young Americans are *in* the Air Force from the moment they take their initial oaths of enlistment prior to basic or precommissioning training; however, they do not actually *join* the Air Force until they accept the Air Force core values of *Integrity First, Service before Self, and Excellence in All We Do* as their own. An Airman's first bond is forged with his or her fellow trainees during basic or precommissioning training. Here, they learn to work together to meet the challenges posed by their trainers. They form their second bond to their first unit as they learn their role in meeting the unit's mission requirements. Finally, they *join* the bigger Air Force and feel connected to the organization and the values shared by Airmen. The timing of this transition is different for each Airman, but much of the transition takes place during first assignments and should be guided by first-assignment supervisors and commanders; 75 of the 98 officers implicated in the test material compromise were 1st or 2nd lieutenants in the early stages of this transition.

The classic Air Force squadron structure provides a commander supported by an operations officer, superintendent, first sergeant, and subordinate flight commanders, section commanders, section chiefs, or noncommissioned officers in charge. These leaders are charged with directing the daily business of the squadron and developing the unit's Airmen. In the absence of this classic leadership structure, inexperienced officers rely on their own judgment to determine an acceptable compromise between their requirement to maintain "integrity first" and their promise to "never leave a wingman behind."

ICBM squadrons possess about 40 CGOs and only two, or maybe three, experienced field-grade officers. As previously discussed, this gap between field-grade leaders and company-grade crew members, when combined with a culture that does not reward initiative, can delay the transition from bonding with fellow junior officers to bonding with the unit and organization. Rebuilding a classic Air Force squadron structure by adding additional experienced supervisors as assistant

---

104. See G-149–158.

operations officers and flight commanders and providing additional leadership responsibilities and opportunities for crew members will help ICBM crew members make the transition from being *in* the Air Force to *joining* the Air Force.

Misconduct

The previous three sections describe the holes or flaws in the organizational culture, leadership, and preconditional layers within Twentieth AF and the 341st MW. By design, each layer acts as a defense against potential misconduct. While each individual layer is imperfect and unable to prevent all forms of misconduct, the combination of layers is designed to give the system strength and, collectively, prevent misconduct. In this case, the flaws in each layer aligned to allow a system failure.

Most of the factors present in the 341st MW were also present in the 90th and 91st MWs. However, there is no evidence that crew members in those wings participated in widespread compromise. Explaining why this misconduct occurred in the 341st MW and not in the other two wings is difficult and would require speculation. Undoubtedly, each of the officers involved were motivated by varying factors that they alone understand.

Of the 15 officers who committed all three offenses—sending, soliciting, and receiving compromised test materials—four were at the center of the web that linked the 98 implicated crew members together. Three of these four are also implicated in continuing AFOSI investigations into sharing of classified test materials, and one of the four is implicated in illegal drug use. The presence of these four junior Airmen at Malmstrom must also be considered a factor in the widespread compromise of test materials in the 341st OG.[105]

The ubiquitous presence of, and comfort with, smart phones among junior officers also affected events at Malmstrom. The ability to rapidly and discretely transmit texts and photos to individuals or groups made the network that supported widespread compromise possible. Smart phones did not cause the cheating, but they made it possible in ways supervisors had not considered.

In summary, the following two preconditions were factors in the compromise of monthly knowledge testing materials in the 341st OG:

- The presence of the four missile crew members in the center of the network that facilitated wholesale compromise of test materials had a corrosive effect on the larger group of Airmen involved in compromise of knowledge tests.

---

105. See Tab L.

- The wide availability of smart phones made it easy to discretely pass monthly knowledge test information between crew members in ways supervisors had not considered.[106]

---

106. See instructor/evaluator focus group responses to question 7, G-43--44.

Tab E

Recommendations

Before we offer specific recommendations, it is important to realize that the current ICBM training, testing, and evaluation system is a rational response to the existing ICBM inspection regime. Senior leaders developed the monthly training and certification process for the purpose of ensuring that MCCMs are prepared for no-notice AFGSC, Twentieth AF, and wing inspector general testing at any moment. When this process is executed with vigor and discipline, it delivers on the requirement to ensure that ICBM crew members remain ready for inspections. Experience has shown, however, that the pressure and pace required to execute the current process are unsustainable.

CDI team focus groups and interviews show that ICBM leaders and crews believe there are better ways to deliver relevant, effective, and efficient training that will still develop reliable crew members with the skills and judgment required to deliver "perfect performance in the field through teamwork" by mitigating and capturing human errors as a team. However, significant and lasting improvements to missile crew culture, training, testing, and evaluation are only possible if higher headquarters adjust inspection criteria and regulatory requirements, focusing on the performance of alert and EWO tasks in the LCC and MPT—with less emphasis on classroom testing and knowledge tests.

The ideas presented here as recommendations were almost all suggested by current ICBM leaders, instructors, and crew members. Some of these ideas were tried before but failed because leaders did not prepare an execution plan that assured the supporting elements required for success were in place. The recommendations are divided into four main categories: reforming organizational culture, empowering crew commanders, improving the quality and purpose of training, and reforming testing and evaluation.

Reforming Organizational Culture

Realign ICBM culture to focus on empowering squadron commanders, flight commanders, and crew commanders to take responsibility for ICBM operations and crew training. Emphasize alert force proficiency as the measure of merit for ICBM crew members.

- Enhance squadron and flight commanders' roles in directing squadron mission planning and operations. Begin to create a culture of critical self-assessment by establishing trust, adopting a credible, non-punitive policy toward error, demonstrating commitment to take action to reduce error-inducing conditions, and collecting data that show the nature and types of errors occurring.

- Support squadron commanders by implementing a classic Air Force squadron structure in operational missile squadrons. Provide more mid-level leadership by retaining more experienced crew members for multiple combat crew tours and assigning them as assistant operations officers, weapons officers, and flight commanders.
- Schedule and perform alerts as a team of five crews from a single flight to build teamwork and empower and develop flight commanders and deputy flight commanders.
- Expand Combat Mission Ready (CMR) positions to include all missileers within the OGs and Twentieth AF/A3N. Every qualified missileer in the OG, from the group commander down, should perform alert tours and be proficient in missile field duties. Every CMR missileer should participate in the same training and testing.
- Institutionalize squadron command post (SCP) and alternate command post (ACP) roles and responsibilities and provide comprehensive upgrade training to ensure that SCP and ACP crews are prepared and competent.
- Focus junior crews on alert crew proficiency by eliminating deputy crew commander instructor and evaluator positions. Crew members should upgrade from deputy crew commander to crew commander and then, potentially, instructor or evaluator.
- Formalize mandatory eligibility criteria for crew commander, instructor, and evaluator positions based on number of alert tours and/or months of service in alert duties, the current guidance is optional and not utilized by all missile wings.
- Celebrate alert tour milestones with patches and ceremonies at intervals of 100 alert tours.
- Publish, teach, and support an AFGSC or Twentieth AF academic integrity policy. Ensure all Airmen understand the expectation of integrity in the classroom and on alert. The recently published AETC academic integrity policy can provide a starting point.
- Conduct periodic competitions between Twentieth AF operational missile wings. Emphasize crew performance and teamwork in the competitions.

Empowering Crew Commanders

Empower crew commanders by providing additional leadership opportunities and making them responsible for developing the skills and knowledge of their crew. Assign squadron weapons officers the responsibility to prepare crew commanders to direct their crew training and development.

- Provide a curriculum covering critical operational and knowledge requirements that should be taught to new deputy commanders during their first year. Build a "dance card" defining learning objectives that must be completed and certified by an instructor,

evaluator, or flight commander prior to beginning formal crew commander upgrade training.

- Extend crew pairings to 9–12 months so that crew commanders can develop and execute long-term training plans and monitor their deputy crew commander's training.
- Reduce crew member travel time, improve alert effectiveness, and expand training opportunities by realigning alert schedules to deploy two missile crews together to conduct 12-hour shifts covering a 72-hour alert period.
- Build teamwork and relationships among operations, maintenance, support, security forces, and medical personnel at lower levels by aligning field tour lengths and assigning missile crews as leaders of multifunction teams for the 72-hour alert period.

Improving the Quality and Purpose of Training

Review all training requirements and ensure training is relevant to crew duties and delivered in the right environment. Ensure all instructors are adequately trained and provide additional training tools and opportunities.

- Review all ICBM training requirements and review and redesign the JPR training requirements to identify JPRs best taught in the LCC, the classroom, or the MPT.
- Remove those JPRs which are performed regularly on alert or are best taught in the MPT from classroom training, allowing them to be completed and signed off by an instructor or evaluator during alert tours and MPT training sessions.
- Reform the Annual Training Evaluation Plan (ATEP) in accordance with the redesigned JPRs to create relevant monthly training blocks, but allow missile wings discretion to schedule the monthly blocks to meet local evaluation and inspection cycles.
- Tailor remaining classroom training to fit specific crew commander and deputy crew commander requirements by conducting training in two sessions: one for crew commanders and one for deputy crew commanders.
- Unify weapon system, codes, and EWO training by creating a position for an OSS chief of training responsible for the design and development of all instructional and test materials for monthly, quarterly, and upgrade training and by working in conjunction with OSS senior crew members and weapons officers to validate all training products before they are administered to students.
- Ensure all OSS/OGV instructors and evaluators are properly trained, either by having them attend the basic instructor course (BIC) or building improved Twentieth AF ICBM Center for Excellence (ICE) courses.
- Schedule a second MPT session each month to allow crew commanders to lead training that addresses specific crew weaknesses or focuses on practicing and mastering specific

procedures. Build and provide the training required to prepare crew commanders to plan and execute training in the MPT.

- Develop computer-based training tools to augment MPT sessions and facilitate crew commander training efforts.
- Institute CRM training focused on reinforcing threat and error management strategies. Emphasize CRM practices during all crew training, beginning in IST.

Reforming Testing and Evaluation

Create a new testing plan that includes monthly testing limited to critical knowledge "bold-face" requirements, quarterly testing built on master question file (MQF) questions that sample knowledge of quarterly JPR requirements, and annual testing built around annual evaluations.

- Monthly knowledge testing should be limited to evaluating critical EWO copying, decoding, validating, and authenticating skills and critical code handling knowledge. Most other EWO JPRs can be demonstrated and evaluated in the MPT.
- Create an MQF for EWO, codes, and weapon system tests that is owned and updated by Twentieth AF. Ensure that all testing supports training and evaluation by distinguishing between testing aimed at measuring currency and knowledge.
- Draw from the Twentieth AF–developed MQF to build quarterly tests that are focused on JPRs trained during that quarter and emphasize safety, security, and the ability to ensure that a weapon can be delivered on time and on target.
- Conduct annual open book and MQF-based closed book tests as part of annual crew member evaluations.
- Reduce the emphasis on scoring 100 percent on tests by making all monthly and quarterly testing pass/fail or allowing crews to take the test together as a team.

Tab F
Summarized Testimony

Malmstrom

F-1.   Col (b)(7)(C)

F-2.   Lt Col (b)(7)(C)

F-3.   Lt Col (b)(7)(C)

F-4.   Lt Col (b)(7)(C)

F-5.   Lt Col (b)(7)(C)

F-6.   Lt Col (b)(7)(C)

F-7.   Maj (b)(7)(C)

F-8.   Maj (b)(7)(C)

F-9.   Capt (b)(7)(C)

F-10.   Capt (b)(7)(C)

F-11.   Capt (b)(7)(C)

FE Warren

F-12.   Col (b)(7)(C)

SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY OF COLONEL [(b)(7)(C)] – 2014-02-15

Col [(b)(7)(C)] appeared at the investigation, was sworn, and testified substantially as follows:

I am Col [(b)(7)(C)] and the [(b)(7)(C)] I have been in the Air Force for 22 ½ years with about 10 ½ years of missile experience.

(b)(7)(A)

Judge Advocate Initials [(b)(6)]

Member's Initials [(b)(7)(C)]

(b)(7)(A)

Judge Advocate Initials (b)(6)

Member's Initials (b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(A)

Judge Advocate Initials (b)(6)

Members (b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(A)

Judge Advocate Initials (b)(6)

Member's Initials (b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(A)

Judge Advocate Initials (b)(6)

Member's Initials (b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(A)

Judge Advocate Initials (b)(6)

Member's Initials (b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(A)

Judge Advocate Initials (b)(6)

Member's Initials (b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(A)..

//signed//

(b)(7)(C)..

(b)(7)(C)..

Colonel, USAF

(b)(7)(C)

Pg 8 of 9

Judge Advocate Initials (b)(6)..

Member's Initials (b)(7)(C)..

Pg 9.89

I declare under penalty that the foregoing in a true and correct summary of the testimony given by the witness. Executed at 0756 hrs at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana, on 15 February 2014.

//signed//

JAMES M. HOLMES
Lieutenant General, USAF
Investigating Officer

I declare under penalty that Colonel (b)(7)(C) appeared before me and swore that the foregoing is a true and correct summary of the testimony given by the witness. Executed at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana, on 19 February 2014.

(b)(6)

//signed//

Captain, USAF
Judge Advocate

SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY OF LT COL [(b)(7)(C)] – 2014-02-14

Lt Col [(b)(7)(C)] appeared at the investigation, was sworn, and testified substantially as follows:

I am Lt Col [(b)(7)(C)] and the [(b)(7)(C)]. I have been in the Air Force for 21 years with about 12 years of missile experience.

(b)(7)(A)

Page 1 of 4. Member Initials [(b)(7)(C)] Judge Advocate Initials [(b)(6)]

(b)(7)(A)

(b)(7)(A)..

(b)(7)(C).. (b)(6)..

(b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(C)   Lt Col, USAF

I declare under penalty that the foregoing in a true and correct summary of the testimony given by the witness. Executed at 0915 hrs at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana, on 14 February 2014.

//signed//

JAMES M. HOLMES
Lieutenant General, USAF
Investigating Officer

I declare under penalty that Lieutenant Colonel [(b)(7)(C)] appeared before me and swore that the foregoing is a true and correct summary of the testimony given by the witness. Executed at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana, on 19 February 2014.

//signed//

Captain, USAF
Judge Advocate

SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY OF LT COL [(b)(7)(C)] – 2014-02-13

Lt Col [(b)(7)(C)] appeared at the investigation, was sworn, and testified substantially as follows.

I am Lt Col [(b)(7)(C)] and the [(b)(7)(C)] I have been in the Air Force for 17 years with 8 years of missile experience. I'm currently in a non-CMR billet as the [(b)(7)(C)].

[(b)(7)(A)]

(b)(7)(A)..

(b)(7)(A)..

(b)(7)(A)

(b)(7)(C)

//signed//

(b)(7)(C)   Lt Col, USAF

(b)(7)(C)

I declare under penalty that the foregoing in a true and correct summary of the testimony given by the witness. Executed at 0909 hrs at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana, on 13 February 2014.

//signed//

JAMES M. HOLMES,
Lieutenant General, USAF
Investigating Officer

SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY OF LT COL [(b)(7)(C),.] 2014-02-13

Lt Col [(b)(7)(C),.] appeared at the investigation, was sworn, and testified substantially as follows:

I am Lt Col [(b)(7)(C),.] the [(b)(7)(C),.] I have been in the Air Force for 19 years with about 15 years of missile experience.

[(b)(7)(A),.]

(b)(7)(A)

(b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(C) Lt Col, USAF

(b)(7)(C)

I declare under penalty that the foregoing is a true and correct summary of the testimony given by the witness. Executed at 1541 hrs at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana, on 13 February 2014.

//signed//

JAMES M. HOLMES
Lieutenant General, USAF
Investigating Officer

I declare under penalty that Lieutenant Colonel [(b)(7)(C)] appeared before me and swore that the foregoing is a true and correct summary of the testimony given by the witness. Executed at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana, on 18 February 2014.

(b)(6)

//signed//

Captain, USAF
Judge Advocate

SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY OF LT COL [(b)(7)(C)..] – 2014-02-13

Lt Col [(b)(7)(C)..] appeared at the investigation, was sworn, and testified substantially as follows:

I am Lt Col [(b)(7)(C)..] and the [(b)(7)(C)..] I have been in the Air Force for 20 years with 14 years of missile experience.

[(b)(7)(A)..]

(b)(7)(A)

(b)(7)(C)

//signed//

(b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(C)

Lt Col, USAF

I declare under penalty that the foregoing in a true and correct summary of the testimony given by the witness. Executed at 1415 hrs at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana, on 13 February 2014.

//signed//

JAMES M. HOLMES,
Lieutenant General, USAF
Investigating Officer

I declare under penalty that Lieutenant Colonel [(b)(7)(C)] appeared before me and swore that the foregoing is a true and correct summary of the testimony given by the witness. Executed at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana, on 18 February 2014.

(b)(6)

//signed//

Captain, USAF
Judge Advocate

SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY OF LT COL [(b)(7)(C)] - 2014-02-13

Lt Col [(b)(7)(C)] appeared at the investigation, was sworn, and testified substantially as follows:

I am Lt Col [(b)(7)(C)] and the [(b)(7)(C)] I have been in the Air Force for 18 years with 10.5 years of missile experience.

[(b)(7)(A)]

(b)(7)(A)..

(b)(7)(C).. //signed//

(b)(7)(C) Lt Col, USAF

(b)(7)(C)

I declare under penalty that the foregoing in a true and correct summary of the testimony given by the witness. Executed at 1253 hrs at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana, on 13 February 2014.

//signed//

JAMES M. HOLMES,
Lieutenant General, USAF
Investigating Officer

I declare under penalty that Lt Col [(b)(7)(C)..] appeared before me and swore that the foregoing is a true and correct summary of the testimony given by the witness. Executed at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana, on 24 February 2014.

(b)(6)..

//signed//

Captain, USAF
Judge Advocate

SUMMARIED TESTIMONY OF MAJOR (b)(7)(C)..

Maj (b)(7)(C).. appeared at the investigation, was sworn, and testified substantially as follows:

I, Major (b)(7)(C).. am the current (b)(7)(C).. Malmstrom AFB, Montana. I have been in this position since September of 2013. (b)(7)(A)..

(b)(7)(A)..

F-32

(b)(7)(A)

(b)(7)(C)

//signed//

Maj, USAF

I declare under penalty that the foregoing in a true and correct summary of the testimony by the witness. Executed at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana, on 13 Feb 2014.

(b)(7)(C)

Col, USAF
Investigating Officer

I declare under penalty that Major [(b)(7)(C)] appeared before me and swore that the foregoing is a true and correct summary of the testimony given by the witness. Executed at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana, on 20 February 2014.

[(b)(6)]
//signed//

Captain, USAF
Judge Advocate

SUMMARIED TESTIMONY OF MAJOR [(b)(7)(C)..]

Maj [(b)(7)(C)..] appeared at the investigation, was sworn, and testified substantially as follows:

I, Major [(b)(7)(C)..] am the current [(b)(7)(C)..] [(b)(7)(C)..] Malmstrom AFB, Montana. I have been in this position since August of 2013. [(b)(7)(A)..]

[(b)(7)(A)..]

Page _1_ of _3_. Member Initials _[(b)(7)(C)..]_ Investigating Officer Initials [(b)(6)..] _Judge Advocate_ [(b)(6)..]

(b)(7)(A)..

(b)(7)(A)..

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana, on ~~13~~ Feb 2014.

2c (b)(7)(C)..

(b)(7)(C)..

//signed//

Maj, USAF

I declare under penalty that the foregoing in a true and correct summary of the testimony by the witness. Executed at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana, on 13 Feb 2014.

(b)(6)..

Col, USAF

Investigating Officer

I declare under penalty that Major (b)(7)(C) appeared before me and swore that the foregoing is a true and correct summary of the testimony given by the witness. Executed at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana, on 20 February 2014.

(b)(6)

//signed//

Captain, USAF
Judge Advocate

SUMMARIED TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN [(b)(7)(C)..]

Capt [(b)(7)(C)..] appeared at the investigation, was sworn, and testified substantially as follows:

I, Captain [(b)(7)(C)..], am the current [(b)(7)(C)..] [(b)(7)(C)..] Malmstrom AFB, Montana. I have been in this position since April 2013. [(b)(7)(A)]

[(b)(7)(A)]

(b)(7)(A)..

(b)(7)(C).. //signed//

(b)(7)(C).. Capt, USAF

Page 2 of 2. Member Initials (b)(7)(C).. Judge Advocate Initials (b)(6)..

Capt [(b)(7)(C)..] *appeared before me and swore that*

I declare under penalty that the foregoing in a true and correct summary of the testimony by the witness.
Executed at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana, on *20* Feb 2014.

(b)(6)..

//signed//

(b)(6)..   Capt, USAF
Assistant Staff Judge Advocate

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS 341ST MISSILE WING (AFGSC)

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM: Chief, OSBT

SUBJECT: CODES INSTRUCTOR CERTIFICATION

Congratulations! You have been selected for duty as a codes instructor. Your projected certification date is _____.
Prior to certification, accomplish the following:

TASK	SELECTEE INITIALS	INSTRUCTOR INITIALS/DATE
a. Complete Initial Instructor Training requirements. per AFGSCI 13-5301 Vol 5 chapter 3 (**Sign off CFETP**) J:\OSB_ALL\TRAIN\Controller Training\Instructors program\Certification\Instructor Materials\Initial Instructor Quarterly Training.ppt		
b. Be knowledgeable of OSB Operations Management Guide, 341 MW OPLAN 405-10, EAP STRAT Vol 16, Vol 16 Annex A J:\OSB_ALL\TRAIN\Regulations		
c. Be knowledgeable of the following training specific materials:		
1. OSB Master Lesson Plans (see Mr. (b)(6))		
2. AFGSCI 13-5301 Vol 5 and Vol 1 J:\OSB_ALL\TRAIN\Regulations		
3. AFI36-2201 J:\OSB_ALL\TRAIN\Regulations or (E-Pubs)		
d. Observe a minimum of one recurring codes class and accomplish documentation procedures.		
e. Observe a minimum of one class other than recurring training. (T64, T5, ICT)		
f. Attend instructor training course Internal or External (Mandatory prior to appointment) Course Name: _____ http://www.teledogic.net/AFIAOL/Lesson01/378_io_isd.inter_01.htm		
g. Instruct two classes under observation.		

Upon completion of the above requirements and approval by
the Senior Code Controller, you will be certified as a codes instructor.
Initial your GG instructor qualifications in

(b)(6) Civ, USAF
Asst. Chief, Wing Codes Training

APPROVED: _____ DATE _____

(b)(6) Maj, USAF
Senior Code Controller, ICBM Wing Codes Flight

J:\OSB_ALL\TRAIN\Controller Training Program\Instructors program\Instructor Certification\Instructor Materials\Instructor Certification
Requirements

Page 4 of 5   Member Initials (b)(7)(C)   Judge Advocate Initials (b)(6)

341 OSS/OSB

CODE HANDLER TEST – AUG 2013

Objective: Upon completion of self study using a monthly study package prior to class and upon receipt of classroom training concerning code handling procedures and control concepts, each code handler will complete this multiple choice test. Minimum passing score is 90%. Those who score less than 90% will be restricted from performing code handler duties until retraining and retesting can be performed. EAP-STRAT VOLUME 16 will be available when applicable.

Note: For a 20-question test, each question is worth 5 points!

Time Required: 60 Minutes

Materials: test, answer sheet, pen or pencil, EAP STRAT VOL 16 (Chapters 2, 3, 4, 7, 13, 14, 15, Attach 4 & 5)

INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING THIS TEST

1. Clear all items from the desk/table, except for required materials.
2. Use individual effort to complete this test.
3. Read each question thoroughly.
4. Select the answer that **most correctly** answers the question.
5. Fill in the corresponding space on the answer sheet.
6. **Direct any questions to the instructor (ONE AT A TIME).**
7. Return the test and completed answer sheet to the instructor.

<u>Note:</u> **All code components are considered operationally coded and have processed operational codes unless otherwise indicated.**

II. SUGGESTED TESTING TECHNIQUES

1. **READ THE QUESTION** carefully before making a selection.
2. If a question is unclear, ask the instructor!
3. Plug the answer back into the question to see if it makes sense.
4. Always ensure that you have not **mis-marked** your answer sheet!
5. Ensure the number of answers equals the number of questions.
6. Don't mark answer "e" if it is not a possible choice.
7. Go through the test three times.
   a. The first time, write your answers in letter form in the right margin of your answer sheet.
   b. The second time, put an "X" in the corresponding space.
   c. The third time, change any discrepancies and darken in the correct spaces.

Written by: Capt (b)(6)

COORDINATION:

TR	OSBQ
OSBT	OSM
SE	OSB

SUMMARIED TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN [(b)(7)(C)]

Capt [(b)(7)(C)] appeared at the investigation, was sworn, and testified substantially as follows:

I, Captain [(b)(7)(C)] am the current [(b)(7)(C)] [(b)(7)(C)] Malmstrom AFB, Montana. I have been in this section since June of 2013 and became the [(b)(7)(C)] in late October 2013. [(b)(7)(A)]

[(b)(7)(A)]

(b)(7)(A)..

(b)(7)(A)..

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana, on __18__ Feb 2014.

//signed//

(b)(7)(C)..

Capt, USAF

(b)(7)(C)

the above named witness swore that

I declare under penalty that the foregoing in a true and correct summary of the testimony by the witness. Executed at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana, on __18__ Feb 2014.

//signed//

(b)(6)..

Capt, USAF

Assistant Staff Judge Advocate

Page 3 of 3. Member Initials (b)(7)(C).. Judge Advocate Initials (b)(6)..

SUMMARIED TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN [(b)(7)(C)..]

Capt [(b)(7)(C)..] appeared at the investigation, was sworn, and testified substantially as follows:

I. Captain [(b)(7)(C)..] am the current [(b)(7)(C)..] [(b)(7)(C)..] Malmstrom AFB, Montana. I have been in this position since the end of October 2013. [(b)(7)(A)..]

[(b)(7)(A)..]

F-47

(b)(7)(A)..

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana, on _20_ Feb 2014.

//signed//

Capt, USAF

(b)(7)(C)..

Capt *Appeared before me and swore that*

I declare under penalty that the foregoing in a true and correct summary of the testimony by the witness. Executed at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana, on _20_ Feb 2014.

(b)(6)..

Capt, USAF
Assistant Staff Judge Advocate

Page _2_ of _2_ Member Initials [(b)(7)(C)..] Judge Advocate Initials [(b)(6)..]

SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY OF COLONEL (b)(7)(C)

Col (b)(7)(C) appeared before the investigation, was sworn, and testified substantially as follows:

I, Colonel (b)(7)(C) am the current (b)(7)(C) at FE Warren AFB, WY. I have been in this position for two and half years. (b)(7)(A)

(b)(7)(A)

(b)(7)(A)

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed at FE Warren Air Force Base, WY on 21 February 2014.

//signed//

(b)(7)(C)   Col, USAF

I declare under penalty that the foregoing in a true and correct summary of the testimony by the witness. Executed at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana, on 21 February 2014.

//signed//

(b)(7)(C)   Col, USAF
Investigating Officer

Page 2 of 2 Member Initials   (b)(7)(C)   Judge Advocate Initial   (b)(6)

Tab G

Twentieth AF 13N CGO Focus Group and Survey Data

Introduction

The CDI selected specific research tools to fully investigate the circumstances and causes of the Malmstrom AFB test compromise, including company-grade officer (CGO) perspectives on training and testing culture, leadership environment and oversight, and missile combat crew culture. The tools used to conduct the assessment of Twentieth AF 13N CGOs' perspectives were focus groups and a mass survey. The survey was sent to all current CGOs in nuclear and missile operations (13N) Officer Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC) who fall under Twentieth AF. Securing a high response rate to a survey can be difficult; however, focus groups were completed in conjunction with the survey to bring depth and details into the investigation and ensure reliable and valid conclusions. Out of the approximately 625 13N CGOs who received an invitation to complete the survey, 249 missileers participated. As their area defense counsel (ADC) advised them not to take the survey, 98 of the 625 possible CGOs were disqualified from taking the survey. Focus groups were conducted at each of the three missile wings—the 341st, 91st, and 90th. The CDI also conducted focus groups at the 381st TRG at Vandenberg AFB.

Findings from the focus groups and survey were organized into four categories: leadership environment and oversight, training effectiveness, monthly currency assessments, and missileer culture. The full results may be found on the following pages. A summary of those findings is included below.

Leadership Environment and Oversight

Survey and focus group findings indicate that missile crews believe misbehavior within squadrons, such as test collaboration, was known at the squadron leadership level. While the majority of respondents did not believe that their squadron commanders value high test scores at the expense of ethics, wing responses differed significantly. A higher level of respondents at the 341st MW agreed at some level that squadron commanders value high test scores even at the expense of ethics. Focus group and survey findings also indicated a perception among CGOs that squadron leadership is excessively involved in day-to-day field operations. When it comes to the perception held by CGOs of whether or not squadron commanders participate in monthly training and testing the same way as missileers, the majority of survey respondents and the focus groups indicate that squadron commanders do not test or train the same as missileers. Overall, opinion seemed positive for squadron-level leadership among survey respondents and focus groups, but survey comments and focus groups indicate a less favorable opinion of OG leadership at the 341st MW.

Training Effectiveness

Survey responses were positive about the effectiveness of IST and MQT, with focus group findings corroborating the positive response to IST. The perception of the effectiveness of monthly training to prepare missileers to perform their primary mission was split, with approximately 40 percent of respondents agreeing at some level and 40 percent disagreeing at

some level. Survey findings indicate that monthly training is effective in preparing missileers for the monthly tests; however, focus group and survey findings indicate that CGOs do not believe the monthly tests provide an accurate assessment of their competency as missileers and believe that doing well on monthly tests does not translate to field performance.

Monthly Currency Assessments

Focus groups and survey findings consistently acknowledged the importance placed on perfection in testing and evaluations within the missileer environment and culture. All focus groups held the common belief that poor test scores, even if a missileer passed, would negatively affect career progression. Survey and focus group findings indicate a preference for crew testing, as opposed to individual testing, within the missile CGO community. In regard to the Malmstrom test incident, the survey results and focus group findings suggest differing cultures among the wings. While over 75 percent of respondents from the 90th MW and 91st MW agreed at some level that the monthly currency tests were administered in accordance with the rules prior to the Malmstrom incident, only 49 percent of the 341st MW respondents agreed at some level. This would indicate that prior to the Malmstrom incident, the testing environment at Malmstrom was likely not as controlled or that tests were not administered according to guidance. While the majority of respondents disagreed with the statement that, prior to the Malmstrom incident, sharing monthly test answers was a commonplace practice and that the reward for sharing test questions was greater than the consequences, the respondents at the 341st MW indicated otherwise; 38.3 percent agreed at some level that sharing monthly test answers was a commonplace practice and 42.4 percent agreed at some level that the reward for sharing test questions was greater than the consequences. While focus group findings indicated that all wings viewed some collaboration as acceptable (i.e., recheck test question 10), the 341st MW respondents viewed sharing test questions and answers as acceptable prior to the Malmstrom incident. As the 341st MW survey respondents were not under investigation and may not have necessarily been personally involved with test misconduct, the survey findings suggest the majority of 341st MW crew members were aware of test misconduct.

Missileer Culture

When asked about loyalty to crew members compared to the Air Force as a whole, slightly more respondents disagreed at some level with the statement that they felt more loyal to fellow crew members (39 percent of respondents disagreed at some level compared to the 29 percent of respondents who agreed at some level). Focus group findings indicated a culture of "us versus them" among missileer crew members, with loyalty often strongest for crewmates. The expected loyalty in missileer culture carries over to turning in fellow missileers for breaking rules, with 73.5 percent of respondents agreeing at some level that if they turned in a fellow missileer for breaking a rule, it would negatively impact how other crew members treated them. This indicates reluctance in the missile community to turn in missileers who may break the rules. However, the majority of respondents disagree at some level that they would be willing to bend rules to help a fellow missileer if that missileer needed their help. Similarly, the majority of survey respondents agreed at some level that they would be willing to turn in a fellow missileer for breaking a rule. This finding was corroborated by focus group findings that suggest loyalty would allow for a

crew member to bend minor rules but that loyalty would only go so far, and missileers would be willing to turn in another missileer if he or she crossed any particular "lines." In contrast, only 40 percent of respondents believed that their peers would be willing to turn in a fellow missileer for breaking a rule.

Twentieth AF Missile Testing, Training, and Environment Survey Methodology

To research the perspectives of the Twentieth AF operational missile CGOs on the circumstances and causes of the Malmstrom AFB test compromise, including but not limited to training and testing culture and leadership environment and oversight, the CDI administered a 28-question cross-sectional survey utilizing a five-point Likert scale. The answer choices ranged from completely disagree to completely agree with a no response button also available. The survey can be viewed below in table 1.

The team placed the survey on the Twentieth AF's SharePoint site, and Maj Gen Jack Weinstein, commander, Twentieth AF, sent an e-mail to all 13N CGOs, inviting them to participate in the survey. The e-mail message can be viewed in attachment 1. The survey collected six basic demographic questions, with commissioning source and commissioning year being optional because of concern that these demographics would make participants easily identifiable. The survey remained open for seven days. The Twentieth AF HQ sent the survey to the three missile wings—the 90th, 91st, and 341st—for dissemination. Wing leadership sent reminder e-mails twice to the target audience of CGOs who are or have been on ICBM missile crews. Approximately 625 13N CGOs received the invitation and the survey link, which included a code to ensure that the data from individuals who may have taken the test but were outside the intended population were not included in the data analysis. ADC counselors advised 98 of the 625 possible participants not to take the survey due to allegations of cheating. Therefore, the total number of participants able to take the survey became 527. Out of the remaining possible participants, 249 13N CGOs completed the survey. MCCMs who were pulling alert while TDY were instructed to answer all questions for their home unit.

Table 1. Missile testing, training, and environment survey.

| Demographics |
| --- |
| Commissioning source |
| Commissioning year |
| Total time in the AF |
| Time as a missile combat crew member (in years) |
| Squadron |
| Base |
| **Survey** |
| 1. If fellow missileers needed my help, I would be willing to bend rules to help them. |
| 2. I think sharing specific currency test questions is acceptable. |
| 3. If I turned in a fellow missileer for breaking a rule, it would negatively impact how others treat me. |
| 4. Prior to the Malmstrom incident, I think monthly currency tests were administered in accordance with the rules. |

| |
|---|
| 5. I feel more loyal to fellow crew members than the Air Force as a whole. |
| 6. There is an expectation to score 100 percent on the monthly test. |
| 7. My score on the monthly currency tests has a significant impact on my career progression. |
| 8. Prior to the Malmstrom incident, the reward for sharing test questions was greater than the consequences. |
| 9. Prior to the Malmstrom incident, sharing monthly test answers was a commonplace practice. |
| 10. I would be willing to turn in a fellow missileer for breaking a rule. |
| 11. My peers would be willing to turn in a fellow missileer for breaking a rule. |
| 12. Initial Qualification Training effectively prepares me to perform my primary mission. |
| 13. Mission Qualification Training effectively prepares me to perform my primary mission. |
| 14. Monthly currency training effectively prepares me to perform my primary mission. |
| 15. Monthly currency training I receive is effective in preparing me for the monthly currency tests. |
| 16. Monthly currency tests provide an accurate assessment of my competency as a missileer. |
| 17. My squadron commander values high test scores even at the expense of ethics. |
| 18. I respect my squadron commander as a leader. |
| 19. My squadron commander places the need of the squadron above personal success. |
| 20. My squadron commander is worried crew mistakes will negatively affect their career. |
| 21. My squadron commander is open to new ideas. |
| 22. My squadron commander participates in monthly training and testing the same way as I do. |
| 23. My squadron level leadership is aware of improper behavior within the unit. |
| 24. Squadron level leadership is excessively involved in day to day field operations. |
| 25. Senior leadership (group and above) would be more effective if they pulled alert duty. |
| 26. Senior leadership does not understand the burden of monthly currency requirements. |
| 27. Monthly testing should be accomplished with your crew partner. |
| 28. A Q1 on evaluations has an impact on my career progression. |
| 29. Are there any other comments or concerns related to these topics that were not addressed by this survey? If so, please specify. |

Limitations

Due to restrictions imposed on the CDI, missileers under investigation for cheating were not surveyed. This resulted in a sample that is less representative of the underlying population than a sample drawn from the entire population would have been. The absence of responses from these missileers biases and lowers the precision and accuracy of the results.

The population and sample size impact the confidence and margin of error. The population of interest is 625 missileers (13N) between the ranks of second lieutenant and captain. The Twentieth AF distributed the survey to those missileers not under investigation and received 249 responses. The response size and variance allow for 85 percent confidence that the reported percentages reflect the population percentages with a margin of error of ±10 percentage points.

Since the Likert's attitude scale is an ordinal (numerically ranked) scale, analysis for identifying the existence of statistically significant differences was limited to the Chi-squared test, and techniques for statistically identifying source(s) of statistically significant differences were not available. Advanced analytical techniques, such as analysis of variance between groups (ANOVA) and t-tests, which would facilitate a higher resolution of analysis and enable statistical identification of source(s) of statistically significant differences, require that the data be continuous and that the interval lengths between the Likert response points be known. In this case, the analysis team did not know the interval lengths and chose not to make assumptions concerning those lengths or continuity.

In some cases, there were not sufficient data to perform the Chi-squared statistical test; thus, statistically based conclusions could not be made in those cases. This was true in general for analysis by squadron because sample sizes for several squadrons were too small. Therefore, regarding analysis by organization, a proper investigative analysis could only be performed at the wing level.

Another limitation involves timing. The survey took place after the initial investigation into the Malmstrom AFB test compromise. Participants likely had different responses after the possibly emotionally charged cheating allegations than they would have given prior to the incident.

Twentieth AF 13N CGO Focus Group Methodology

Focus Group Protocol

The focus groups covered questions related to the circumstances and causes of the Malmstrom AFB test compromise, including but not limited to training and testing culture and leadership environment and oversight. The CDI, led by Lt Gen James M. "Mike" Holmes, conducted these focus groups at F. E. Warren AFB, Vandenberg AFB, Minot AFB, and Malmstrom AFB to probe the institutional factors that contributed to the Malmstrom AFB nuclear missile currency test cheating incident. As specified in Twentieth AF memorandum and the AFGSC's CDI into ICBM testing culture at Malmstrom AFB, the focus group questions focused on missile CGOs' perspectives on missile training and testing culture and leadership environment and oversight. The questions utilized for the focus groups are listed below, organized by bases. CDI facilitators asked Vandenberg CGOs a different set of questions, as participants were not operational nor had they been an MCCM. The students at Vandenberg offer a different perspective and can provide insight into IST, having not yet served on missile combat crews. Thus, their perspectives adhere more closely to what is taught to all missileers before CGOs reach the wings.

Five to seven operational CGOs were selected at each base to attend one of three or four focus groups. F. E. Warren and Vandenberg had three focus groups each. Minot and Malmstrom had four focus groups each. At Vandenberg, facilitators selected five CGO IST students per focus group. The students chosen for each focus group were among those already slated for future duty at one of the three operational missile bases—F. E. Warren, Malmstrom, or Minot AFB.

Focus group participants each received a brief introduction on the scope of the focus group. To ensure all comments remained confidential, facilitators did not collect name or personal identifying information. The focus groups took approximately 90 minutes to complete.

Focus Group Questions

Vandenberg CGO Focus Group Questions

1. What is your opinion of IST training?
2. What do you think about your IST block tests?
3. Is there pressure to get a perfect score on the block tests?
4. Do you think your tests are measuring your proficiency within each block?
5. How many of you wanted to be missileers?
6. Are you excited to go out to the missile wings?
7. What have you heard about the monthly currency tests at the missile wings?
8. Have you heard it is important to score 100 percent on your monthly currency tests?
9. Should it be important to make a 100 percent on the monthly currency tests?
10. As a new missileer, do you think it is more important to be loyal to your fellow missileers or to the rules?
11. Why do you think missileers would collaborate on the monthly currency test questions?
12. Do you think collaborating on tests goes against integrity?
13. What changes would you make to IST?

F. E. Warren, Minot, and Malmstrom (Twentieth AF) CGO Focus Group Questions

1. What policy/guidance exists over testing procedures? How well do instructors follow policy/guidance?
2. How is loyalty to each other viewed in the missile community? Can you imagine a situation where loyalty would lead to setting aside the rules?
3. Why do you think missileers would be willing to collaborate on the monthly currency test questions?
4. Do you think collaborating on tests goes against integrity?
5. How do you think leadership views test collaboration?
6. How does leadership affect the attitude surrounding testing?
7. What could leadership do to prevent cheating on tests in the future? What actions could be taken to prevent cheating?
8. What sort of pressure is there to score a 100 percent on the currency tests?
9. What occurs when a missileer doesn't score a 100 percent on the currency tests?
10. Should it be important to score a 100 percent?
11. Are monthly tests a good measure of missileer proficiency? Or is there a better measure out there?
12. Are the currency tests relevant to field operations? What do you think about its level of difficulty?
13. How frequently should the currency tests be given?

14. Who do you believe should instruct monthly training?

15. How would you improve the training process?

Characteristics of Participants

A total of five to seven 13N CGOs participated in each group. The groups included second lieutenants, first lieutenants, and captains. The focus groups occurred during normal working hours—0800 to 1630. The groups included males and females, containing an assortment of commission sources (OTS, USAFA, and ROTC) as well as participants who were prior enlisted before becoming 13N CGOs. All individuals were college graduates, as that is a prerequisite for commissioning.

Vandenberg Participants

All participants were students in missile IST. Participants had all completed, at a minimum, the first five blocks of training out of the possible 10 blocks of training. A total of 15 individuals participated in the focus groups.

Malmstrom, F. E. Warren, and Minot (Twentieth AF) Participants

All participants were MCCMs. Some participants had worked in the shops before or served as executive officers. There were male and female participants, participants with prior enlisted military experience, and participants from a variety of commission sources. A total of 63 individuals participated in the Twentieth AF 13N CGO focus groups—17 at F. E. Warren, 21 at Minot, and 25 at Malmstrom.

Focus Group Analysis Methodology

Focus groups were conducted in a permissive, nonthreatening environment to obtain 13N CGOs' perceptions on the circumstances and causes of the Malmstrom AFB test compromise. To better match the participants' ranks, two CGOs (a captain and first lieutenant) ran the focus groups. The first step to analyze the focus group data was to have the interviews transcribed; thus, the focus group observer took detailed notes. Once the notes were finished, they served as the basis for further qualitative analysis. Qualitative analysis was performed by identifying themes and patterns and making comparisons between groups (differences among groups at each base and differences among bases' overarching findings). Analyzing qualitative data involves development and assignment of themes and categories and looking for patterns and contrasts. The process includes data reduction and interpretation of meaning.

Emphasizing and focusing on remarks that were tangentially related to the preset questions meaningfully reduced the mass of data collected through the focus groups. To perform the qualitative analysis, the CDI searched the remarks for commonalities and contrasted and compared groups at the base level and then at the Twentieth AF level. The focus group data analysis below includes written summary notes based on the findings at each base. The CDI created the categories while reviewing the comments and identifying common themes.

Focus Group Limitations

A great deal of the skepticism about the value of focus groups likely arises from the perception that focus group data are subjective and difficult to interpret. However, the analysis and interpretation of focus group data can be as rigorous as that generated by any other method. Some of the limitations of focus groups as an analytical method are listed below.

1. Focus groups often have less experimental control; the data is often more difficult to organize.
2. The success of the focus groups often depends on the moderator; thus, there is a high potential for leading and bias.
3. Discussion must be conducted in an environment that is conducive to conversation.
4. Qualitative data are limited in their external validity or their ability to be generalized to the general population. A quantitative study will be necessary in order to have good external validity.

Another limitation is the same faced by the survey—that the focus groups took place after the initial investigation into the Malmstrom test compromise. Participants likely had different responses after the possibly emotionally charged cheating allegations than they would have given prior to the incident.

Twentieth AF Missile Testing, Training, and Environment Survey Data Analysis

Demographics

The survey included six demographic factors: number of years spent in the active Air Force, year of commissioning, commissioning source, wing number, squadron number, and the number of years spent as an MCCM.

Figure 1. Survey respondents by years on active duty.

Figure 2. Survey respondents by commissioning year.

Figure 3. Survey respondents by source of commissioning.

Figure 4. Survey respondents by wing.

Figure 5. Survey respondents by squadron.

Figure 6. Survey respondents by years as missile crew.

Summary of Responses

Questions were categorized by leadership environment and oversight, training effectiveness, monthly currency assessments, and missileer culture. Each category contains a frequency table and summary statistics table of the responses. Responses that are heavily skewed positively or negatively are highlighted in their respective tables.

Leadership Environment and Oversight

The questions in this category centered on respondents' views of their leadership regarding respect, ethics, and duty responsibilities. It should be noted that 60.2 percent of respondents agreed that their squadron leadership was aware of improper behavior (question 6). In addition, 10.4 percent of respondents chose not to answer that question, which was particularly high in comparison to the other questions in this category. Also, the responses indicate that 76.3 percent respect their squadron commander as a leader (question 11). The results for questions 6 and 11 are highlighted in the following table.

Table 2. Leadership environment and oversight questions: percentages.

| Questions	Completely Disagree 1	Somewhat Disagree 2	Neither Agree nor Disagree 3	Somewhat Agree 4	Completely Agree 5	No Response
3. Senior leadership does not understand the burden of monthly currency requirements.	5.6%	16.9%	20%	22.1%	31.7%	3.6%
4. Senior leadership (group and above) would be more effective if they pulled alert duty.	37%	16.5%	13.7%	11.7%	17.7%	3.6%
5. My squadron level leadership is excessively involved in day to day field operations.	4%	17.3%	19.7%	26.1%	29.7%	3.2%
6. My squadron level leadership is aware of improper behavior within the unit.	10.1%	4%	14.5%	29.7%	30.5%	10.4%
7. My squadron commander participates in monthly training and testing the same way as I do.	37.4%	15.7%	14.9%	12.6%	10.9%	8.8%
8. My squadron commander is open to new ideas.	7.6%	10.8%	16.5%	33.3%	28.5%	3.2%
9. My squadron commander is worried crew mistakes will negatively affect their career.	15.7%	16.1%	23.7%	23.7%	15.3%	5.6%
10. My squadron commander places the need of the squadron above personal success.	7.2%	9.6%	22.9%	24.9%	31.3%	4%

Questions	Completely Disagree 1	Somewhat Disagree 2	Neither Agree nor Disagree 3	Somewhat Agree 4	Completely Agree 5	No Response
11. I respect my squadron commander as a leader.	5.2%	6%	9.2%	24.1%	52.2%	3.2%
12. My squadron commander values high test scores even at the expense of ethics.	38.6%	24.1%	20.5%	6%	6%	4.8%

**Table 3. Leadership environment and oversight questions: mean, median, and deviation.**

Questions	Mean	Median	N	No Response	Standard Deviation
3. Senior leadership does not understand the burden of monthly currency requirements.	3.60	4	240	9	1.27
4. Senior leadership (group and above) would be more effective if they pulled alert duty.	2.55	2	240	9	1.54
5. My squadron level leadership is excessively involved in day to day field operations.	3.62	4	241	8	1.21
6. My squadron level leadership is aware of improper behavior within the unit.	3.32	3	222	27	1.03
7. My squadron commander participates in monthly training and testing the same way as I do.	2.38	2	227	22	1.43
8. My squadron commander is open to new ideas.	3.66	4	241	8	1.23
9. My squadron commander is worried crew mistakes will negatively affect their career.	3.07	3	235	14	1.32
10. My squadron commander places the need of the squadron above personal success.	3.66	4	239	10	1.24
11. I respect my squadron commander as a leader.	4.16	5	241	8	1.16
12. My squadron commander values high test scores even at the expense of ethics.	2.13	2	237	12	1.20

Note: Mean and standard deviation results in the above table were calculated based on the assumption that the response data are continuous and that the intervals between adjacent Likert response points are one unit in length.

Training Effectiveness

The questions in the training effectiveness category centered on respondents' views of the effectiveness of monthly currency tests, mission qualification training, and initial qualification training. In question 13, 71.5 percent of respondents disagreed that monthly currency tests provided an accurate assessment of missileer competency. However, in question 14, 66.7 percent of respondents indicated that monthly training was effective in preparing them for the monthly currency tests.

Table 4. Training effectiveness questions: percentages.

| Questions	Completely Disagree 1	Somewhat Disagree 2	Neither Agree nor Disagree 3	Somewhat Agree 4	Completely Agree 5	No Response
13. Monthly currency tests provide an accurate assessment of my competency as a missileer.	40.6%	30.9%	11.7%	11.7%	4.8%	0.4%
14. Monthly currency training I receive is effective in preparing me for the monthly currency tests.	4.4%	12.5%	14.5%	42.2%	24.5%	2%
15. Monthly currency training effectively prepares me to perform my primary mission.	18.1%	22.5%	18.9%	28.1%	11.7%	0.8%
16. Mission Qualification Training effectively prepares me to perform my primary mission.	6.4%	17.3%	15.7%	41.8%	17.7%	1.2%
17. Initial Qualification Training effectively prepares me to perform my primary mission.	6%	14.5%	11.7%	44.6%	22.5%	0.8%

Table 5. Training effectiveness questions: mean, median, and deviation.

Questions	Mean	Median	N	No Response	Standard Deviation
13. Monthly currency tests provide an accurate assessment of my competency as a missileer.	2.10	2	248	1	1.19
14. Monthly currency training I receive is effective in preparing me for the monthly currency tests.	3.71	4	244	5	1.11
15. Monthly currency training effectively prepares me to perform my primary mission.	2.93	3	247	2	1.31
16. Mission Qualification Training effectively prepares me to perform my primary mission.	3.48	4	246	3	1.16
17. Initial Qualification Training effectively prepares me to perform my primary mission.	3.64	4	247	2	1.16

Note: Mean and standard deviation results in the above table were calculated based on the assumption that the response data are continuous and that the intervals between adjacent Likert response points are one unit in length.

Currency Assessment

The questions in the currency assessment category centered on respondents' views about the impact that monthly currency training scores had on their careers, perceived expectations related to scoring, and testing procedures. On question 1, 83.5 percent of respondents indicated that a Q1

on evaluations impacted their career. Additionally, on question 22, 75.9 percent of respondents agreed that monthly currency tests have a significant impact on their career. On question 23, 88.4 percent of respondents signaled that there is an expectation to score 100 percent on the monthly tests. On question 2, 75.1 percent of respondents agreed that monthly testing should be accomplished with their crew partner. On question 27, 78.8 percent of respondents disagreed that sharing specific currency test questions was acceptable.

Table 6. Monthly currency assessment questions: percentages.

Questions	Completely Disagree 1	Somewhat Disagree 2	Neither Agree nor Disagree 3	Somewhat Agree 4	Completely Agree 5	No Response
1. A Q1 on evaluations has an impact on my career progression.	1.6%	3.6%	8.4%	22.5%	61%	2.8%
2. Monthly testing should be accomplished with your crew partner.	6.4%	6%	10.5%	20.1%	55%	2%
20. Prior to the Malmstrom incident, sharing monthly test answers was a commonplace practice.	38.2%	22.5%	15.7%	8.4%	7.6%	7.6%
21. Prior to the Malmstrom incident, the reward for sharing test questions was greater than the consequences.	33.3%	20.9%	16.1%	9.2%	11.2%	9.2%
22. My score on the monthly currency tests has a significant impact on my career progression.	2.8%	10%	9.6%	27.7%	48.2%	1.6%
23. There is an expectation to score 100% on the monthly test.	2%	4.4%	3.6%	16.1%	72.3%	1.6%
25. Prior to the Malmstrom incident, I think monthly currency tests were administered in accordance with the rules.	6.4%	7.6%	9.2%	30.5%	41.4%	4.8%
27. I think sharing specific currency test questions is acceptable.	61.5%	17.3%	10%	3.6%	2.8%	4.8%

Table 7. Monthly currency assessment questions: mean, median, deviation.

| Questions	Mean	Median	N	No Response	Standard Deviation
1. A Q1 on evaluations has an impact on my career progression.	4.42	5	242	7	0.92
2. Monthly testing should be accomplished with your crew partner.	4.14	5	244	5	1.22
20. Prior to the Malmstrom incident, sharing monthly test answers was a commonplace practice.	2.19	2	230	19	1.29
21. Prior to the Malmstrom incident, the reward for sharing test questions was greater than the consequences.	2.38	2	226	23	1.39
22. My score on the monthly currency tests has a significant impact on my career progression.	4.10	4	245	4	1.12
23. There is an expectation to score 100% on the monthly test.	4.55	5	245	4	0.92
25. Prior to the Malmstrom incident, I think monthly currency tests were administered in accordance with the rules.	3.97	4	237	12	1.21
27. I think sharing specific currency test questions is acceptable.	1.62	1	237	12	1.02

Note: Mean and standard deviation results in the above table were calculated based on the assumption that the response data are continuous and that the intervals between adjacent Likert response points are one unit in length.

Missileer Culture

The questions in the missileer culture category centered on respondents' views on the loyalty of peers and rule enforcement. In question 26, 73.5 percent of respondents indicated that turning in a fellow missileer would negatively impact how they were treated by others.

Table 8. Missileer culture questions: percentages.

Questions	Completely Disagree 1	Somewhat Disagree 2	Neither Agree nor Disagree 3	Somewhat Agree 4	Completely Agree 5	No Response
18. My peers would be willing to turn in a fellow missileer for breaking a rule.	6%	16.9%	31.3%	30.5%	9.6%	5.6%
19. I would be willing to turn in a fellow missileer for breaking a rule.	2%	11.2%	23.3%	36.6%	20.9%	6%
24. I feel more loyal to fellow crew members than the Air Force as a whole.	18.9%	20.1%	28.1%	20.5%	8.4%	4%

| Questions	Completely Disagree 1	Somewhat Disagree 2	Neither Agree nor Disagree 3	Somewhat Agree 4	Completely Agree 5	No Response
26. If I turned in a fellow missileer for breaking a rule, it would negatively impact how others treat me.	4%	6%	12.5%	32.5%	41%	2%
28. If fellow missileers needed my help, I would be willing to bend rules to help them.	23.3%	28.5%	21.7%	15.7%	4.8%	6%

Table 9. Missileer culture questions: mean, median, and deviation.

Questions	Mean	Median	N	No Response	Standard Deviation
18. My peers would be willing to turn in a fellow missileer for breaking a rule.	3.22	3	235	14	1.06
19. I would be willing to turn in a fellow missileer for breaking a rule.	3.67	4	234	15	1.02
24. I feel more loyal to fellow crew members than the Air Force as a whole.	2.79	3	239	10	1.23
26. If I turned in a fellow missileer for breaking a rule, it would negatively impact how others treat me.	4.02	4	244	5	1.09
28. If fellow missileers needed my help, I would be willing to bend rules to help them.	2.47	2	234	15	1.18

Note: Mean and standard deviation results in the above table were calculated based on the assumption that the response data are continuous and that the intervals between adjacent Likert response points are one unit in length.

Comparisons by Wing

Analysts compared responses among the three wings to assess the presence of a statistical difference. For each question with a response, a Chi-squared comparison was performed by wing, with the hypothesis that for each question the wing populations answer the questions similarly. For a given question with sufficiently low Chi-squared statistic values, analysts concluded that one wing responded differently than the other two. Only questions for which there was sufficient sample size and where statistically significant differences were found are presented below. In each question, analysts then reviewed the percentage of responses for each Likert score. Analysts could only make inferences on how questions are answered by the population with a confidence interval half-length (i.e., error) of 10 percentage points (see limitations). Therefore, it could be concluded with 85 percent confidence that the response percentages for a given wing that differed from the others by 20 percentage points or more are significantly different—these cells are highlighted in the table below.

Table 10. Twentieth AF wings comparison.

Question	Wing	Completely Disagree 1	Somewhat Disagree 2	Neither Agree nor Disagree 3	Somewhat Agree 4	Completely Agree 5
7. My squadron commander participates in monthly training and testing the same way as I do.	341st MW	60.3%	19.0%	13.8%	5.2%	1.7%
	90th MW	46.8%	19.0%	21.5%	5.1%	7.6%
	91st MW	23.3%	14.4%	13.3%	26.7%	22.2%
12. My squadron commander values high test scores even at the expense of ethics.	341st MW	20.3%	25.4%	27.1%	18.6%	8.5%
	90th MW	50.6%	22.8%	21.5%	1.3%	3.8%
	91st MW	44.4%	27.3%	18.2%	3.0%	7.1%
13. Monthly currency tests provide an accurate assessment of my competency as a missileer.	341st MW	61.7%	20.0%	6.7%	8.3%	3.3%
	90th MW	28.0%	31.7%	14.6%	14.6%	11.0%
	91st MW	38.7%	36.8%	12.3%	11.3%	0.9%
15. Monthly currency training effectively prepares me to perform my primary mission.	341st MW	25.0%	21.7%	18.3%	25.0%	10.0%
	90th MW	9.8%	18.3%	19.5%	28.0%	24.4%
	91st MW	21.0%	26.7%	19.0%	30.5%	2.9%
16. Mission Qualification Training effectively prepares me to perform my primary mission.	341st MW	3.3%	5.0%	15.0%	50.0%	26.7%
	90th MW	8.5%	13.4%	12.2%	41.5%	24.4%
	91st MW	6.7%	27.9%	19.2%	38.5%	7.7%
18. My peers would be willing to turn in a fellow missileer for breaking a rule.	341st MW	14.3%	30.4%	33.9%	19.6%	1.8%
	90th MW	3.8%	11.4%	38.0%	34.2%	12.7%
	91st MW	4.0%	16.0%	29.0%	38.0%	13.0%
20. Prior to the Malmstrom incident, sharing monthly test answers was a commonplace practice.	341st MW	8.5%	21.3%	31.9%	12.8%	25.5%
	90th MW	40.7%	24.7%	19.8%	8.6%	6.2%
	91st MW	56.9%	25.5%	7.8%	7.8%	2.0%
21. Prior to the Malmstrom incident, the reward for sharing test questions was greater than the consequences.	341st MW	9.6%	25.0%	23.1%	21.2%	21.2%
	90th MW	42.3%	23.1%	17.9%	5.1%	11.5%
	91st MW	46.9%	21.9%	14.6%	8.3%	8.3%
22. My score on the monthly currency tests has a significant impact on my career progression.	341st MW	0.0%	3.3%	5.0%	16.7%	75.0%
	90th MW	3.7%	12.3%	11.1%	32.1%	40.7%
	91st MW	3.8%	12.5%	11.5%	31.7%	40.4%
25. Prior to the Malmstrom incident, I think monthly currency tests were administered in accordance with the rules.	341st MW	16.4%	16.4%	18.2%	32.7%	16.4%
	90th MW	3.8%	7.6%	8.9%	29.1%	50.6%
	91st MW	3.9%	3.9%	5.8%	34.0%	52.4%

Twentieth AF 13N CGO Focus Group Analysis

Vandenberg AFB CGOs

What is your opinion of IST training?

Overall, the majority of respondents from all the focus groups perceived training as fair and well-constructed to achieve the course objectives. Students in all groups expressed that during some training days they experience a fire-hose effect—being inundated with information. However, these events represent a small percentage of their overall training experiences. Additionally, the majority of respondents expressed a favorable opinion of their IST and their instructor cadre—as competent, professional, and positive. All groups noted that many of their instructors have frequently stated that expectations and standards will be higher upon arriving at the missile wings. Students from all groups stated they frequently hear from their instructors the phrase "things will be different once you get to the wing." This sentiment was commonly hinged to the perception that pressure to perform perfectly will be intensified by the cultural expectations of the missile wings.

What do you think about your IST block tests?

The majority of group respondents perceived their block tests as fair and as a good measurement of the course material and achievement of competency objectives. One participant from group 2 noted that the tests struck a delicate balance between assessing straightforward concepts and critical thinking components. Respondents from all groups indicated that the performance expectations were realistic and challenging but achievable.

Is there pressure to get a perfect score on the block tests?

The majority of all group participants indicated that there was pressure to receive a perfect score; however, this pressure was primarily manifested internally and was not the result of external factors. Subsequently, students would place the greatest amount of pressure on themselves; however, students received multiple inputs in all groups that resulted in them experiencing external pressures. For example, one class instructor had established a 98 percent test average as the class goal. This action and other verbal comments by instructors about high expectations such as "jobs at the wing depend on your test scores," which was cited by a student in group 3, contributed to the perception that perfect scores were the unofficial expectation.

Do you think your tests are measuring your proficiency within each block?

All groups repeated the common response themes given to question 2, stating that the tests do measure individual proficiency.

How many of you wanted to be missileers?

Of the 15 total participants, no individual wanted to be a missileer. Only one member stated that he or she had listed space and missiles on his or her dream sheet, and this student did so in the hope of going into space.

Are you excited to go out to the missile wings?

The majority of respondents from all groups reported that they were anxiously excited about their new assignments and the prospect of employing their training and having their efforts contribute to an operational impact. However, the same population size also indicated that they were initially demoralized about their AFSC assignment.

What have you heard about the monthly currency tests at the missile wings?

All groups noted that they have heard from their instructors and fellow students that the tests at the wings would be more challenging than the Vandenberg tests and that expectations would be higher. A classroom instructor reportedly told one participant from group 1 that "there's a lot of pressure to get 100 percent at the wing." All groups reinforced that the rumor mill perpetuates a commonly held notion that perfect scores are the missile wing expectation and that those who fall short will suffer punitive measures.

Have you heard it is important to score 100 percent on your monthly currency tests?

Within all groups, participants predominantly answered yes. The responses gathered to question 7 represent exactly the same sentiments expressed in response to this question.

*Should it be important to make a 100 percent on the monthly currency tests?*

The majority of group respondents agreed that striving for perfection should be the expectation of all military professionals. However, if individuals fall short of this goal, that should not be viewed negatively. One participant in group 1 noted that "I learn best when I make a mistake and mess something up; however, I feel like I'm not allowed to make mistakes."

As a new missileer, do you think it is more important to be loyal to your fellow missileers or to the rules?

All group respondents agreed that by following the rules, one is being loyal to one's fellow missileers.

Why do you think missileers would collaborate on the monthly currency test questions?

The majority of respondents from all groups indicated that pressure (internally, from peers and leadership) would force missileers to collaborate on tests. The second commonly expressed theme was the missileers' desire to progress within their peer group—individuals who did not

receive consistent perfect scores would not advance and would fall behind their peers. Other individuals conjectured that those who would collaborate on tests had become too lazy, that the numbness and dissociation from taking too many tests fueled a need to collaborate, and that the horror stories produced by the missileer rumor mills about the unfair consequences imposed on missileers who missed test questions pushed missileers to cheat.

Do you think collaborating on tests goes against integrity?

Universally, all students agreed that collaborating on tests or any action that gave an individual a testing advantage goes against integrity.

What changes would you make to IST?

Respondents provided a very diverse spectrum of responses. One participant requested the course be extended to avoid the overload effect on certain training days. Another member countered that the course did not need to be longer; rather it should contain an equally balanced training schedule. One member from group 2 asked that instructors incorporate more videos of procedures to help students visualize concepts. The same member also requested that instructors eliminate the phrase "this is how I do this," because having multiple instructors provide variations on the same procedures can confuse students. Lastly, one theme which was echoed in all groups was the need to include a review day prior to block tests.

Twentieth AF CGOs

What policy/guidance exists over testing procedures? How well do instructors follow policy/guidance?

Focus group participants at the 91st and 90th missile wings indicated that applicable regulations and guidance directives dictate testing procedures, and the instructors properly proctored and supervised such procedures throughout the testing period. In one group from the 91st MW, crew members noted that prior to the wing's 2012 CUI, there were exceptions to testing policies, including free class 100s for posting changes within EWO documents or for holidays. The same group stated that these policies were completely eliminated post-CUI. Responses from the 341st participants varied from those of the 90th and 91st in that none of the groups mentioned any guidance or regulations for testing. However, one of the 341st groups noted that proctors have undertaken several new initiatives to discourage cheating, detailing that proctors have separated students with various seating/spacing intervals, employed different test versions, and used two proctors to answer questions and monitor for collaborative efforts. Two of the 341st groups described how students can ask questions, take bathroom breaks, and use their regulations throughout the testing process.

How is loyalty to each other viewed in the missile community? Can you imagine a situation where loyalty would lead to setting aside the rules?

All respondents in all groups expressed that loyalty was high among MCCMs and that they felt a strong team mentality within the crew force. All respondents emphasized that crew members should take care of each other. Some such statements include "we're all in this together" and "it's us versus them." At Malmstrom, participants clarified that they are most loyal to their crew partner and then to the CGO corps. One of the 341st MW groups indicated that loyalty has limits, stating that "when it comes to the things that are real big, we know where the line is." However, another participant in the same group stated that "lines get blurred when you're told to take care of your deputy." In all four groups, the majority of 341st participants offered similar responses, stating that crew members take care of each other—even in field operations—whether by signing on the launch control center inventory for items that another crew accidently omitted or checking their deputies' test answers. As a participant of one of the 341st groups noted, "We are all sinners in the hands of an angry God."

Participants in the 91st MW groups demonstrated a greater reluctance to bend rules over loyalty than those at the other two military wings—due to the cataclysmic 2013 CUI. One 91st MW group stated that regulatory compliance in the last year has vastly increased, with members now more afraid of the punitive effects of noncompliance. One of the 91st MW groups expressed a rift in missileer loyalty, noting that "there are two different groups in missiles, one in which people know this job requires loyalty to each other and another group who wants to advance and have shop hires, and throws others under the bus for their own advancement."

Why do you think missileers would be willing to collaborate on the monthly currency test questions?

All groups at all wings expressed that the higher pressure to score a 100 percent to ensure career progression, coupled with an environment that had historically condoned test collaboration, led missileers to think collaborating on the monthly currency test was acceptable. The groups at 90th MW specified that leadership expects/demands perfection on the monthly tests, and test collaboration occurred in an attempt to score 100 percent. Overall, the groups at the 341st MW noted that the perceived lack of value in tests resulted in crew members being more inclined to collaborate, because through this perspective, there was no operational impact. Frustration about the overemphasis placed on test scores and displeasure with irrelevant test questions was commonplace. As one participant stated, "It's not knowledge based, its trickery." Therefore, collaborating to avoid being tricked and subsequently admonished was considered acceptable. One of the 341st MW groups noted that since missileers do everything together as a crew besides testing, they develop this interdependency and then remove it when they test. All groups at the 91st MW articulated the same core themes that peer competitiveness coupled with unrealistic/illogical expectations by group and squadron leadership created an environment in which cheating was condoned. One participant conveyed the high expectations by sharing that his or her squadron commander told MCCMs during their squadron command post certification

brief that "if my field leaders can't score better than 95 percent on tests, maybe they shouldn't be in the field; maybe they should be studying."

Do you think collaborating on tests goes against integrity?

Overall the groups at the 341st and 90th missile wings found collaborating on tests to be acceptable as long as they are not giving out answers. However, all group participants from the 91st MW agreed that collaborating on test materials was an integrity violation. However, one of the 91st participants added that "you can talk yourself into doing things you wouldn't normally do because you see a culture of compromises and a leadership which is aware of what's going on and tolerates it." While the participants from the 90th MW found the test compromise incident at Malmstrom wrong, all groups felt that helping one's crewmate was different as long as direct answers were not given. The respondents held that verbal suggestions, such as "recheck number 10," were acceptable. The 90th MW groups' reasoning for this was that in the field they help each other and call around to other crews; however, on tests they were on their own—contrary to their normal way of operating. Participants in the 341st MW groups responded similarly to their peers in the 90th MW, noting that crew commanders should be allowed to ask their deputy if they have any questions prior to submitting their test. One of the 341st MW groups was reluctant to respond, but eventually admitted that if another person gave you answers, it constituted cheating. Another of the 341st MW groups agreed that collaborating was cheating, but rebutted that "there are different levels of cheating," and "integrity is subject to the environment created by leadership." One of the 341st MW groups noted that the squadron commanders take the monthly tests without a proctor and openly collaborate without adverse consequences. Ultimately, all 341st MW groups conceded that collaborative efforts did constitute cheating.

How do you think leadership views test collaboration?

Overall, every focus group believed leadership was aware of the test collaboration and that the lack of efforts to correct test collaboration before the 2013 CUI at the 91st MW or the Malmstrom incident indicated those leaders condoned such collaboration. One of the participants from the 91st MW noted that "cheating has been going on for years; however, leadership pretends that the cheating is not happening." As one 341st participant noted about test collaboration, "We're paying for the sins of our fathers." The consensus from the 91st MW participants seemed to be that leadership was unofficially aware of the test collaboration, and as one crew member noted, "Leadership knows exactly the worthlessness of our testing, and the cheating which occurs; however, they choose not to engage." As another participant pointed out from the 91st MW, "Our squadron leadership was just another generation of cheaters." While two groups from the 341st thought that leadership did not approve of collaborating, participants believed leadership turned a blind eye to the situation—allowing it to continue. Another 341st group assumed that leadership knew what was occurring with the small collaborative efforts; however, "they probably didn't know about the texts and photos." A similar response came from another 341st group participant who stated, "I believe the culture of collaboration has been around for a long time, and it got out of control." There was frustration from participants in three of the 341st groups regarding squadron leadership not taking the tests in the same manner in

which crews are testing, alleging that leadership is given tests with highlighted answers. Similar sentiments were expressed at the 90th MW, with the caveat that unofficially, past leadership had encouraged collaboration and that, due to the old operations group commander, every one helped each other to score 100 percent.

How does leadership affect the attitude surrounding testing?

Overall, leadership was viewed as playing a major role in the amount of pressure placed on test scores. All the groups perceive leadership to be excessively test-focused, creating a perception that test scores are the most important metric for career progression. The 90th MW groups noted that the old operations group commander had an unwritten policy that "you must get 100 percent"; in fact he would reportedly have the scores posted and draw a line to indicate "these people are not meeting standards." However, 90th MW participants noted that current leadership has moved away from the test scores being the most important metric. The 341st groups expressed frustration, noting that leadership stressed the importance of scoring a 100 percent but that the same leadership kept increasing the test difficulty in an attempt to lower the test average. A participant from a 91st MW group noted a similar issue, saying he was directed to "start writing harder tests due to better crew performance on tests." This led to confusion as leadership's expectation was 100 percent, but the same leadership was dissatisfied when this standard was met. Participants in two of the 341st groups expressed astonishment regarding how their leadership began to move away from test scores since the Malmstrom incident. One participant revealed that the group commander told his mission qualification training (MQT) class that "your tests are very important"; however, following the initiation of the investigation, he said to the crew force "I don't look at your scores." Another member echoed this perception of irony, noting that test scores are still briefed weekly at operations group staff meetings, where scores are compared, generating inflated emphasis and perception of importance. Frustration was also common among the 341st participants regarding the lack of transparency behind leadership's actions, such as decisions about shop hires, expectations, crew member progression, and feedback from operational performance that may reinforce the perception that 100 percent scores are necessary to progress. 91st MW group participants stated that leadership personalities and emphasis areas are cyclic and that "old hat missileers go the way of the old order," exhibiting hypersensitivity toward test scores. Another participant had positive sentiments toward the progress leadership has made regarding testing, noting that "we're moving in a positive direction in regards to leadership's reaction to failures, General Weinstein's policies have helped."

What could leadership do to prevent cheating on tests in the future? What actions could be taken to prevent cheating?

Overall, participants from the 91st and 90th missile wings asserted that they do not have a cheating problem currently. In the 91st MW, the present leadership's lack of stress on the importance of test scores has removed the motivation for cheating. In the 90th MW, effective proctoring and multiple test versions solved the problem. One 91st MW participant pointed out that leadership establishes the culture and that right now "we're on the right track . . . [and] we're

rebuilding but we're still fragile." A common sentiment across all the 90th CGO focus groups was that if the tests simply assessed what they were intended to measure, cheating would not be so rampant. Additionally, participants asserted that test questions tended to delve into obscure concepts rather than assessing the baseline knowledge expectations. Suggestions for improvements leadership could take to remove the motivation for cheating came from 91st and 341st MW participants, who suggested making scores nonpunitive by using a pass/fail scoring system and allowing crew testing (allowing missileers to test with their crew partner). Participants assert this would remove the stigma associated with the perfection standard that is often compounded by internal pride and leadership-induced stress. A 341st MW participant added that "peers shouldn't be grading each other's tests," and leadership should "let people fail and let them learn without it being a punitive process." Another participant added that "what can be done to prevent murder in the future, there will always be a way around. I think we're asking the wrong question. Why don't we figure out how to measure what matters?"

What sort of pressure is there to score a 100 percent on the currency tests?

The pressure to score a 100 percent on the currency tests varies among the wings. While all wings historically place great emphasis on scoring 100 percent, the 90th MW participants suggested that their squadron leadership has progressed from using test scores as the primary metric. Participants in these groups noted that previous leaders generated significant pressure for scoring 100 percent, indicating that the commander looked only at test results, not the whole person. Additionally, the 90th MW participants noted that the drive for perfect scores was reinforced by a fear of punitive measures for failure to succeed; however, each group specified that the 90th does not have the same problems under current leadership. However, in the 91st and 341st missile wings, test scores were still viewed as the primary metric. The importance of testing resonated across all the 341st MW groups, with one participant stating that the 490th Missile Squadron "places squadron averages on the mission planning slides, and one member was told by the squadron commander that he was making himself ineligible to go to the shops when he missed two test questions." All group respondents affirmed that this culture of perfection has contributed to an unhealthy competitive environment in which crew members judge one another on the basis of their scores. Additionally all groups confirmed that leaders over-relied on test scores to differentiate among crew members and that participants perceived leadership uses test metrics as the primary measurement for crew member progression. Responses from the 91st MW groups varied slightly in content but carried the same overall theme that progression as a missileer depends upon testing performance and that one needs perfect scores in the missile career field to progress—because it is one of the few measurable metrics in missile operations. Participants from both the 91st and 341st indicated that the pressure to score a 100 percent on the currency tests begins at Vandenberg, where instructors mention the important of perfect scores on the monthly tests at the wings. A 341st MW participant mentioned that his or her squadron commander told MCCMs that "if you keep getting 98s, you will never go to the shop." At every wing shop, hires were seen as the most important step to career progression and led to sitting fewer alerts.

What occurs when a missileer does not score a 100 percent on the currency tests?

While there is great pressure to score a 100 percent on the tests, at each wing no group mentioned any punitive action taken for failing to score a 100 percent. Rather, action seemed to be taken if a crew member failed a test, meaning scoring below 90 percent. A 91st MW participant summarized the common sentiment over test failures, stating that "if you fail a test you're taken out back and shot." However, the 341st MW participants noted that if a missileer fails to score a 100 percent on the currency tests, he or she was likely to draw unwanted attention from squadron leadership. One participant added that if you do not receive consistent perfect scores, "you will be an 8-0 line crew member for four years." In the 341st MW, participants believed that upon new MCCMs' arrival from Vandenberg, leadership labeled and tracked them based upon their testing performance. This hierarchy is perceived to have long-term effects, resulting in stalled progression—with one missed opportunity snowballing into another and compounding the peer group separation. Participants from the 91st MW stated that prior to the 2013 CUI, repercussions from test failures were more punitive in nature; however, more recently, actions are simply corrective retraining measures. However, one of the 91st MW groups emphasized that their squadron leadership is not focused on why the crew member scored poorly but rather how to get that member to 100 percent.

Should it be important to score a 100 percent?

While all Twentieth AF CGO focus groups believed that striving for perfection is admirable, not all participants believed it should be important to attain a perfect score—they believed there is a reason the regulation sets 90 percent as passing and crew members should be held to this 90 percent standard. There is a common belief among all group members, regardless of wing, that the emphasis on test scores has led the missile career field away from the intent of the test, which is to validate training. A 341st MW participant noted that the operational missile community needs a means to ensure crew members know their job; however, the current monthly tests do not measure that. One of the 341st MW groups noted that the missile community is creating good test takers but that the goal should be perfect operations in the field rather than in training. The majority of the 91st MW participants also believed that only collective crew knowledge needs to be 100 percent.

Are monthly tests a good measure of missileer proficiency? Or is there a better measure out there?

Overall, not a single group participant across the Twentieth AF believed the monthly tests were a good measure of missileer proficiency. Participants predominantly agreed that these tests do not have a consistent baseline across the wings and do not measure any qualitative factors relevant to field performance. As a 91st MW participant noted, "Test scores are not indicative of operational proficiency; just because I make a 100 percent doesn't mean I'm proficient, but leadership doesn't see it that way." A similar response was made by a 341st MW participant who noted that "the things we do the most frequent in the field are trained and tested the least," reemphasizing the diminished value of the training and testing. However, a few groups from the 341st MW and

91st MW did see potential value in the tests—but not in their current form. A common consensus among those groups was that evaluations, if administered properly, are a good measurement. As participants from the 91st MW stated, "Most of the stuff we do in the operational environment, we don't test on." However, 90th MW groups felt that monthly tests should be used for currency instead of proficiency. Their underlying supposition is that without a test, missileers would not study. Every participant across the three wings noted that the best measurement of operator proficiency is garnered from field performance; however, participants had a hard time coming up with methods to quantify or assess field performance. All Twentieth AF groups believed a better and currently available measure for operational proficiency would be using the missile procedures trainer (MPT), a training simulator, and that the MPT is the best validation mechanism for measuring proficiency and knowledge.

Are the currency tests relevant to field operations? What do you think about their level of difficulty?

The overarching consensus was that tests are written to stratify operation crew members and that test taking does not translate to field performance. A 341st participant's statement that "everything but the mission is the mission" summarized the common sentiment among all participants, alluding to the common practice among leaders in missile operations of becoming fixated on extraneous details and losing focus on the operational site picture. He added that since the Malmstrom investigation started, "I've been treated so much better now than I have been over my last four years. I think leaders now realize how important my role is; they are so happy to have bodies to go on alert." Some 91st MW participants also complained, as one group stated that the value of classroom training sessions was severely diminished due to the lack of relevancy and instructional effectiveness of the training materials. The participants of all groups echoed that the classroom instruction was "death by PowerPoint slides," which was repetitive and a check-the-box requirement that was a complete waste of time.

The predominant response across all group participants was that the test difficulty varies. Some questions are well designed and others are not, with numerous questions delving in the irrelevant supporting materials within the crew members' technical orders and EWO regulations. All group participants expressed a universal disdain for questions that had no operational value. Participants from one of the 91st MW groups expressed their frustration in being subjected to the mood and perspective of the test author, resulting in some months with notably easy tests and others filled with stump-the-dummy type questions. Participants from the 341st MW had a similar response, noting there is extreme subjectivity based upon the test author and that tests will become more challenging in preparation for inspections. However, other participants were quick to defend test writers, citing their lack of formal training and oversight. During testing at 341st MW, there was a slide on display that stated students should "beware of the hook," referring to catching the subtle details within questions intended to challenge and potentially confuse test takers. Participants at the 341st echoed this idea, noting that many tests were poorly written, utilizing complex scenarios instead of assessing baseline knowledge. Participants at the 341st and 91st noted that since Twentieth AF has taken over writing the monthly tests, the issues with complex questions have disappeared. Not a single participant from the 341st or 91st

disliked the Twentieth AF tests; rather, they found them a straightforward and a fair measurement of knowledge. Only some participants of the 90th MW groups preferred their own test writers over the Twentieth AF standardized tests.

How frequently should the currency tests be given?

The responses to the frequency of currency tests were very diverse within and among wings. The responses fluctuated among quarterly testing, monthly testing, or a graduated testing schedule based on performance and time on crew. Groups from the 341st, 91st, and 90th MW all had participants that did not see anything wrong with monthly examinations if the tests were written properly and assessed knowledge and competency. Multiple participants from all wings suggested the testing interval should depend on how long missileers have been on crew, with experience driving the testing frequency. There was a consensus among the groups at all wings that new operational missileers should have monthly testing and training due to the amount of information they must learn; however, they believed the pressure to be perfect on the tests is unacceptable and crew members should be allowed to learn from their mistakes. There was a caveat noted by participants from the 91st MW that the inspection cycle drives the testing culture and frequency due to the high rate of inspections.

Who do you believe should instruct monthly training?

The group opinions on who should instruct monthly training differed among the three wings—with the 90th and 91st against deputy trainers and the 341st in favor of deputy trainers. All group participants at the 341st MW believed instructor selection should be based upon competency and knowledge, not position; if a missileer has the knowledge and ability, he or she should be allowed to instruct and evaluate. The lack of transparency in shop (instructor) selections and the criteria for selection to the crew force were points of contention for participants in all three wings. Members from all the 91st MW groups agreed that the current process for selecting evaluators and instructors is completely broken. One participant described it as a "good ole boy system," where shop crews look out for their own. He described how evaluators returning to their line squadron to complete their upgrade evaluation were told "the first one back is free," referring to a free evaluation rating. Each group from the 90th and 91st agreed that the deputy instructor position should be removed, stating that deputies lack the credibility and experience to make them subject matter experts and should instead be learning their job. The responses were overwhelmingly similar—that crew members with experience and credibility should be the sole instructors and evaluators for the crew force. However, participants from multiple 341st groups argued that there are few positions and opportunities available for officers to develop and grow in their leadership faculties and that removing deputy instructors might stunt CGO development. These participants supported their argument for keeping the deputy position using the example of a junior deputy instructor who did a phenomenal job instructing. Some participants in the three wings also recommended that instructors and test proctors PCS to a different wing to alleviate the issues that may arise from the buddy system and remove the peer pressure. A myriad of suggested alternatives from the 91st MW included having civilians or members from other sections proctor the tests to remove the peer/social group pressure. Others suggested having only experienced and respected crew commanders in shop positions.

How would you improve the training process?

The participants offered multiple responses covering a wide variety of training processes and functions. A few suggestions were recurrent among various groups, including empowering the crew commander to lead and train the crew and to instill more trust in the crew commander and his or her perspective; having the flight commanders and CGOs run the day-to-day operations and training; using crew time more deliberately; having a willingness to admit knowledge and performance deficiencies and making it okay to fail and show weaknesses; and aligning the testing, training, and evaluation environmental expectations.

A group at the 91st proposed having tiered training and tests, separating freshmen and seniors to offer training tailored to their experience level. Some other suggestions from the 91st included a master question bank at Twentieth AF for monthly tests, tracking on-the-job training to eliminate classroom training requirements, and defining structured pathway/intervals for crew member progression. Additional ideas included utilizing the squadron weapons officers more effectively; establishing a universal alert count standard for completion of crew tours; creating environments where mistakes are valued as learning opportunities; triaging training requirements based on criticality to place emphasis on the information that should have higher importance; creating better instructional products to make them useful and engaging and less of a "copy and paste" exercise; making training and testing more conceptual, more focused on understanding relationships, and less procedural in nature; standardizing instructional processes and products across the wings; and allowing more MPT time for crew practice.

Answers from participants in the 341st MW groups also varied considerably. These included such ideas as making computer-based training available to crew members to complete while on alert, starting classroom sessions with a pretest to show how training should be tailored to the audience, eliminating the death-by-PowerPoint culture, updating training periodically to ensure the same materials are not presented on a continuous basis, placing greater emphasis on the crew commander being responsible for training his or her deputies, removing emphasis from crew integral rates, allowing a more flexible schedule to give crew members varying crew perspectives and eliminating crew complacency, placing emphasis on the whole-person concept when making manning decisions, establishing formalized criteria and procedures for shop hires to show crew members a clear pathway for progression, minimizing schedule changes that negatively impact family life, allowing more time for MPT sessions, providing different training sessions for different crew members based on experience levels, allowing crews to test together but retaining an independent EWO assessment for individualized components, and having a closed/open book test hinged to annual evaluations.

Responses from the 90th MW included making the test pass/fail. Others suggested eliminating monthly testing and focusing on training, establishing crew testing, writing better tests, increasing simulator time, and adding another trainer to each wing.

Twentieth AF 13N CGO Assessment Findings

Leadership Environment and Oversight

A startling revelation is that 60.2 percent of respondents at some level agreed that their squadron leadership was aware of improper behavior. Additionally, 10.4 percent of respondents chose not to answer that question, which was particularly high in comparison to the other questions in this category. This would suggest that misbehavior within squadrons, such as test collaboration, was known at the squadron leadership level. Focus group comments corroborated that leadership likely was aware of test collaboration. While 64.7 percent of respondents do not believe that their squadron commander values high test scores even at the expense of ethics, wing responses differed significantly—offering an insight into differing leadership cultures. While approximately 72 percent of respondents from the 90th and 91st missile wings disagree at some level with the statement that their squadron commander values high test scores even at the expense of ethics, only 45.7 percent of respondents at the 341st disagreed at some level, and 27.1 percent of respondents at the same wing believe their squadron commander values high test scores even at the expense of ethics. This latter statistic compares to the 4.9 percent who agree with the same statement at the 90th and 10.1 percent of respondents from the 91st.

Only 22.5 percent of respondents disagree at some level with the statement that senior leadership does not understand the burden of monthly currency requirements, while 53.8 percent either somewhat or completely agree with the statement. This sentiment was also expressed in focus group discussions, as participants often noted that senior leadership is far removed from the operational day-to-day requirements and does not understand the issues today's MCCMs face.

The survey indicated that 55.8 percent of respondents agree at some level that squadron-level leadership is excessively involved in day-to-day field operations. Focus group findings validate these findings, as participants expressed a common belief that squadron leadership micromanages and crew members and flight commanders have no actual power and are not trusted to perform on their own.

When it comes to squadron commanders participating in monthly training and testing the same way as missileers do, 37.4 percent of respondents completely disagree and only 23.5 percent indicate some degree of agreement. Most telling is the breakdown by wing, with the participants at the 91st providing significantly different answers than those at the 341st and 90th. At the latter wing, 60.3 percent completely disagree that their squadron commander participates in monthly training the same way as crew members do, while 46.8 percent hold the same view at the 90th. By contrast, only 23.3 percent of respondents at the 91st completely disagree and 48.9 percent of respondents either somewhat or completely agree that their squadron commander participates in monthly training and testing the same way they do. Focus group findings corroborated and expanded upon these survey findings. Since the 2013 CUI, squadron commanders at the 91st MW have been taking their monthly tests and completing their academic training with missile crews. However, groups at the 341st indicated that their squadron commanders take the monthly test with other squadron commanders in a class known as "T5" and that squadron commanders

also receive answers along with the test. Respondents from the 90th MW focus groups also indicated that their squadron leadership takes the monthly tests separate from crews.

Overall, opinion seemed positive for squadron-level leadership, with 76.3 percent of the responses indicating that 13N CGOs respect their squadron commander as a leader. Additionally, 61.8 percent of respondents perceive their squadron commander as open to new ideas. There was an even distribution of respondents who believed their squadron commander was worried crew mistakes would negatively affect his or her career, with 31.8 percent of respondents disagreeing at some level and 39 percent of respondents agreeing at some level. Only 16.8 percent of respondents disagreed at some level with the statement that their squadron commander places the need of the squadron above personal success, whereas 56.2 percent of respondents agreed at some level. Focus groups also did not indicate a problem with squadron leadership; only a few participants made negative statements. However, responses on the survey comments as well as focus group comments indicated that the opinions of group-level leadership, particularly the operation groups at certain wings, such as the 341st MW, were not as favorable.

Training Effectiveness

Survey responses were positive for the effectiveness of MQT and IST, with 59.5 percent of respondents agreeing at some level that MQT effectively prepared them to perform their primary mission and 67.1 percent of respondents agreeing at some level that IST effectively prepared them to perform their primary mission. The positive response to IST training reverberated in focus group findings, with the majority of current students perceiving IST as fair and well-constructed to achieve the course objectives. Similarly, not a single focus group participant in the Twentieth AF suggested IST needed to be improved. Responses were consistent across wings, with no significant differences.

Participants' opinions were split regarding the effectiveness of monthly training, with 39.8 percent agreeing at some level that monthly currency training effectively prepared them to perform their primary mission and 40.6 percent disagreeing at some level. This split was largely uniform across the three wings. Respondents indicated that the monthly training was effective in preparing them for the monthly currency tests, with 66.7 percent agreeing at some level. However, 71.5 percent disagreed at some level that monthly currency tests provide an accurate assessment of their competency as a missileer. The views of 341st MW respondents were significantly different from those at the 90th and 91st, as 61.7 percent of respondents at the 341st completely disagreed that monthly currency tests provided an accurate assessment of missileer competency and 20 percent somewhat disagreed. In comparison, only 28 percent at the 90th and 38.7 percent at the 91st disagreed completely, and 31.7 percent at the 90th and 36.8 percent at the 91st disagreed somewhat. The sentiment that monthly testing fails to accurately assess a missileer's competency was expressed by every Twentieth AF focus group. Overall, not a single

group participant across the Twentieth AF believed the monthly tests were a good measure of missileer proficiency, with the overarching consensus being that tests are written to stratify operation crew members and that test taking does not translate to field performance.

Monthly Currency Assessments

The focus group and survey findings supported the perception of the importance placed on perfection in testing and evaluations within the missileer environment and culture. The focus group findings indicated that the pressure to score a 100 percent on the currency tests varies depending on the wing. While all wings historically place great emphasis on scoring 100 percent, the 90th MW groups suggested that their squadron leadership had progressed from using test scores as the primary metric. In contrast, the perception persisted that the 341st leadership still emphasized the importance of scoring a 100 percent. And the common belief held by all focus groups is that scoring poorly on tests, even if a missileer passes, will negatively affect career progression. The survey results indicate this sentiment is expressed across the wings, with 82.5 percent of respondents believing at some level that a Q1 on evaluations has an impact on their career progression and 75.9 percent of respondents agreeing at some level that the score on the monthly currency tests has a significant impact on their career progression. However, the wings' focus groups gave different responses, with 75 percent of the 341st participants agreeing completely (16.7 percent agreeing somewhat) and approximately 41 percent of the 91st and 90th participants agreeing completely (32 percent agreeing somewhat) that the score on the monthly currency tests has a significant impact on career progression. Additionally, 88.4 percent of respondents agreed at some level that there is an expectation to score 100 percent on the monthly test, and in contrast to the focus group findings, there was no significant difference between the wings' responses.

Survey findings mirrored the focus groups' suggestion that monthly testing should be crew testing. 75.1 percent agreed at some level that monthly testing should be accomplished with their crew partner, and only 12.4 percent disagreed at some level.

In regard to the monthly test collaboration that occurred at Malmstrom AFB, the survey results combined with the focus group findings offer an insight into differing cultures between the wings. When asked whether sharing specific currency test questions is acceptable, 78.8 percent of respondents disagreed at some level. Interestingly, 71.9 percent of respondents agreed at some level that prior to the Malmstrom incident, they thought the monthly currency tests were administered in accordance with the rules. However, survey respondents from the 341st MW answered significantly differently than those at the other wings, with only 16.4 percent of respondents agreeing completely compared to the over 50 percent of respondents from the 90th and 91st holding the same view. A total of 49.1 percent of the 341st MW respondents agreed completely or somewhat, whereas a total of 79.7 percent of respondents from the 90th MW and 86.4 percent of respondents from the 91st MW agreed completely or somewhat. This would indicate that prior to the Malmstrom incident, the testing environment at Malmstrom was likely not as controlled, and tests were not administered according to guidance.

The findings indicated that 60.7 percent of respondents disagreed at some level that prior to the Malmstrom incident, sharing monthly test answers was a commonplace practice. However, the 341st MW respondents answered significantly differently than the other two wings, with only 29.8 percent of the respondents disagreeing at some level and 38.3 percent of respondents agreeing at some level. 56.2 percent of respondents disagreed at some level that prior to the Malmstrom incident, the reward for sharing test questions was greater than the consequences. Yet again, the 341st responded significantly differently with only 9.6 percent of respondents disagreeing completely, compared with the approximately 45 percent of respondents from the 90th and 91st. In regard to the reward for sharing test questions being greater than the consequences prior to the Malmstrom incident, 42.4 percent of respondents from the 341st agreed either somewhat or completely. As 98 of the possible 200 missileers at the 341st were unable to take the survey due to advice from their ADC counsel, the respondents' perspective is even more telling—these were the individuals who were not implicated in the testing probe. The results do not include responses from those missileers under suspicion of misconduct. While focus group findings indicate that participants at each wing viewed collaboration as acceptable, the 341st had a culture that viewed sharing test questions and answers as acceptable. While the respondents were not necessarily involved in test misconduct, the findings would suggest an environment at the 341st where the majority of crew members at least knew misconduct was occurring.

Missileer Culture

The questions that centered on respondents' views about the loyalty of peers and rule enforcement offer insight into the missileer culture. Only 40.1 percent of the respondents believed their peers would be willing to turn in a fellow missileer for breaking a rule. Although responses from the 341st MW were not significantly different from the other two wings, 21.4 percent of 341st responders, the lowest percentage among the wings, agreed that their peers would be willing to turn in a fellow missileer. An additional 57.5 percent agreed at some level with the statement that they would be willing to turn in a fellow missileer for breaking a rule. The focus groups corroborate this finding, as participants indicated that loyalty would allow for bending minor rules; however, all respondents indicated that there are lines they would not cross to protect a fellow missileer.

Slightly more respondents disagreed with the statement that they feel more loyal to fellow crew members than to the Air Force as a whole, with 39 percent of respondents disagreeing at some level and 28.9 percent agreeing at some level. Focus group findings indicate a culture of "us versus them" in the operational missile community and suggest that loyalty is often strongest for crewmates. Significantly, 73.5 percent of respondents agreed at some level that if they turned in a fellow missileer for breaking a rule, it would negatively impact how others treated them, while only 10 percent of respondents disagreed at some level. This indicates reluctance in the missile community to turn in missileers who may break rules—most likely due to a fear of being ostracized or otherwise negatively perceived within their community. Additionally, 51.8 percent of respondents disagreed at some level with the statement that they would be willing to bend rules to help a fellow missileer, if that fellow missileer needed their help. Only 20.5 percent of

respondents agreed at some level that they would be willing to bend rules to help another missileer.

Attachment 1: Survey Introduction Email

Earlier this year, there were allegations of drug use and cheating on monthly currency tests within the Twentieth AF ICBM operations crew force. In response to this incident, the Commander, Air Force Global Strike Command initiated an investigation into the missile training, testing and evaluation environment. This survey is a critical tool for providing senior leaders insight into the environment in which ICBM operators work. Your answers on the following questions will aid in shaping the way forward. Please use your perspective as a missileer to answer the questions as honestly as possible.

Welcome to the Twentieth AF Missile Testing, Training and Environment Survey.

Please take a few minutes to provide us with some honest feedback. All responses will be anonymous. Individual responses will be kept confidential but summarized responses may be released to the public under the Freedom of Information Act (consider OPSEC implications).
If you are not currently on missile crew, but are a CGO who has missile crew experience, please answer this survey based on that experience. If you have no experience in the missile field or are an FGO, then please do not take this survey.

Please use the final question to elaborate on any specifics you feel need to be addressed that may or may not have been covered in this survey. Your honest feedback is extremely valuable and appreciated. All of your comments and responses will be carefully reviewed by leadership and will be critical to their decisions about what the future of training and testing within missile operations will look like.

Ensure that you enter the access code provided to you in this email. If you do not enter that code, your responses cannot be accepted because we cannot verify that they came from a CGO missileer.

The ACCESS CODE for the survey is (b)(5)..

The survey will close out COB 13 Feb 2014.

When you have carefully reviewed these instructions, please proceed to the survey by clicking the link below. Thank you for your time and feedback.

https://20af.eis.af.mil/em/A3/Lists/Current%20and%20former%20MCC%20survey/overview.aspx

CGO Instructor/Evaluator Focus Group Data

Introduction

The purpose of the instructor groups was to explore the institutional factors that contributed to the Malmstrom AFB nuclear missile currency test compromise incident as specified in the Commander Directed Investigation (CDI) into ICBM Testing Culture, Malmstrom Air Force Base, MT memorandum dated 27 January 2014. Focus group questions listed below sought members' perspectives on missile training and testing culture as well as leadership environment and oversight. These questions also sought instructor and evaluator suggestions on how to improve the integrity of the testing process and the ICBM training and evaluation system as a whole.

Summary of Findings

Focus group responses reveal significant contributing factors that led to an environment where test compromise could occur, including a culture centered upon perfection in test scores, relaxed standards creating gaps in testing integrity safeguards and a perceived gray area in academic integrity, and crew force loyalty. However, respondents also provided several recommendations for improvement, including reducing pressure caused by the culture of perfection by minimizing the importance of knowledge testing scores, ensuring knowledge testing meets the objectives, and allowing flexibility for wings to develop their own training and evaluating processes— maximizing the effectiveness and efficiency of the training process. While these findings should not be interpreted as justification for alleged inappropriate or illegal actions of officers within the ICBM community, they do provide insight into possible root causes for observed activities and potential recommendations for improvement.

The participants cited a culture of perfection in the ICBM community that often manifested itself in the training and testing environment. According to participants, at times, squadron and group leadership placed significant emphasis on knowledge testing scores, utilizing them as a performance standard in rating individual proficiency, manning decisions, and individual and unit competition. Often, according to participants, the expectation of crew members was to score a 100 percent on most, if not all, examinations. The amount of pressure seemed dependent on leadership climate, with Minot and F. E. Warren participants noting reduced pressure today compared to previous experiences. They noted, however, that this dynamic was based on leadership climate and not part of any cultural norms. Participants believed this dynamic could easily revert back with any change in the leadership teams. Participants also believed that this culture of perfection was a contributing factor in crew members taking actions outside the individual effort standard, including "fishing" for answers, commanders helping deputies, and group testing. A few participants believed this to be a key contributing factor in the testing compromise at Malmstrom AFB.

Participants also revealed gaps in enforcement of standards utilized to protect testing integrity. The missile wings had taken fairly significant steps to protect the integrity of knowledge testing, including implementing test control, proctoring tests, utilizing multiple versions of tests, masking

versions of tests, and controlling answer sheets. However, leadership did not follow these safeguards for all knowledge testing environments. Participants at all bases observed relaxation of the standards when it came to codes and weapon system testing, believing the open book nature of the testing would limit instances of crew members cheating on these tests. For example, at Minot, leaders often failed to proctor tests, leaving enforcement of the rules up to the class—an action later reversed following the 2013 combined unit inspection (CUI). Additionally, participants in all groups believed that while students were aware of the higher-headquarters-levied individual testing requirement, the students see activities such as group testing and fishing for answers as longstanding "accepted practices." The lack of standard enforcement allowed for an environment where tests could be compromised and where crew members became willing to compromise the integrity of the individual effort knowledge tests.

Another challenge revealed by participants revolved around the relationships within the ICBM community. While instructors across all groups showed a significant loyalty to duty, they also felt pressure in their loyalty to one another and the group as a whole. This created a very challenging position for instructors between enforcing the standards and serving their fellow crew members. Some instructors would not allow any level of "assistance"; others saw such assistance as an opportunity to meet the primary objective to train crew members. Still others noted the pressure on an instructor may drive him or her to mistake "the wingman concept" for "helping a buddy out." Focus groups felt that this pressure would be most profound for a deputy commander and recommended a more robust instructor certification training and periodic follow-on training and oversight—especially for deputy commanders. Additionally, focus group members from AETC recommended that AFGSC clearly define academic integrity and cheating in the AFGSC Instruction 13-5301 volumes to protect crew members and testing integrity from cultural norms that may run contrary to the desired training and testing process.

All focus groups agreed that changes should be made in the training and testing system. First, they believed that the importance of testing scores should be minimized. The purpose of this is twofold: 1) to bring testing back within the bounds of its objectives, measuring crew member proficiency and validating training; and 2) to limit one of the major factors driving crew members to cheating—the culture of perfection. Participants recommended a broad scale of options, ranging from eliminating testing to nonretributional testing to pass/fail testing. Most participants believed that pass/fail testing would be the most effective, as it would reduce the importance of scores while keeping the opportunity to "fail" to ensure crew members take both training and testing seriously.

Focus groups also noted that testing should meet a set of objectives. Currency tests that measure crew member proficiency should focus only on the key tasks and knowledge areas important for performance as a crew member (similar to rated bold-face tests). Proficiency tests utilized to validate training can be more broad or in-depth depending on objectives and levels to which members are trained but should also allow students to make mistakes (i.e., masked scores, pass/fail, or nonretributional only). Finally, instructors recommend wings be allowed to develop their own training, much of which is currently developed at Twentieth Air Force. According to participants, developing training at the wing level more effectively applies the ISD model and

allows greater flexibility for wings to meet training needs and address task deficiencies in the most effective and efficient manner.

All Air Force officers are trained on the core values, the first of which is integrity. Participants revealed that students were aware of and understood higher headquarters testing requirements; however, a series of factors, including several outlined by these instructor focus groups, served to create an environment where testing integrity was able to be compromised. The findings of these focus groups provide both insight into the root causes and recommendations for improvement as viewed by the instructors and evaluators serving on the front line where the incidents occurred.

Instructor Focus Group Methodology and Protocol

Instructor focus groups were conducted at F. E. Warren AFB, Vandenberg AFB, Minot AFB, and Malmstrom AFB. The CDI conducted three instructor focus groups at each wing, with each group comprising three to six wing-certified missile combat crew instructors and evaluators. The exception was Malmstrom, where limitations of available instructors and evaluators due to alert schedules and those represented by legal counsel only allowed for two focus groups, with each comprised of three to four wing-certified instructors and evaluators. The CDI also conducted three focus groups each, comprising four AETC-certified missile initial qualification training instructors stationed at Vandenberg. The AETC focus groups were divided by the base of previous missile assignment (F. E. Warren, Malmstrom, and Minot). Each focus group was conducted by the same two members of the CDI to ensure continuity.

All focus groups occurred during normal working hours, with the earliest group starting at 0800 and the latest group ending at 1730. All groups were conducted in a private room, with only focus group and CDI members present. Focus group participants received a brief introduction on the scope of the focus group from CDI members. The CDI also explained that it would not be including names and other personal identifying information in its notes or the CDI write-up to ensure all comments remained confidential. The CDI then conducted a question-and-answer session utilizing the questions below. The AETC focus groups were asked the same question set as the missile wing focus groups but were also asked to compare and contrast their experience at the missile wings and their experience as an AETC instructor. The CDI concluded focus groups with the opportunity for group members to provide additional feedback on topics related to the CDI that might not have been covered during the course of the discussion. Each focus group took approximately 90 minutes to complete.

Focus Group Questions

1. How are the currency tests typically administered? Could you walk me through a typical testing session? What are the procedures if a proctor leaves the room?
2. What instructions are given to students before they take the tests?
3. What policy/guidance exists over testing procedure? How aware are the students of the policy/guidance set for testing procedures? How well do students follow policy/guidance?

4. Do you agree with the testing policy/guidance?
5. What is the training for an instructor/test proctor? Do you feel the training is adequate? What would you change about it?
6. What type of oversight is provided for instructor duties? How are you evaluated?
7. What safeguards are taken to ensure integrity of the test? What actions could be taken to prevent cheating?
8. How important is a squadron's performance on testing? Why is it important?
9. What occurs when a missileer does not pass a test? Is there motivation to ensure all test takers pass?
10. What sort of pressure is there to ensure students score a 100 percent on the currency test? From whom do you typically see that pressure? Do you feel an internal pressure, or a personal motivation to ensure a student scores a 100 percent?
11. What is the relationship between instructors and students like? How about outside the classroom?
12. How would you change the testing process?

Characteristics of Participants

Instructor focus groups under this CDI surveyed a total of 46 officers. The groups included 38 males and 8 females across an assortment of commission sources (OTS, the USAFA, and ROTC) and from different races. As a college degree is a prerequisite for commissioning, all individuals were college graduates, with many participants having obtained master's degrees. Focus groups at the missile wings included 26 captains and 8 lieutenants. Most members were on their first operational missile tour. Several of the instructors had been extended on their first duty assignment beyond the normal four-year PCS point to fill EWO, codes instructor, or senior crew member billets (a fairly normal practice in ICBM operations). Several of the instructors also had prior enlisted experience in the Air Force or sister services. The AETC instructor groups included 12 captains on their second or third tour as officers in the Air Force, with several of these instructors also having prior enlisted experience. All AETC instructors had conducted an operational missile crew tour at one of the three missile operations wings prior to their assignment as an AETC instructor.

Focus Group Responses

1. How are the currency tests typically administered? Could you walk me through a typical testing session? What are the procedures if a proctor leaves the room?

Focus group participants revealed that the EWO test had the strictest controls, due to its classified nature. All wings administered the EWO test in a vault using multiple versions of the test. All wings now also mask the version, so students are not aware of the version they are taking. A minimum of an instructor and an O-5 proctor all EWO examinations. Instructors must limit the number of answer sheets to two, and students who leave the room must be escorted— per Twentieth AF policy. Participants noted different experiences with codes and weapon system testing. Test booklets were controlled. However, students could utilize multiple answer sheets,

but only one was expected to be turned in to the proctor. All other answer sheets were not controlled in most cases. Additionally, there may or may not be multiple versions of the test administered to students. Focus groups said that due to the open-book nature of the codes and weapon system tests, cheating was not expected. All tests (EWO, codes and weapon system) were proctored, with the exception of Minot as discussed below.

There was a significant difference in responses to this question from the focus group at Minot and the Minot instructor focus group conducted at Vandenberg. All focus group participants stationed at Minot and the former Minot crew members at Vandenberg revealed that prior to the 2013 CUI, Minot knowledge testing was not always proctored. Participants noted that in many of the testing sessions, the instructor initiated the test and then left the room. Members in the room then dictated the testing atmosphere, which varied from individual testing to crew testing to the entire class taking the test together. During the 2013 CUI, crew members were expected to take an individual effort test, which approximately 25 percent failed. All knowledge tests administered post-CUI are now proctored, and leadership strictly follows higher headquarters testing guidelines. Minot focus group members noted that testing scores have risen significantly and that they believe the rise in scores is due to the enforcement of the individual effort standard.

2. What instructions are given to students prior to taking the tests?

Participants revealed similar procedures across the missile wings. Participants stated that instructors would sometimes show a slide on testing procedures at the end of the brief. All EWO tests included an extensive set of instructions on the first page of the test, including the directions that each test is individual effort. Participants at Minot stated that these directions "may or may not" be on the weapon system and codes tests, while participants at Malmstrom and F. E. Warren recalled instructions being on all of their weapon system and codes tests. Participant responses revealed that the AETC IST unit at Vandenberg had the most robust instructions to students. The first day of IST includes a lesson on academic integrity and instructions on testing. Rules on academic integrity are once again briefed to the students just prior to the test, and each test includes instructions highlighting the test as individual effort. Participants believed that this was necessary for the new students at Vandenberg but did not feel it was necessary to go this in-depth at the wing; they believed that the instructions in the testing booklet were sufficient.

3. What policy/guidance exists over testing procedure? How aware are the students of the policy/guidance set for testing procedures? How well do students follow policy/guidance?

All focus groups revealed that testing policy at the wings is derived from the AFGSC Instruction 13-5301 associated volumes, the Annual Training and Evaluation Plan, the Twentieth Air Force Standard EWO Training Materials (SETM), and recent guidance memorandums from Twentieth Air Force. All focus groups stated that they believed all students were aware of the knowledge testing policies listed in these documents. However, focus group responses also revealed that these policies were not always enforced. Across focus groups, participants noted violations of the individual effort requirement, including crew commanders assisting deputy crew commanders, students fishing for answers through clarification questions to test proctors, and group testing.

Several participants in focus groups across the bases noted that the relaxed standards enforcement led to students viewing the above "techniques" as accepted practices and "everyone thought it was innocent."

Participants at Vandenberg noted a rigorous testing and academic integrity policy. Chapter 4 of AETC Instruction 36-2909, *Recruiting, Education, and Training Standards of Conduct*, outlines the meaning of academic integrity and clearly defines cheating. These participants felt it was a good baseline and thought that a similar section should be included in the AFGSCI 13-5301 volumes. They believed that providing a clear definition of cheating would better protect crew members and the integrity of the testing process from certain cultural norms that may run contrary to desired testing practices.

4. Do you agree with the testing policy/guidance?

Focus groups unanimously agreed that testing policy and guidance needs to change. There was unanimous disagreement with the policy of having an O-5 in the room for testing. One participant noted, "If you can't trust me to test, then how can you trust me on alert?" Participants felt that the presence of instructor proctors in the room was sufficient. Additionally, participants across focus groups questioned the frequency of testing. Several groups questioned the need for monthly codes and weapon system testing, citing that these may be better trained/evaluated in the simulator or via an annual codes certification, for example. Across the groups, participants were also concerned regarding the objective of knowledge tests. They did not believe the questions on knowledge tests accurately identify crew members' knowledge deficiencies or that the tests adequately validate training. Another focus group challenged Twentieth Air Force's writing of the tests. They believed it breaks the ISD model the Air Force uses to develop training. Allowing the wings to develop training gives them flexibility to better train and evaluate tasks and respond to training deficiencies in an effective and efficient manner.

5. What is the training for an instructor/test proctor? Do you feel the training is adequate? What would you change about it?

Participant responses demonstrated very similar experiences in training received to become instructors and evaluators. All three wings had a two- to three-day classroom portion of instructor training, a self-study, and approximately three observations (more if needed) of an instructor or evaluator conducting duties prior to certification. Additionally, Twentieth Air Force requires all instructors and evaluators to attend training for their duties at the ICE within the first three months of certification. However, due to funding restrictions, wings are currently waived from this requirement. Participants felt the ICE course was very useful for a new instructor or evaluator; however, participants who had attended after their first three months of certification did not feel the course was worthwhile.

While all participants in the Malmstrom focus groups felt prepared for instructor/evaluator duty following instructor/evaluator training, participant readiness for instructor duty at other bases varied. Several focus groups touched on deputy commanders being pushed forward for instructor

or evaluator duty too fast. Participants who did not feel as adequately prepared could not note any specific areas for improvement other than focusing on preparing them to teach in the classroom rather than instructional processes (where to stand, how to fill out training forms, etc.). Additionally, there was little if any instruction on knowledge testing rules/procedures across the missile wings.

The AETC instructors noted a robust training process prior to becoming instructors compared to their certification experiences at the missile wings. Instructors are required to attend the basic instructor course and then observe seasoned instructors conducting duties prior to certification. Participants felt that the AETC certification process better prepared them for their instructor duties and definitely better prepared them for test administration. Once again, however, instructors complained that the course focused more on procedure than on actually preparing them to be an instructor.

6. What type of oversight is provided for instructor duties? How are you evaluated?

Participant experiences for follow-on training, oversight, and evaluation varied throughout the wings. All wings except Malmstrom had an annual training requirement and also were visited/inspected by Twentieth AF, with most instructors and evaluators experiencing more than one observation per year. All wing instructors/evaluators also noted they would receive feedback from their trainees or evaluatees. Participant responses varied as to whether they felt their postcertification training and evaluation requirements served to improve their capability as an instructor or evaluator, but most recommended at least some level of periodic training throughout the year. Malmstrom had a semiannual requirement for instructor observations and would conduct quarterly instructor training sessions. All participants in the Malmstrom focus groups felt their training was sufficient in preparing them for instructor duties.

The AETC IST instructors had a robust postcertification program, requiring three observations in the first three months followed by semiannual and annual observations—depending on level of experience. Once again, participants noted that these observations focused more on procedure than technical content of what they were teaching, but they still found the feedback useful in making them a better instructor. Participants agreed that a more robust postcertification program would be useful to wing instructors, provided it focused on improving the instructor rather than evaluating procedure.

7. What safeguards are taken to protect the integrity of the test? What actions can be taken to prevent cheating?

Participants noted that the missile wings had fairly robust policies to protect the integrity of the test, when the local policies were followed. Currently, missile wing instructors create knowledge tests on password-protected drives accessible only to instructors. Paper copy tests are stored in safes or the EWO vault, are numbered, and can be checked out only by instructors. Multiple versions of the test are created and masked to prevent cheating, and answer sheets are controlled (at least in EWO). Student seating is spaced out, when possible, to prevent students from looking

at one another's paper. Additionally, following the Malmstrom incident, cell phones and other electronic devices are not allowed in unclassified classrooms. Such restrictions already existed in EWO class due to classified material used in training. Focus group participants noted that wings could enforce existing policy and utilize the same procedures employed to protect EWO tests for codes and weapon system testing to further prevent cheating.

8. How important is a squadron's performance on testing? Why is it important?

All focus groups agreed that a squadron's performance on knowledge testing was important, citing that testing scores are included in officer performance reports and individual and unit award packages. Several participants responded that testing scores are "the most important factor," "everything," and "a top concern of leadership," and "it's all about the metrics." Several groups noted that squadron commanders wanted to win the Squadron of the Year award, with one determining element being testing scores. Several focus groups relayed stories of squadron commanders in metrics meetings arguing over a 0.1 percentage point difference in knowledge testing scores. Another participant noted hearing the operations group commander say of metrics, "It's how I score my squadron commanders." Participants at Minot and F. E. Warren focus groups noted that that emphasis on test scores had dropped, but they believed that this is driven by current operations group leadership. They feared that attention could easily revert back to testing scores following leadership changeover.

9. What occurs when a missileer doesn't pass a test? Is there motivation to ensure all test takers pass?

Participants noted that an ICBM crew member who fails a monthly examination or annual evaluation will be restricted from alert duties. The individual is subsequently retrained, retested, or reevaluated, and then unrestricted from duty by his/her certifying official. Additionally, due to the extremely competitive nature of missile crew member scores, a crew member who fails a knowledge test or monthly examination will likely not be hired as an instructor, evaluator, or other such position. This can also mean that a member who has already achieved such a position may be fired for a testing failure (see also question 10). One participant overheard a student saying, "Well, there goes my career," after failing a monthly test. Participants at Minot and F. E. Warren noted that historically crew members would be fired for failing a test, but recently a more whole-person concept is considered. However, like question 8 above, this dynamic, too, is leadership dependent according to participants.

When asked if there is motivation to ensure all test takers pass, participants quickly answered that they did not feel pressure to ensure students passed. Participants across all bases relayed stories of group leadership directing harder tests if there were not enough failures or testing scores were too high. Instructors, however, noted pressure when it came to retraining and retesting these individuals. Often there was pressure to push the member through retraining the same day as he or she failed the knowledge test to ensure he or she was available for alert the following day. Participants saw this as commanders caring more for meeting a schedule than

ensuring the crew member actually understood the material, and they questioned whether the monthly training was really about training the crews or about "checking a box."

10. What sort of pressure is there to ensure students score a 100 percent on the currency test? From whom do you typically see that pressure? Do you feel an internal pressure, or a personal motivation to ensure a student scores a 100 percent?

While instructors across all groups initially stated that they did not feel pressure to ensure students received 100 percent, as discussions unfolded, some stated that they did feel pressure brought on by this dynamic. Several participants cited squadron leadership (commanders and operations officers) telling them, "I don't care how you do it, get a 100 percent." All groups across all bases shared stories of crew members not being hired or being fired and even being placed on directed study during "days off" for averaging less than 97 percent on knowledge tests (equivalent to one missed question per test). One participant stated, "Your job is on the line every time you take a test." As such, participants relayed stories of crew commanders arguing the fidelity of questions in order to get questions "thrown out," and at times the crew commanders would check their deputy crew commander's answer sheet to ensure they also scored a 100 percent. Participants experienced crew members fishing for answers through the use of clarification questions clearly phrased so the instructor would give away the answer if he or she addressed the crew member's question. Finally, where the testing environment allowed, a few participants relayed stories of crew or group testing being conducted on individual effort tests.

Participants had a wide variety of response to such pressure. Several participants noted seeing clarification questions as a training opportunity and would "assist [crew members] without giving them the answer." They stated that they wanted to ensure the crew member only missed the question if they truly did not understand the concept. Others stated that they experienced a wide range of instructor responses to clarification questions, ranging from giving no assistance at all to literally pointing out the answer to the student. To other participants, the pressure did not come from an individual but the desire to "ensure the crew force as a whole succeeds." While not being directly asked, three focus groups at Malmstrom and Minot cited the pressure to get a 100 percent as the primary reason for the test compromise at Malmstrom, stating that "they don't cheat to pass, they cheat to get a 100 percent."

11. What is the relationship between instructors and students like? How about outside the classroom?

When asked about the role friendships played, participants gave a variety of answers. Those instructors who were no longer combat mission ready (CMR) crew members actively performing alert duty responded more quickly and with more definitive answers that personal relationships did not factor into grading knowledge tests. However, those still on CMR crew status unanimously noted that they had personal relationships with "just about everyone" to whom they administered knowledge tests. While stating that their duty as an instructor was never compromised, several of the CMR-certified instructors did see how an instructor could be

compromised by friendships. One participant stated that one "could see the possibility of an instructor mistaking the wingman concept by trying to help a buddy out." Another cited loyalty to the crew force as a whole, stating that the pressure "wasn't to help friends, but ensure that the crew force as a whole succeeds." However, schedulers within the group stated that they were cognizant of such relationships and would reschedule events where the trainer and trainee had a close relationship (i.e., spouse, roommate, etc.) where possible. Additionally, all surveyed instructors seemed to have a strong sense of duty, with several sharing stories of giving a failing score to a friend and fellow crew member who did not pass a test.

12. How would you change the testing and training process?

Participants unanimously agreed that the testing process needs to change and provided a series of suggestions as to where they believed changes would best serve the ICBM force. All focus groups agreed there needs to be a change in the scoring process and that the pass/fail system would likely be the best compromise. Several group members recommended going to a nonretributional test, but there was also concern that crew members would not take training seriously without the forcing function of the test. Numerous focus groups across the wings suggested that missile testing mirror the rated community with a pass/fail, bold-face test from a test bank, focusing only on the critical items a crew member needs to know. One participant also recommended eventually going to a computer-based testing system, also like the rated community, to drastically reduce the possibility of cheating. Participants suggested that the training validation function for monthly training sessions could be covered by a nonretributional test, correctable to 100 percent, if deemed necessary by leadership. All focus groups discussed crew testing as an option with mixed results. Focus group members agreed that, with the exception of a distinct few, most activities are conducted as a crew, but crew testing would also allow a commander to "pull along" a weak deputy commander. Finally, several groups discussed eliminating weapon system and codes testing altogether and replacing such testing with training validation through performance-based checks in the simulator. This would open up more time to do deep-dive training during weapon system and codes class. Many participants did note, however, that simulator training should be a crew member's opportunity to make a mistake so training events in the simulator should be largely nonretributional, as these activities are already validated through an annual crew member evaluation in the simulator. All groups believed that EWO classroom training and testing should continue to ensure crew readiness for the wartime mission.

Several focus groups also recommended a change in how training is conducted. First, several focus groups recommended that the wing should build training products, with Twentieth Air Force approving or disapproving those products as required. This fits better with the ISD model, according to participants, and would allow greater flexibility in training and training validation. Additionally, participants recommended that the Job Performance Requirements Listing and the Annual Training and Evaluation Plan be reviewed and changed. Participants suggested that certain lower-priority tasks, such as blast door operations, could be trained by the missile combat crew commander to their deputy commander—much like other Air Force on-the-job tasks are trained. This would reduce the number of tasks trained during group classroom sessions and

allow greater focus on more important tasks. Some participants suggested training with a more Socratic question and answer method rather than the current death-by-PowerPoint lecture style used today. Several other participants recommended having commander and deputy commander classes, where deputies could study core concepts and commanders could do a deep dive into tasks. One participant with extensive training experience summarized it by stating, "You cannot put training in a box. Yet that is how the Air Force does it." The bottom-line theme across all focus groups is that they want training and testing to meet objectives and better prepare the crew force rather than simply checking a box.

Leadership Interview Analysis

Introduction

The purpose of the squadron and group commander interviews was to explore the institutional culture and leadership factors that may have contributed to the Malmstrom AFB knowledge test compromise incident as specified in the Commander Directed Investigation (CDI) into ICBM Testing Culture, Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana, memorandum dated 27 January 14.

Summary of Findings

Demographics

Across the missile wing leadership enterprise, all key officer leadership positions were manned with personnel that had previous missile crew experience. The squadron commanders' experience level in ICBM operations averaged 11 years. Across the three bases, F. E. Warren, Minot, and Malmstrom, the averages were 10, 11, and 12 years respectively. Overall, individual squadron commander experience levels ranged from a minimum of six years to a maximum of 15 years. The group commanders' experience level in ICBM operations was more disparate. The F. E. Warren group commander has six years' experience in ICBM operations and 20 months in the job; the Minot group commander has been in ICBM operations for 20 years with seven months in the job; and the Malmstrom group commander has 10 years' experience in ICBM operations and 19 months in the job.

Training

All of the commanders who were asked "are missile crews sufficiently trained to execute their mission without additional input?" responded affirmatively. These perceptions have been reinforced over time by their OGV shops, their personal crew member experiences, high test scores, and favorable inspection results.

There were several suggestions to improve the overall training environment. One commander noted that he wants to see better classroom training for their new deputy commanders. Two others stated that they wanted to see more realistic, real world, story-driven training rides in the simulator versus event-driven trainer rides. Two others suggested that having a fighter-pilot-type debrief with experienced instructors at the end of the simulator ride would help reinforce the training objectives. One suggested that "we should train how we fight" and that the unclassified training products should be available to crew members on-demand using their computers. Another suggested making the training more ISD compliant, focusing on knowledge and performance skills required for crew member operations and focusing less on generic tasks.

Relative to leadership oversight of the training, all of the squadron commanders who were asked, with the exception of the OSS commanders, unanimously stated that they do not observe very much training. They stated they do not observe the classroom training because they do not want to interfere with classroom instruction; they think their presence makes the students feel

uncomfortable, and then students do not feel free to ask any questions. Most of the training squadron commanders do observe is from behind the glass of the MPT, where students cannot see them. All of the OSS commanders unanimously spent more time observing classroom instruction, MPT training, and crew testing.

A minority of the commanders do not like the current practice of having deputy crew member instructors that are not already crew commanders. Under the current construct, once you have been a deputy crew member for approximately 12 months, leadership selects who goes to the shop and become a deputy instructor/evaluator. When one becomes an instructor/evaluator, one's monthly alert requirement is reduced from eight alerts a month to two alerts a month. The result of the current construct is that you have a very junior crew member instructor/evaluator with little weapons systems experience and operational proficiency, which limits his or her ability to be an effective and credible instructor.

Over the course of conducting 20 leadership interviews, there were a few themes that resonated with everyone. One of the themes was that crew members will not volunteer to take additional training rides in the MPT to improve their performance. Interviewees said there is a stigma attached to doing more training rides. Thus, students worry that if they ask for more training, leaders will perceive them as slow learners or perhaps incompetent crew members. This parallels another theme the interviewers heard that says "pulling more alerts over a long period of time is seen as a bad thing." Another version of the same theme is "those with the least amount of alert tours wins." These themes seem to resonate with how crew members perceive their operational proficiency and performance.

Testing

Attention to detail is drilled into missile crew members from day one at Vandenberg AFB during their IST. Once they finish IST, they move to their operational base to complete their MQT program. Once qualified, CMR crew members take a monthly codes test and weapons system test that are completely open book to stay certified. In addition, they take the EWO test, which allows crew members to use certain regulations while limiting access to others. A few of the commanders stated that these open-book tests more likely evaluate crew members' ability to look things up versus their knowledge and understanding of the material.

All of the commanders interviewed stated that they have not verbalized or directed any test expectations other than crew members need a 90 percent or higher score to pass the test. However, a majority of the commanders interviewed shared the following themes they have heard from crew members or other leadership relative to test expectations. These include the following statements: "If you don't have a 98 percent test average, you're not coming to the shop"; "Get 100 percent no matter what it takes"; and "We're doing this to make sure everyone succeeds." Although current leadership says this does not reflect reality, there is the perception among the crew force that they need to get a 100 percent on their tests for positive career progression and other desirable opportunities.

A majority of the commanders we interviewed about the testing compromise at Malmstrom were quite surprised by the number of people involved, the boldness of their actions, and the level of sophistication involved with the compromised material. However, a couple of commanders at Minot stated that they were not so much surprised that the test compromise had occurred, just surprised at how it had happened. Another commander who was not surprised stated that he saw cheating back when he was a crew member at Malmstrom. One of the commanders stated, "I don't know how they could have seen it coming, [or] how they could have stopped it from happening."

All of the commanders unanimously responded in the affirmative when asked if they would be open to a master question list or bold-face type test. Using that train of thought, commanders offered several different ideas on ways to improve the testing. A couple of commanders recommended that the tests be pass or fail. Another commander recommended computer-based training, with the primary focus on evaluating crew performance in the simulator. Several others stated there is little value in the current open-book testing process because it only reflects how well one can look things up in the technical orders or regulation. A couple of commanders also recommended that testing should be conducted quarterly rather than monthly. They also stated we should place more weight on the trainer rides versus the paper test.

A majority of commanders noted that testing policy and guidance instructions were very clear and posted on the cover pages of the tests. However, one commander noted that there were no clear definitions or stated policy on academic integrity. Another commander stated that the recently published guidance on test procedures is muddy and confusing.

All the commanders unanimously responded affirmatively when asked if they "receive updates on how the crews are doing in testing." However, they also stated that they do not look at individual test scores. A couple of commanders said the test scores are posted for everyone to view. Utilization of test scores varied across the wings. All wings develop metrics using the standardized training and review panel (STRP) process but stated the STRP product was driven by Twentieth AF and is only used to review trends for training validation—not to track individual scores. Additionally, a couple of squadron commanders noted these average scores are used for OG awards. In addition, all commanders noted that test scores appear in almost all officer performance reports (OPR) in the wing, but a recent policy change states that one can no longer utilize test scores in OPR bullets.

A majority of the commanders identified a "gray area" in missile testing culture. They noted that the standards protecting test integrity were not always followed. For example, a majority of the commanders recalled testing experiences during their time on crew when crew commanders would assist deputy crew commanders by checking their answers or telling them to go back and check a particular answer. When asked if squadron commanders take the tests in the same venue as their crew members, Malmstrom and F. E. Warren commanders noted that they take these tests separately from their crews, while Minot leadership takes their tests with their crews. The rationale provided by Malmstrom and F. E. Warren for the difference was that commanders take the test a month prior to "validate the test" and remove any bad questions prior to crews taking the test. The fact that crew members at Malmstrom knew that combat-mission-ready squadron

commanders took an individual effort test as a group may have contributed to expanding the perceived "gray area" rules on testing by the crews.

Overall, commanders want to provide an atmosphere of excellence for their personnel. One of the commanders even said that he was glad to see the CDI: "I see it as help is on the way." The findings of these interviews identified several factors that may have contributed to an environment where test compromise could occur. While none of these factors should be mistaken as rationale for crew member misconduct, correcting the identified issues within the system and institutional culture would serve to further protect system integrity and better prepare crew members for mission success.

Leadership Interview Participation Methodology and Protocol

Leadership interviews were conducted at the three operational missile wings located at F. E. Warren AFB, Wyoming; Minot AFB, North Dakota; and Malmstrom AFB, Montana, and the AETC training group located at Vandenberg AFB, California. The latter conducts space and missile IST for the Air Force. Interviews included a total of 20 officers: 4 group commanders; 3 deputy group commanders; and 13 squadron commanders from the operational missile squadrons, the OSS, and the IST training squadron at Vandenberg AFB.

All interviews were conducted in a private room with only Lt Gen James M. "Mike" Holmes and the respective commander being interviewed, with Lt Col (b)(6) (CDI team member) taking notes as the recorder. Lt Gen Holmes prebriefed the commanders on the scope and purpose of the CDI and then asked each commander a series of questions. Commanders at Malmstrom AFB provided a sworn summarized testimony of their respective interviews. All other interviews were not taken as sworn testimony. Based upon Lt Gen Holmes experience and discretion, previous responses nullifying future questions, or timing constraints, not all questions associated with the interview script were asked. Additionally, some of the questions were for demographic and organizational analysis only. The CDI team included only questions and responses relevant to this report as part of this annex. Each interview group took approximately 60 minutes to complete.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER
AIR FORCE GLOBAL STRIKE
COMMAND

AIR FORCE GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND
INSTRUCTION 13-5301, VOLUME 1

16 MAY 2011

Incorporating Change 1, 23 SEPTEMBER 2011

Nuclear, Space, Missile, Command and Control

RAPID EXECUTION AND COMBAT
TARGETING (REACT) CREW TRAINING

COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY

ACCESSIBILITY: Publications and forms are available on the e-Publishing website at www.e-publishing.af.mil for downloading or ordering.

RELEASABILITY: There are no releasability restrictions on this publication.

OPR: HQ AFGSC/A3TO

Certified by: HQ AFGSC/A3T (Colonel Daniel A. Kosin)

Supersedes: AFGSCI 36-2202v1, 1 Dec 2009

Pages: 81

This instruction implements Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 13-5, *Nuclear Operations.* This instruction defines roles, responsibilities, and minimum requirements for REACT mission-ready training programs for employment of the Minuteman III Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and applies to 13S personnel assigned to Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC), Twentieth Air Force (20 AF) and AFGSC Missile Wings (MW). This instruction applies to 392nd Training Squadron (392 TRS) as applicable. This instruction does not apply to Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard units. This instruction requires collecting and maintaining information protected by the Privacy Act of 1974 authorized by 10 USC 8013. Privacy Act system notice number F036 AF PC C, Military Personnel Records System, applies.

Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) using the AF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*; route AF Form 847s from the field through Major Command (MAJCOM) publications/forms managers. Ensure that all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained in accordance with Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 33-363, *Management of Records*, and disposed of in accordance with Air Force Records Information Management System (AFRIMS) Records Disposition Schedule (RDS) located at https://www.my.af.mil/afrims/afrims/afrims/rims.cfm. See Attachment 1 for a glossary of references and supporting information.

Chapter 2

MISSION QUALIFICATION STATUS AND CERTIFICATION

2.1. General Information. Missile operations training programs are designed to advance individuals who have completed initial training and obtained Basic System Qualification (BSQ), BMC, BMK or CMR qualification status.

2.1.1. The 20 AF Commander is not required to maintain a qualification status, but may choose to be certified if desired.

2.1.2. BMK status is the minimum level of qualification applicable for the Missile Wing Commander (MW/CC), Missile Wing Vice Commander (MW/CV), Operations Group Commander (OG/CC) and the Operations Group Deputy Commander (OG/CD).

2.1.3. BMC status is the minimum level of qualification applicable for squadron commanders (SQ/CC), operations officers (SQ/DO), Chiefs of Standardization and Evaluation (Chief of Stan/Eval), Chiefs of Training (OSOs) and weapons officers.

2.1.3.1. 20 AF/CC or wing commanders can designate additional positions as BMC. Designated individuals must comply with qualification requirements in accordance with paragraph 2.4.

2.1.4. Personnel with unauthorized launch (UL) access will not be CMR certified and will not perform alert duty.

2.1.5. 20 AF/CC or wing commanders may require BMC certified individuals to upgrade to CMR. These individuals must comply with CMR qualification requirements in accordance with paragraph 2.5.

2.1.5.1. Staff officers that are required to maintain CMR status will be certified as a crew commander.

2.1.6. HQ AFGSC/A3 is the sole authority for revoking and establishing new CMR position requirements. Units and 20 AF will submit recommendations with the appropriate justification to HQ AFGSC/A3T. Upon approval, HQ AFGSC/A3 division(s) will update applicable guidance.

2.1.6.1. Current CMR positions include:

2.1.6.1.1. Missile Combat Crew Commander (MCCC)

2.1.6.1.2. Deputy Missile Combat Crew Commander (DMCCC)

2.2. Basic System Qualification. Interim qualification status of an individual who satisfactorily completed IST or staff officer course, but has not completed requirements for BMC or CMR qualification.

2.3. Basic Mission Knowledge. The qualification status of an individual who satisfactorily completed unit training and will not be qualified as BMC or CMR.

2.3.1. Qualification Requirements.

2.3.1.1. Individual must complete unit level training course.

2.3.1.2. Additional unit BMK qualification requirements will be forwarded for annual review to 20 AF/A3, with a copy forwarded to HQ AFGSC/A3TO.

2.3.2. DELETED.

2.3.2.1. DELETED.

2.3.3. Certifying Official.

2.3.3.1. The next senior commander or deputy in the operational chain of command documents, in writing or electronic signature, BMK qualification of personnel.

2.3.3.2. Qualifications will be documented on the AFGSC Form 91 *Individual's Record of Duties and Qualifications*.

2.3.4. Currency Requirements.

2.3.4.1. As a minimum, BMK qualified individuals must receive quarterly training to include EWO, codes, weapon system, Nuclear Surety, Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) training and supplemental training. In addition, BMK individuals will receive training for EWO revisions, code system changes and weapon system modifications.

2.3.4.2. If individual will be a PRP certifying official, the individual must meet qualifications for PRP duty established in Department of Defense (DoD) 5210.42-R_AFMAN 10-3902, *Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program (PRP)*.

2.3.5. Removal from Qualification Status.

2.3.5.1. Documentation of removal from qualification is only required to be annotated on the AFGSC Form 91. Personnel will be removed from BMK qualification for any of the following:

2.3.5.1.1. Failure to maintain the appropriate security clearance.

2.3.5.1.2. Permanent change of station (PCS).

2.4. Basic Mission Capable. The qualification status of an individual who has satisfactorily completed the minimum training required to be familiar with tasks associated with their unit's mission.

2.4.1. Qualification Requirements.

2.4.1.1. SQ/CCs and SQ/DOs must complete the AETC course designed for missile staff officer training.

2.4.1.1.1. The AETC course is not required if it was previously accomplished, or the individual was CMR within the last 4 years.

2.4.1.2. SQ/CCs, SQ/DOs and staff officers requiring BMC qualification must complete MQT.

2.4.1.2.1. EWO and codes certifications are not required.

2.4.1.3. Meet medical qualifications for Space and Missile Operations Duty (SMOD) established in AFI48-123, *Medical Examinations and Standards*.

2.4.1.3.1. Units will ensure an individual who does not meet SMOD qualification, will at no time, be allowed to interact with operational systems. This does not

preclude the individual from receiving classroom training, simulator instruction or instruction on operational equipment that has been electronically isolated and performing in a simulator capacity.

2.4.1.4. If individual will be a PRP certifying official, the individual must meet qualifications for PRP duty established in DoD 5210.42-R_AFMAN 10-3902.

2.4.1.5. Individuals must complete an initial MPT observation conducted by the OSS Senior Crew. The monthly proficiency script may be used for the BMC observation.

2.4.2. Certifying Official.

2.4.2.1. The next senior commander or deputy in the operational chain of command documents, in writing or electronic signature, BMC qualification of personnel.

2.4.2.2. Qualifications will be documented on the AFGSC Form 91.

2.4.3. Currency Requirements.

2.4.3.1. BMC qualified individuals must receive monthly EWO training, weapon system training, codes training, as well as recurring nuclear surety training and missile safety training, and accomplish the monthly missile procedures trainer (MPT) session.

2.4.3.1.1. Attendance for classroom training is mandatory; however, testing is optional.

2.4.3.2. BMC qualified individuals should accomplish at least one Launch Control Center (LCC) visit every month.

2.4.4. DELETED.

2.4.4.1. DELETED.

2.4.4.1.1. DELETED.

2.4.4.1.2. DELETED.

2.4.4.1.2.1. DELETED.

2.4.5. DELETED.

2.4.5.1. DELETED.

2.4.5.1.1. DELETED.

2.4.5.1.2. DELETED.

2.4.6. Removal from Qualification Status.

2.4.6.1. Documentation of removal from qualification is only required to be annotated on the AFGSC Form 91. Personnel will be removed from BMC qualification for any of the following:

2.4.6.1.1. Failure to maintain the appropriate security clearance.

2.4.6.1.2. Permanent change of assignment (PCA) to a non-BMC position.

2.4.6.1.3. Permanent change of station (PCS).

2.4.7. Requalification.

2.4.7.1. Personnel must meet requirements outlined in paragraph 2.4.1. to be requalified as BMC.

2.4.7.2. When significant hardware, software, or procedural changes impact unit mission requirements, personnel will be requalified to address the changes. HQ AFGSC/A3 will determine the requirement for requalification based on recommendations from 20 AF and HQ AFGSC/A3T.

2.5. Combat Mission Ready. The qualification status of an individual who has satisfactorily completed MQT, maintains qualification and proficiency, and is responsible for completing their unit's operational mission. Qualification and proficiency are maintained through the accomplishment of monthly training and operational alerts.

2.5.1. Certification Requirements.

2.5.1.1. Individuals must complete IST, or the AETC course designed for missile staff officer training as applicable.

2.5.1.1.1. IST or other AETC training is not required if an individual has been CMR in the same weapon system within the last 4 years and there has been no major system modification. Local requalification training at the unit is appropriate.

2.5.1.2. Individuals must meet SMOD qualifications established in AFI 48-123.

2.5.1.3. Individuals must meet qualifications for PRP duty established in DoD 5210.42-R AFMAN 10-3902.

2.5.1.4. Individuals must complete MQT or requalification training (RQT).

2.5.1.5. Individuals must complete an initial or qualification evaluation as required by AFGSCI 13-5301v2, *Rapid Execution and Combat Targeting (REACT) Crew Standardization and Evaluation.*

2.5.1.6. As a minimum, CMR certification will include an EWO certification and a codes certification briefing.

2.5.1.6.1. EWO certification briefings will be given to the squadron commander or operations officer at a minimum. The squadron commander and operations officer will present their certification briefing to the next senior commander or deputy in the operational chain of command.

2.5.1.6.2. Staff officers that are required to be CMR will present the EWO certification briefing to the next senior commander.

2.5.1.6.3. Individuals must be codes certified in accordance with the EAP-STRAT Volume 16, *ICBM Code Component Control Policy and Procedures (U).*

2.5.2. Certifying Official.

2.5.2.1. The squadron commander or operations officer documents, in writing or electronic signature, CMR certification for crew members in their unit, ensuring successful completion of all required training and evaluations. Another unit commander or operations officer may accomplish the CMR certification when requested by the initiating unit commander.

2.5.2.1.1. The next senior commander or deputy in the operational chain of command documents, in writing or electronic signature, CMR certification for staff officers.

2.5.2.2. CMR, EWO, PRP, codes, and additional position certifications will be documented on the AFGSC Form 91.

2.5.3. Proficiency and Currency Requirements.

2.5.3.1. CMR qualified individuals are required to complete the monthly EWO training (T1), weapon system training (T3), codes training (T4) and MPT session, as well as recurring nuclear surety training and missile safety training.

2.5.3.1.1. CMR qualified individuals are required to pass all monthly tests with a score of 90% or higher.

2.5.3.2. Line CMR qualified individuals are required to perform a minimum of four alerts in one calendar month (one-month Lookback period). Instructors, evaluators, flight commanders and all CMR certified staff officers are required to perform a minimum of two alerts in one calendar month.

2.5.3.2.1. If unable to pull four/two alerts in the current one-month Lookback period, an individual must meet the three-month Lookback requirement of twelve/six alerts. The three-month Lookback period is the combination of the current calendar month and the two previous calendar months. See Figure 2.1 for an illustration of the Lookback review process.

2.5.3.2.1.1. Anytime the one-month Lookback requirement is met, there is not a requirement to accomplish the three-month Lookback review.

2.5.3.2.2. Upon initial CMR certification or change in duty position, individuals are not eligible to meet the three-month Lookback requirements until the third calendar month.

2.5.3.2.2.1. Following an initial CMR certification or change in duty position, an individual must meet the one-month Lookback requirements for their respective position until they are eligible for the three-month Lookback.

2.5.3.2.2.2. Individuals are not required to meet one-month Lookback requirements during the month of certification or duty position change. One-month Lookback requirements will begin the first month following certification or duty position change.

2.5.3.2.2.2.1. For example, an instructor returns to a tactical squadron and upgrades to the MCCC position in January. The individual must perform a minimum of four alerts in February and March. Starting in April, the individual must comply with the three-month Lookback requirements.

2.5.3.2.3. Competitors and trainers participating in Global Strike Challenge are only required to perform a minimum of two alerts per calendar month during the authorized training and competition period.

2.5.3.2.3.1. Individuals that have a change in alert requirements will transition in accordance with paragraph 2.5.3.2.2.1.

Chapter 3

FORMAL TRAINING

3.1. Training Processes. Units, in coordination with 20 AF, will develop processes to conduct training of missile combat crew members and provide feedback to the individual and squadron on a crew member's demonstrated performance in order to fulfill training program requirements outlined in this instruction. Reference AFH 36-2235v11 for all instructional material development.

3.1.1. Training programs must be designed and implemented using performance standards to provide and maintain the essential skills, knowledge, and motivation required for mission accomplishment. Identified deficiencies will also be corrected through the training programs.

3.1.1.1. Training programs will also instruct personnel on new or revised procedures and equipment as directed by 20 AF or per group commander direction.

3.1.2. Units will ensure all JPRs are trained at least once every 12 months.

3.1.3. DELETED.

3.1.3.1. DELETED.

3.2. Simulator Training. The MPT provides a controlled off-line environment for simulating operational scenarios to accomplish training.

3.2.1. Units should maximize use of an off-line environment to conduct training. Every effort will be made to limit the use of the operational environment for training when off-line training devices are non-existent or degraded.

3.2.2. Prior to conducting a training session in the operational environment, units must gauge impact to field operations before dispatching instructors or trainees. Units will use risk management processes to mitigate any adverse operational impact.

3.2.3. When instructors other than the on-duty crew are conducting training on operational equipment, the on-duty crew commander maintains authority during the session. Safety and operational requirements will take priority over simulated activities.

3.2.4. DELETED.

3.2.4.1. DELETED.

3.2.4.2. DELETED.

3.3. Classroom Training. Classroom training sessions are designed to facilitate discussion of weapon system concepts, operations, and problems.

3.3.1. Training and tasks that are presented to the students will be administered using a standard lesson plan format.

3.3.2. DELETED.

3.3.3. Units will use the 20 AF Master Weapon System Lesson Plan to develop classroom training.

3.4. Knowledge Tests. Knowledge tests are used to ensure the effectiveness of the classroom training. Knowledge testing will be consistent with AFMAN 36-2236.

3.4.1. Knowledge tests will be used to test tasks identified in the JPRL.

3.4.2. Automatically restrict individuals in accordance with paragraph 2.5.4.1.4. for failing a knowledge test. The individual must be retrained and re-tested prior to being removed from restricted status.

3.4.2.1. Individuals failing a knowledge test will be re-tested on the same material; however, a different version of the test must be used.

3.4.3. Questions asked during a training scenario to clarify a crew member's actions are not considered a knowledge test.

3.4.4. Tests given during weapon system, codes and EWO classroom training are knowledge tests. These tests may also be administered during higher headquarters (HHQ) evaluations or inspections.

3.4.5. Unless under the supervision of a certified instructor, only certified instructors will write and administer knowledge tests.

3.5. 20AF ICBM Center of Excellence (ICE) Courses.

3.5.1. Operations Instructor Course. This course focuses on MPT and classroom instruction, in-briefs, out-briefs, training documentation and error assessment. At the end of the course, each student teaches a classroom lesson plan.

3.5.2. Operations Evaluator Course. This course focuses on LCC and MPT evaluations, evaluation protocol, in-briefs, out-briefs, evaluation documentation and error assessment. At the end of the course, each student does a mock error assessment and out-brief exercise.

3.5.3. Operations Scriptwriter Course. This course focuses on the development of unit training and evaluation scenarios used in the MPT. Students are trained on how to write and program an effective training or evaluation script with an opportunity to program MPT scenarios on the Minuteman Enhanced Procedures during an in class practical exercise.

3.5.4. Instructor Methods Course. This course provides REACT instructors a standardized foundation for developing their instructional techniques. Specific instruction is given on presentation, techniques and responsibilities associated with ―hands-on‖ training.

3.5.5. Advanced ICBM Operations Course. This course provides students with the background knowledge and understanding to perform a variety of roles within nuclear operations. Specific instruction on history, policy and legal aspects of nuclear operations is combined with exercises designed to give a broad perspective of the nuclear enterprise.

3.6. Weapons Instructor Course (WIC).

3.6.1. The WIC provides the world's most advanced training in weapons and tactics employment to US Air Force officers. The WIC develops officers through advanced instructor training in the planning, posturing and employment of the Minuteman III ICBM and US nuclear weapons through all phases of conflict.

3.6.2. The ICBM WIC trains weapons instructors possessing the knowledge and skills necessary to provide weapons and tactics expertise at the squadron, wing and headquarters

level. Graduates will lead weapons and tactics development and provide in-depth expertise throughout the ICBM community and nuclear enterprise. Graduates are trained to be an expert in the full array of weapons and weapons-related equipment allowing them to integrate with other weapons systems to increase the effectiveness of joint force employment.

Chapter 4

QUALIFICATION TRAINING

4.1. General. Qualification training includes IST, MQT, upgrade training, RQT and any other training required for additional qualifications necessary to accomplish the mission. Refer to Attachment 7 (Air Force Proficiency Codes) for proficiency code definitions.

4.1.1. Performance-based weapon system JPRs will be trained to a proficiency level 3c at a minimum.

4.1.2. F0XX JPRs will be trained to the proficiency level identified in AFGSCI 13-5301v4.

4.2. Initial Skills Training. AETC will conduct system-specific and position-specific training as a prerequisite to the qualification training an individual will receive at the units.

4.2.1. Due to the nature of certain tasks or equipment limitations, the 392 TRS is not required to train students on every task. Refer to Attachment 2 and AFGSCI 13-5301v4 for JPRs exempted from training. Exempted tasks will be trained during MQT.

4.2.2. The 392 TRS will train and evaluate all tasks in accordance with the Course Training Standard (CTS).

4.2.3. A waiver request for personnel with previous CMR experience in like weapon systems will be handled on a case-by-case basis. Waiver requests will be processed in accordance with paragraph 1.4.

4.2.4. Operational units will participate in the IST Graduate Training Verification Process. The purpose of this process is to verify AETC training and the graduate's knowledge and skill through a combination of interviews, knowledge tests, individual tasks or subtask checkout, and training scenarios.

4.2.4.1. The goals of the program are to reduce and/or eliminate the duplication of training between IST and MQT, to provide feedback to AETC, to determine if a graduate needs additional training on any IST-taught task(s) or subtask(s), and to assist the unit in estimating the time required to qualify the trainee to BMC or CMR status.

4.2.4.2. Units will conduct the same verification process for each graduate. Standardization of the process will identify AETC trends and assist in unit training requirements.

4.2.4.2.1. The only exception to the standardized process is to account for any deficiencies notified by AETC. If a graduate arrives with an AETC deficiency notification, the verification process is adjusted to account for the deficiency.

4.2.4.2.2. Individuals who did not attend IST are exempt from the IST verification process.

4.2.4.3. Operational units will provide verification process feedback to 20 AF within 10 working days after completion of an MQT class for IST and familiarization courses. Format and content will be in accordance with Attachment 8 (Initial Skills Training Feedback).

4.2.4.3.1. The information will be consolidated by 20 AF/ICE and forwarded to 392 TRS/DOT and HQ AFGSC/A3TO. This tool does not replace the Graduate Assessment Survey (GAS), but will be used in conjunction with the GAS by the 392 TRS.

4.2.4.3.2. Based on the results of this feedback, 20 AF will forward recommended changes to AETC courses through HQ AFGSC /A3TO in accordance with paragraph 9.3 of this instruction.

4.3. Mission Qualification Training. Units will develop and conduct a training program that focuses on completing the training requirements not accomplished at IST and to increase the proficiency of IST graduates in order to prepare them for BMC or CMR status.

4.3.1. MQT will also focus on local procedures and orientation to ensure a smooth transition from IST to BMC or CMR status and will not be designed as a substitute for available ISTs.

4.3.2. 20 AF may establish additional MQT program guidance for the requirements listed in paragraph 4.3.5.

4.3.2.1. Additional unit MQT requirements will be forwarded for annual review by 20 AF/A3, with a copy forwarded to HQ AFGSC/A3TO.

4.3.3. Individuals should enter MQT as soon as practical after arriving on station following IST graduation.

4.3.4. Units will determine MQT program requirements for each BMC or CMR program by using the appropriate TEPS/EWO TEPS (ETEPS).

4.3.5. The MQT program will include the following:

4.3.5.1. A Missile Alert Facility (MAF) training tour to include a tour of an operational LCC [Wings 3&5] and Launch Control Equipment Building (LCEB)<.

4.3.5.2. Training on local procedures.

4.3.5.3. EWO, weapon system, missile safety, codes, and nuclear surety training.

4.3.5.4. A minimum of three MPT qualification sessions prior to CMR certification.

4.3.5.4.1. Monthly recurring MPT sessions do not count as qualification sessions.

4.3.5.5. A familiarization tour of a launch facility (Launcher Support Building (LSB), Launcher Equipment Room (LER), etc.).

4.3.5.5.1. The OG/CC or designated representative may waive the tour if mission requirements or weather prohibit completion. If not accomplished as part of MQT due to local conditions, the LF tour should be accomplished within 6 months of certification.

4.3.5.5.2. The on-base LF trainer/simulator may be used to satisfy the LF tour requirement if unable to visit an operational LF.

4.4. Requalification Training. RQT is given to qualify individuals who have been BMC or CMR decertified, who have previous experience in a similar weapon system and have been waived from IST, or to qualify a crew member following a major weapon system modification.

4.4.1. RQT will be developed by the unit OSS to address the situation leading to decertification and to meet the training requirements for the individual. The RQT will be approved by the OSS/CC or DO.

4.4.2. Staff officers can be initially trained directly into the crew commander position.

4.5. Upgrade Training. Upgrade training is given to personnel upgrading from their current crew position to a new position within the unit.

4.5.1. With the exception of those listed in paragraph 4.4.2., individuals are not eligible to complete upgrade training unless they are certified mission-ready as a DMCCC.

4.5.2. Units may use MQT material to train an individual in another duty position.

4.5.3. Upgrades from DMCCC to MCCC must include:

4.5.3.1. A minimum of three distinct qualification MPT sessions in the new crew position to reinforce good judgment and setting priorities.

4.5.3.1.1. Training provided to a DMCCC during their MCCC upgrade sequence will only be provided by an MCCC instructor.

4.5.3.2. Monthly recurring MPT sessions do not count as qualification sessions.

4.6. Alternate Command Post/Squadron Command Post Training. Crews assigned to the ACP/SCP must possess the necessary weapon system knowledge and maturity to provide effective command and control of subordinate LCCs and the wing as a whole.

4.6.1. Individuals should meet minimum upgrade guidelines outlined in paragraph 9.1.

4.6.2. Unless previously ACP/SCP certified in a different position, crew members must be trained on ACP/SCP duties and responsibilities. Training and qualification requirements will include, at a minimum, the following:

4.6.2.1. Training on ACP/SCP-unique equipment and duties.

4.6.2.2. Instruction or discussion on the responsibilities and accountability of ACP/SCP duty.

4.6.2.3. Instruction on wing reporting and processing requirements (e.g., SFAM, Dull Sword, etc.).

4.6.2.4. At least one MPT session focusing on ACP/SCP-unique tasks and duties.

4.6.2.4.1. Taking the monthly MPT session as the ACP/SCP does not count as the ACP/SCP focused MPT session.

4.6.2.5. Complete a training tour of an operational ACP/SCP configured LCC.

4.6.3. Upon completion of all required training, crew members will be certified in accordance with paragraph 2.7.

Chapter 5

PROFICIENCY TRAINING

5.1. General. BMC and CMR personnel will receive periodic training to maintain proficiency. Proficiency training (PT) includes recurring training (RT), individual training (IT), upgrade training (UT), and supplemental training (ST).

5.1.1. Performance-based weapon system JPRs will be trained to a proficiency level 3c at a minimum.

5.1.2. F0XX JPRs will be trained to the proficiency level identified in AFGSCI 13-5301v4.

5.1.3. Training products must be fully coordinated with applicable agencies (e.g., safety office, codes flight, weapons and tactics flight, etc.) prior to being used for documented training.

5.2. Recurring Training. RT emphasizes knowledge and skills not used on a routine basis and knowledge and skill deficiencies identified through feedback. RT provides the medium for knowledge enhancement training. The training increases a person's knowledge of job-related tasks, other duty positions, and the work environment.

5.2.1. RT may include, but is not limited to, individual task presentation, classroom presentations, computer-based training, knowledge testing, MPT training scenarios, and on-duty crew observations.

5.2.2. All BMC and CMR personnel will be trained in all proficiency and knowledge level tasks or subtasks at least annually.

5.2.2.1. JPR coverage for each training session will be in accordance with a standardized annual training and evaluation plan (ATEP). The ATEP identifies when JPRs will be trained and the number of times JPRs will be evaluated at each wing. Task or subtask levels are emphasized, and the method of training (weapon system training, MPT session, etc) is identified for each JPR.

5.2.2.2. Evaluations will not be used in lieu of training to satisfy annual training requirements.

5.2.3. Crew members will begin receiving RT the first month following successful completion of BMC or CMR certification.

5.2.3.1. Restricted missile combat crew members (MCCMs) should continue to receive RT.

5.2.3.2. Decertified MCCMs do not need to attend RT. Individuals must accomplish RQT to resume BMC or CMR status.

5.2.4. Crew members are required to receive the monthly training in the MPT, EWO classroom training and test, weapons system classroom training and test, codes classroom training and test, as well as recurring missile safety and nuclear surety training.

5.2.4.1. MPT sessions emphasize crew interaction, dynamics and prioritization in a realistic crew environment.

5.2.4.2. Failure to accomplish any of the training or tests will result in restriction in accordance with Chapter 2.

5.2.4.2.1. Personnel who develop the RT knowledge test are exempt from taking the RT knowledge test for the month they developed. Personnel will not develop successive RT knowledge tests.

5.2.4.2.2. A waiver request must be submitted by the unit if an operational situation or extenuating circumstance prevents any monthly training from being accomplished.

5.2.4.3. Certified OSS instructors may receive the recurring training and tests prior to the calendar month presentation. Any training received must be fully coordinated to count as required training.

5.2.5. Recurring training should be accomplished as an integral crew.

5.2.6. A crew consisting of an ACP/SCP certified commander and deputy commander will be trained performing ACP/SCP actions.

5.2.7. A recurring MPT session must have a certified MCCC and DMCCC (or dual-qualified MCCC) with the following exceptions:

5.2.7.1. In the event two DMCCCs accomplish the monthly proficiency MPT session as part of an upgrade sequence, both crewmembers will receive credit for their recurring proficiency MPT session regardless of the qualification rating received during the upgrade evaluation.

5.2.7.2. In the event a CMR crew commander accomplishes his or her monthly proficiency MPT session with a non-CMR deputy, the crew commander will receive credit for the monthly proficiency MPT session.

5.2.7.3. CMR crew members accomplishing a monthly proficiency MPT session with a BMC certified commander will receive credit for the monthly proficiency MPT session.

5.2.8. An ACP/SCP certified crew member should take the recurring MPT session as an ACP/SCP crew in accordance with paragraph 2.7.3.2.

5.3. Individual Training. Use IT when an individual is placed in restricted status as a result of evaluation deficiencies or recommendations, or when an individual failed or did not complete any monthly RT requirement.

5.3.1. The squadron commander or operations officer may direct IT as deemed necessary.

5.3.2. Individual training is developed, conducted and documented under the supervision of a certified instructor in response to individual crew or crew member performance deficiency. Units may use existing lesson plans and scripts.

5.4. Supplemental Training. ST trains crew members on new or changed procedures, hardware and software when RQT is not warranted. ST may be directed by squadron commanders and above.

5.4.1. ST will be developed based on the operational impact(s) of the new or changed procedure(s), hardware, or software.

5.4.2. When developing or changing training materials, any changes will be added to all training programs.

5.4.3. Changes directly affecting mission accomplishment or safety will be administered to all personnel before they perform crew duty (e.g., alert, evaluation, or MPT session).

5.4.4. Any certified instructor may present supplemental training.

5.4.5. Units will track completion of supplemental training to ensure all crew members receive necessary training. All supplemental training will be documented, but does not count as recurring training.

5.5. BMK Training Requirements. BMK personnel must receive RT at least quarterly.

5.5.1. Quarterly training will include the following:

5.5.1.1. Modifications or procedural changes involving EWO, Codes and weapon system during the previous quarter.

5.5.1.2. Significant upcoming events (Simulated Electronic Launch-Minuteman (SELM), code change, communication system exercises, etc.).

Chapter 6

TRAINING SCENARIOS AND SCRIPTS

6.1. Training Scenarios. The purpose of a training scenario is to reinforce classroom training, guide individual self-study, allow students to demonstrate proficiency in performance level tasks and to maintain an individual's or crew's proficiency. Training scenarios will test the ability to multi-task, and force personnel to react to situations ranging from fundamental to complex in a controlled environment. Scenarios will emphasize knowledge and skills necessary to execute the mission.

6.1.1. Crew members should be trained in a realistic crew environment.

6.1.2. Scenarios administered to an individual or crew may consist of a single task, a group of tasks strung together or multiple tasks occurring simultaneously.

6.1.3. Training scenario results are based on crew member performance on each task or subtask with respect to the applicable performance standard.

6.1.4. Operational environment training will be used to train tasks that cannot be otherwise simulated (e.g., Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Checkout, LCEB inspections, blast door operation, etc.). Use a lesson plan to minimize the risk and standardize the training shown in the operational environment.

6.1.4.1. When instructors other than the on-duty crew are conducting training on operational equipment, the on-duty crew commander maintains authority during the training session.

6.2. Scenario Support Personnel. Scenario support personnel are individuals in addition to instructors that participate in presenting a training scenario as required. These may include, but are not limited to, MPT operator, trusted agents, and other personnel necessary to ensure proper scenario presentation.

6.2.1. Only certified instructors or personnel under the supervision of a certified instructor will act as support personnel.

6.3. Training Scripts. Units will design and use scripts to conduct training scenarios to ensure standardization of presentation and proper application of performance standards. Scripts will include instructions for instructors, scenario support personnel, simulated inputs, and status card inputs as applicable.

6.3.1. All simulation or training materials will be marked ―For Training Use Only".

6.3.2. Proficiency and upgrade scripts will contain valid peacetime and wartime stimuli. Stimuli will be identified by JPR, task description, scenario support personnel, initiation and response agencies and notes or expected responses (e.g., TEPS/ETEPS notes, instructor notes and expected trainee response).

6.3.2.1. Estimated scenario run times, if included, are for scenario presentation only and do not establish a time standard for completing actions. Applicable time standards must be annotated within the script.

6.3.2.2. Monthly and qualification MPT sessions will have a minimum of four Level A performance events.

6.3.3. Do not create actual conditions that could jeopardize personnel safety or cause equipment damage.

6.3.4. EWO and weapon system portions of training may be designed to provide a seamless training session.

6.3.5. Monthly recurring training scripts should not be designed to exceed 4 hours.

6.3.5.1. The intent of the 4 hour training script is to dedicate approximately three hours to the monthly JPR training requirements and one hour dedicated to a specific focus area.

6.3.5.2. Recommended focus areas consist of fires, emergency power/air procedure, security/contingency, codes/safety, EWO and communication systems.

6.3.5.2.1. Units may train one of the recommended focus areas, or train other focus areas determined by the units to address deficiencies identified through methods such as trend analysis or field deviations.

6.3.5.2.2. The one hour focus area may be used to satisfy a monthly JPR requirement (e.g., security situation requirement for a specific month could be accomplished in a security focus area during that same month).

6.3.6. Qualification and supplemental training scripts should not be designed to exceed the scheduled MPT time.

6.3.7. Scripts must be fully coordinated prior to being used for documented training. At a minimum, coordination for training scripts must include the Chief of Operations Training, Chief of Stan/Eval, EWO training and plans flight, weapons and tactics flight, senior evaluator crew, and senior instructor crew.

6.3.7.1. If codes related events are trained, the codes flight must coordinate.

6.3.7.2. If a weapon system safety rule (WSSR) or missile safety is trained, the wing safety office must coordinate.

6.3.7.3. The Chief of Operations Training will be the final approval for all training scripts.

6.3.8. Units must retain training scripts and ancillary items such as dispatches, status cards and script programs in either paper or electronic copy for a period of at least 12 months from the on-line date. This does not require a removable storage element for old revision products. Off-line scripts do not require updates.

6.4. TEPS and Timing Constraints. TEPS detail task performance, standards, timing requirements and constraints for the express purpose of standardizing training and evaluation that support operational mission ready certification requirements.

6.4.1. TEPS/ETEPS are designed for preparing and presenting training and evaluation materials and will be used to prioritize tasks during an evaluation. TEPS/ETEPS will not supplement technical data or instructions.

6.4.2. TEPS/ETEPS are divided into three levels.

6.4.2.1. Level A - Tasks, if not performed correctly, could result in mission failure, endangerment of human life, serious injury or death or require an elevated level of proficiency.

6.4.2.1.1. Level A tasks have the greatest potential for mission and/or personnel impacts and drive the most stringent training and evaluation program requirements.

6.4.2.1.2. Asterisked Level A performance standards are not subject to judgment and require strict application and adherence. Asterisked Level A's are used where a direct correlation exists between exceeding the time and a tangible undesirable outcome, or a task requires a higher level of proficiency necessary for mission accomplishment.

6.4.2.1.3. Non-asterisked Level A performance standards provide an objective measurement guideline for performances requiring urgent action. Because event outcome may be influenced by outside factors, there is not always a direct correlation between outcome and successful completion of task-associated actions within the specified time parameter(s). Exceeding one of these times may not indicate a serious deficiency based on judgment and assessment of the specific scenario. Non-asterisked performance standards are guidelines to aid unit commanders in determining corrective actions.

6.4.2.1.4. If the subsequent event has a Level A time standard, time it normally, without adjustment for the "pending" original time standard.

6.4.2.1.5. When more than one Level A time standard is running simultaneously, time them concurrently only if specifically written for concurrent timing, otherwise, time separately and sequentially.

6.4.2.2. Level B - Tasks deemed integral to the performance of other tasks and required to sustain acceptable weapon system operation and mission execution.

6.4.2.2.1. Operators must accomplish Level B tasks properly without taking any intervening lower priority actions that would, in the normal sequence of events, adversely affect task performance or outcome.

6.4.2.3. Level C - Rudimentary or simple tasks related to weapons system operations that by themselves have little or no impact on mission execution.

6.4.2.3.1. Level C tasks apply where no specific time standard is identified. The standard is to accomplish the task proficiently in accordance with technical orders and governing directives.

6.4.3. Outside agency responses will not be used to satisfy accomplishment of TEPS. If the missile combat crew (MCC) has the technical data to satisfy their required tasks, the outside agency will not provide that data.

6.4.4. TEPS/ETEPS do not describe the only correct response and do not replace operational technical data or instructions. They are intended for a controlled scenario environment and are used to improve proficiency.

6.4.5. Training scenarios may violate TEPS constraints in order to enrich the MCC's proficiency, but should be realistic.

6.4.5.1. Crew Enrichment Training (CET) scenarios must be clearly identified in training materials.

6.5. Status Presentation. Crew members must receive proper configuration and status for operational realism.

6.5.1. Status presentation requirements and configuration actions for fire/overheat conditions, nuclear detonation (NUDET) and Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP)/High Altitude Burst (HAB) indications will be provided by 20 AF.

6.5.2. Status cards and briefings will be standardized and presented in accordance with 20 AF direction.

6.6. Briefings. It is the responsibility of the instructors to conduct appropriate briefings throughout the course of the MPT session.

6.6.1. Instructors will conduct a pre-brief to set the environment of the training and to ensure the trainee clearly understands expectations, responsibilities, limitations and other rules of engagement before being administered training scenarios.

6.6.2. For training scenarios conducted in the operational environment, instructors will pre-brief the on-duty crew, Flight Security Controller (FSC), Facility Manager (FM) and other topside support personnel as applicable, ensuring they understand their roles and limitations.

6.6.2.1. Safety and operational requirements take priority over simulated activities. Instructors will intervene to prevent a safety hazard or damage to equipment. Additionally, for training conducted in the operational environment, instructors will intervene to prevent mission failure or degradation.

6.6.3. Instructors may use briefings as necessary for scenario transitions, scenario presentation in accordance with the script and to emphasize concepts presented in the lesson plan.

6.6.4. Instructors will not lead or prompt trainees into taking a correct action. To ensure effective use of training resources and prevent improper procedures from being reinforced, they may step in to redirect trainees once they are satisfied the crew is accomplishing incorrect actions or failing to accomplish required actions.

6.6.4.1. Provide training to correct deficiencies and reinforce the proper actions for task accomplishment as soon as practical after a trainee takes an incorrect action.

6.7. Scenario Termination. Once a training session is started, all efforts will be made to complete the session.

6.7.1. Situations may arise in which early termination would be required. Training scenarios terminated early may be re-initiated from the point activity was originally stopped, or it may be completely re-accomplished.

6.8. Outbriefing the Trainee. The outbrief provides feedback to the trainee and the training program.

6.8.1. The outbrief will include discussion of positive performance, strengths and crew goals, any noted deficiencies, probable causes, areas for improvement and direct or indirect impacts to the mission, personnel, and other organizations.

G-70

Chapter 7

INSTRUCTOR TRAINING AND CERTIFICATION

7.1. Instructor Training and Certification Program. The training and certification program is developed and administered to ensure CMR certified instructors can conduct standardized, objective training.

7.1.1. 20 AF may establish additional instructor training program guidance for the requirements listed in paragraph 7.2.1.3.

7.1.2. Units may choose to certify instructors only for the environment they will provide training in (e.g., classroom, simulator, etc.).

7.2. Instructor Training Requirements. Instructor trainees will be observed and supervised by a certified instructor during all instructor training activities.

7.2.1. Prior to certification, instructor trainees must accomplish the following actions:

7.2.1.1. Observe a certified instructor conduct a training session for each applicable environment (e.g., classroom training, MPT training, etc.).

7.2.1.2. Observe simulator operations to include pre- and post-training scenario activities.

7.2.1.3. Instructor trainees must receive instruction on the following items:

7.2.1.3.1. Instructor responsibilities.

7.2.1.3.2. MPT and Missile Enhanced Procedures (MEP) Trainer configuration, training or test material handling and control procedures, and scheduling procedures.

7.2.1.3.3. Training presentation techniques.

7.2.1.3.4. Identifying deficiencies.

7.2.1.3.5. Pre- and post-training requirements and activities.

7.2.1.3.6. Documentation requirements.

7.2.1.3.7. Construction and administration of knowledge tests.

7.2.1.3.8. Construction and administration of individual or multiple-task training scenarios.

7.2.1.3.9. Construction and administration of lesson plans.

7.2.1.3.10. Any unit policies and requirements (locally developed).

7.2.1.3.11. ISD process and procedures.

7.2.1.4. Instructor trainees must administer each applicable training session under the observation of a certified instructor.

7.2.1.5. Instructors must attend the ICE Operations Instructor Course (OIC) no later than 3 months after their PCA, unless the individual has previously attended the course due to prior instructor certification.

7.2.1.5.1. Commander instructors will be placed in instructor restricted status in accordance with paragraph 7.9.1.2, and will not administer training until the course has been accomplished.

7.2.1.6. DMCCC instructor trainees must complete a four-month apprenticeship-style period prior to instructor certification. The four-month period consists of one month focused on training and certification requirements followed by three months of supervised instruction and experience development.

7.2.1.6.1. The four-month period begins when the individual PCAs into the OSS.

7.2.1.6.2. During this period, DMCCC instructor trainees must complete all certification training and will administer training in conjunction with a certified instructor.

7.2.1.6.3. Upon completion of the four-month period and all required training, the DMCCC instructor trainee will be eligible for instructor certification.

7.2.1.7. Instructors responsible for writing scripts must attend the ICE Operations Scriptwriters Course as soon as possible.

7.3. Instructor Certification. Only certified instructors or instructor trainees under direct supervision of a certified instructor or Chief of Operations Training may conduct and document operations training. Instructors will be trained, observed, recommended, and appointed for certification.

7.3.1. Instructor certification occurs by position only; therefore, instructors certified while in the DMCCC position are not automatically instructor certified in the MCCC position.

7.3.2. Observations and certifications are specific for each particular training environment.

7.3.2.1. An instructor may administer training in an environment for which they are certified, prior to certification in another environment.

7.3.2.2. There is no limit to the number of observations it might take for an instructor to become certified. If an instructor fails to certify while being observed, retraining must be accomplished in the deficient area before the next attempt at certification.

7.3.3. If the instructor trainee is not recommended for certification during their certification training session in either environment, the Senior Crew observer or the Chief of Operations Training will become the instructor of record.

7.3.3.1. The Senior Crew is designated as the CMR instructor crew who may observe and recommend certification of other instructors to the Chief of Operations Training.

7.3.4. After the instructor trainee has been trained and observed administering applicable training, the Chief of Operations Training or Senior Crew member will provide certification recommendations to the OSS commander or operations officer.

7.3.5. The OSS commander or operations officer will certify instructors in writing.

7.3.5.1. Certification paperwork must also include the signature of an approved individual recommending certification.

7.3.6. Instructor observations and certifications will be documented on the AFGSC Form 91.

7.4. DELETED.

   7.4.1. DELETED.

   7.4.2. DELETED.

   7.4.3. DELETED.

      7.4.3.1. DELETED.

   7.4.4. DELETED.

7.5. Senior Crew Certification. Senior Crew instructor positions will be managed as specialized REACT crew positions, filled by selected individuals that are technical experts. Instructors may expect to extend their crew tour to fulfill these duties.

   7.5.1. Senior Crew instructors must be certified in both the MPT and classroom. The Chief of Operations Training will observe prospective Senior Crew instructors observing other instructors and recommending them for certification in both the MPT and classroom. The Chief of Operations Training will recommend Senior Crew certification to the OSS commander.

   7.5.2. The OSS commander will certify instructors to be Senior Crew instructors in writing.

      7.5.2.1. Certification paperwork must also include the signature of an approved individual recommending certification.

   7.5.3. Senior Crew instructor observations and certifications will be documented on the AFGSC Form 91.

   7.5.4. Senior Crew instructors should remain in their positions for at least 12 months. When conditions dictate replacement of a Senior Crew in less than 12 months, the OG/CC will request a waiver from 20 AF/A3 explaining the circumstances for the early departure.

   7.5.5. If a Senior Crew member is unable to perform their duties for an extended period (e.g., absent for 30 days or more due to illness or TDY), an interim Senior Crew member will be selected.

      7.5.5.1. Interim Senior Crew members must be appointed in writing and documented on the AFGSC Form 91. Interim Senior Crew may perform all required actions of a certified Senior Crew. Certification process is not required.

   7.5.6. Individuals appointed to a Senior Crew position are required to receive a qualification evaluation prior to certification. The qualification evaluation will be administered by the evaluator Senior Crew and observed by the Chief of Stan/Eval. The evaluation must be accomplished within 3 months prior to certification.

7.6. Weapons Officer Instructor Certification. Weapons officers cannot provide unsupervised weapon system classroom or MPT training unless CMR and instructor certified. Weapons officers filling tier-one positions in tactical missile squadrons are staff officers and will be CMR certified.

   7.6.1. Training and certification of weapons officers for classroom and MPT instruction will be in accordance with paragraphs 7.2. and 7.3.

      7.6.1.1. Weapons officers are not required to attend the ICE instructor courses.

7.6.1.2. The Chief of Operations Training or higher authority will conduct weapons officer observations and will make certification recommendations.

7.6.1.3. DELETED.

7.6.1.3.1. DELETED.

7.6.1.3.2. DELETED.

7.6.1.3.3. DELETED.

7.6.1.3.4. DELETED.

7.6.1.3.5. DELETED.

7.6.1.4. DELETED.

7.6.2. Weapons officers are permitted to instruct F10 (Tactics, Techniques and Procedures) JPRs regardless of BMC or CMR certification.

7.6.2.1. BMC weapons officers may instruct F10 JPRs in the EWO classroom environment; however, BMC weapons officers providing F10 JPR instruction in the MPT or weapon system classroom environment must be accompanied by a CMR certified instructor.

7.6.3. DELETED.

7.6.3.1. DELETED.

7.6.4. DELETED.

7.7. Additional Certification Requirements. Instructors must be certified in the position(s) in which they train.

7.7.1. Instructors must be CMR certified in accordance with chapter 2 of this instruction.

7.7.2. Instructors must be ACP/SCP certified. If the individual is not ACP/SCP certified prior to their PCA, OSS will ensure certification is completed following their PCA into OSS.

7.7.2.1. Instructors must be ACP/SCP certified prior to administering MPT training to ACP/SCP crews.

7.8. Recurring Training and Certification Requirements. Instructors must be trained, observed and maintain currency.

7.8.1. Instructors must receive recurring instructor training to ensure standardization and to maintain instructor proficiency.

7.8.1.1. Recurring instructor training will be conducted quarterly and will ensure all instructor training tasks listed in paragraph 7.2.1.3. are covered annually.

7.8.1.2. The instructor Senior Crew or Chief of Operations Training will administer the instructor training program.

7.8.2. Instructor and Senior Crew certifications expire on the first day of the 13th month following their last certification. Instructors will be observed annually in each environment in which they are certified.

G-74

7.8.2.1. The Chief of Operations Training is responsible for meeting the annual observation requirements on all certified instructors.

7.8.2.1.1. If the incumbent instructor Senior Crew's certification expires prior to a 20 AF visit, the certification date is automatically extended by 6 months. Certification dates beyond 18 months require HQ AFGSC/A3TO approval. Submit waiver request through 20 AF/A3NV.

7.8.2.2. The Chief of Operations Training may delegate annual observation requirements to the Senior Crew or designated representative.

7.8.2.2.1. Senior crews or designated representatives will only observe instructors certified in the same or a less comprehensive position. In addition, if a section chief is designated as the observer, they will only observe individuals in an environment in which they are certified.

7.8.2.2.2. When senior crews or designated representatives conduct annual observations, they will brief the Chief of Operations Training and document the annual observation on the AFGSC Form 91.

7.8.3. An annual observation is required to maintain certification. An annual observation is required for each environment for which an instructor is certified.

7.8.3.1. Instructors observed during an evaluation by 20 AF/A3N will satisfy an instructor's annual observation requirement for the environment observed.

7.9. Instructor Restricted Status Requirements. An individual may be prohibited from performing instructor duties without being decertified.

7.9.1. Place an individual in instructor restricted status for the following reasons:

7.9.1.1. The individual is placed in restricted CMR status.

7.9.1.1.1. When an instructor is placed in CMR restricted status for proficiency reasons, the instructor may not administer training.

7.9.1.1.2. When placed in restricted status for medical or PRP reasons, the individual may conduct classroom or simulator training if they have received recurring training and maintained currency.

7.9.1.1.3. When an individual is in CMR restricted status for non-performance of alert duties in accordance with chapter 2 of this instruction, the individual may conduct classroom or simulator training if they have received all recurring training and maintained currency.

7.9.1.2. The individual does not receive quarterly recurring instructor training, training required for certification or fails to receive an annual observation.

7.9.1.3. At the direction of the OSS commander, operations officer or Chief of Operations Training.

7.9.2. Individuals who are not CMR, or who are restricted for reasons other than those listed above will not perform instruction or duties involving operation of the weapon system.

7.10. Removal From Restricted Status. Instructors may be removed from instructor restricted status upon completion of corrective actions.

7.10.1. Remove an individual from instructor restricted status for the following:

7.10.1.1. Individuals who were placed in CMR restricted status must be removed from CMR restricted status.

7.10.1.2. Individuals who missed quarterly instructor training must complete the applicable training that was missed.

7.10.1.3. Individuals placed in instructor restricted status at the direction of the OSS commander, operations officer or Chief of Operations Training must satisfy requirements established by the certifying official.

7.11. Decertification and Recertification Requirements. The OSS commander will decertify and recertify instructors when needed.

7.11.1. Instructors will be decertified in writing for the following reasons:

7.11.1.1. Individual is no longer needed as an instructor.

7.11.1.2. Individual no longer possesses the degree of proficiency or professionalism to be an effective instructor.

7.11.1.3. Individual departs unit due to a PCS or PCA.

7.11.1.4. Individual is decertified from CMR duties.

7.11.2. Upon decertification, the individual will not perform instructor duties.

7.11.3. An instructor may be recertified following completion of corrective actions as directed by the certifying official.

7.12. Tailored Instructor Training Program. Once an individual has been certified as an instructor within AFGSC, they will not be required to re-accomplish an entire training program at their new assignment.

Chapter 8

TRAINING DOCUMENTATION

8.1. Training Documentation. Upon completion of each training session, instructors will document the training administered to provide a means to track individual performance or progression and to contribute to internal and external feedback on training program effectiveness.

8.1.1. Instructors will observe and document all training and deficiencies on electronic or paper forms developed and approved by 20 AF.

8.1.2. Each training entity (e.g., codes, OSS courseware, etc) must retain their documentation of recurring weapon system, codes, EWO, MPT, nuclear surety, missile safety training and JPR coverage as applicable for every individual crew member.

8.1.2.1. All training documentation will be retained for the previous calendar year, and up to the current month of the current year, or until the individual no longer performs the unique duties.

8.2. Documenting Deficiencies. Documenting identified deficiencies provides a means to identify trends, track individual performance, provides performance feedback to the individual's supervisor and serves as a key feedback and training program tool.

8.2.1. When the trainee causes a script deviation and an incorrect action results, the instructor will document deficiencies against the JPR to which the deficiency should be attributed.

8.2.1.1. If a crew member recognizes a status change but fails to perform a required JPR, document the deviation against the JPR that should have been performed.

8.2.1.2. If a crew member recognizes a status change but performs the wrong JPR, document the deviation against the JPR that should have been performed. However, give JPR credit for the task or subtask that was performed.

8.2.1.3. If a crew member does not recognize a status change and a resulting task or subtask requirement, document the deviation against the required JPR.

8.2.1.4. When the JPR being performed directs transition to another task or subtask, and the trainee fails to perform the subsequent task or subtask or fails to identify the requirement to transition, document the deviation against the JPR that directed the transition.

8.2.1.5. If a crew member performs an unnecessary action which causes or results in a deviation, document the deviation against the JPR being performed when the unnecessary action was taken.

8.2.2. Use Attachment 6 (Deficiency Codes) to describe the root cause of a trainee's deficiency.

8.2.3. Instructors will forward script discrepancies to the script OPR.

8.3. Training Reports. A standardized training report will be used for monthly recurring or qualification MPT training sessions for each individual to document details of the administered training.

8.3.1. A crewmember will receive credit for a JPR by performing any portion of a task, regardless if a checklist is used or if all actions are contained within another checklist.

8.3.1.1. The instructor awarding JPR credit is documenting the crew has been adequately trained on the task.

8.3.1.2. A01A, A01B, A01C, A01E, A01F, A01G, B02A, B02E, B02F, and B04A are inherently accomplished in every MPT training session.

8.4. Individual Qualification Folders. Units will maintain individual training and evaluation documentation in an IQF for all BMC, BMK and CMR personnel. Electronic formatted IQFs are authorized provided proper security measures, backup capability, and sustainment plans are in place.

8.4.1. Use of the AFGSC Form 91 is mandatory. Units will use this form to document the individual's entire history while assigned to a BMC, BMK or CMR duty position.

8.4.1.1. Software applications capturing the same information obtained by the AFGSC Form 91 are authorized provided the unit gains HQ AFGSC/A3T approval prior to use. Reference AFI 33-360 for guidance on gaining approval.

8.4.1.2. Units using electronic forms will develop a plan to ensure adequate security procedures are in place to prevent tampering by unauthorized personnel and to document timely back-up and recovery procedures. Regardless of format (hardcopy or electronic), the unit is ultimately responsible for the information contained on these forms.

8.4.2. As a minimum, the following information will be documented on the AFGSC Form 91:

8.4.2.1. Arrival and departure from unit.

8.4.2.2. Entry into MQT for BMC or CMR qualification, or unit level training for BMK qualification.

8.4.2.3. Qualifications, certifications and decertifications will be annotated. Units will ensure a reason for decertification is included and all decertification paperwork is maintained in the IQF.

8.4.2.3.1. Required qualifications and certifications include BMC, BMK, CMR, EWO, PRP, Codes, ACP/SCP, instructor, evaluator and senior crew certifications.

8.4.2.4. Placement in and removal from restricted status.

8.4.2.5. Evaluation or observation results.

8.4.2.6. Instructor or evaluator annual observation.

8.4.2.7. Appointment and removal as a SME.

8.4.3. Use of the AFGSC Form 91A, *Record of Signatures,* is mandatory. Units will use this form to record all required certification and decertification signatures. The AFGSC Form 91A will relate signatures back to entries on the AFGSC Form 91.

8.4.3.1. Digital signatures are authorized provided the units institute an authentication or security system, such as using card readers with the Common Access Card authentication system.

8.4.4. Units will provide AFGSC Form 91s and AFGSC Form 91As, or a copy of pertinent digital data, to the individual upon their PCS.

8.4.5. If hardcopy records are maintained, the IQF will have six sections and be maintained according to the following guidance. Digital data systems will maintain this same information, and will be organized in a similar format.

8.4.5.1. Section 1- AFGSC Form 91, AFGSC Form 91A, all applicable Memorandums for Record (MFR) and other supporting documentation. The AFGSC Form 91 and AFGSC Form 91A will be placed on top. Post all MFRs and supporting documentation beneath the forms in reverse chronological order (with the most recent on top).

8.4.5.2. Section 2 – Certification and Decertification Paperwork and unit generated tracking sheets. Final signatures will be recorded on AFGSC Form 91A, and tracking sheets may refer to AFGSC Form 91A.

8.4.5.3. Section 3 – Evaluation Paperwork. Include all evaluation documentation to include 392 TRS evaluation documentation, unit Corrective Action Worksheets and associated MFRs. Post documents in reverse chronological order.

8.4.5.4. Section 4 – Restricted Status Paperwork. Include all paperwork to restrict an MCCM and remove an MCCM from restricted status.

8.4.5.5. Section 5 – Training Records from January through December of the previous calendar year. Post documents in reverse chronological order.

8.4.5.6. Section 6 – Training Records from January through present month of the current calendar year. Post documents in reverse chronological order.

8.4.5.6.1. All other training records for an individual will be maintained in a separate folder.

Chapter 9

MISCELLANEOUS

9.1. Crew Member Upgrade and PCA Requirements. There is no substitute for field experience. Proficiency, experience, and leadership are important attributes to consider when selecting individuals for instructor duty or upgrades.

9.1.1. Individuals should meet the following minimums for upgrade, evaluator or instructor duty:

9.1.1.1. A deputy should have 42 alerts to be eligible for ACP/SCP certification.

9.1.1.2. A deputy should have 72 alerts or 12 months of CMR time (whichever comes first) to be eligible for evaluator or instructor duty.

9.1.1.3. A deputy will be eligible for commander upgrade upon completion of evaluator or instructor duty.

9.1.1.4. A deputy that remained in a tactical squadron should have 96 alerts or 16 months of CMR time (whichever comes first) to be eligible for commander upgrade.

9.1.1.5. A commander should have 42 alerts as a commander to be eligible for ACP/SCP certification if he or she was not previously ACP/SCP certified as a deputy.

9.1.1.5.1. There are no guidelines for minimum number of alerts for a commander that was previously ACP/SCP certified as a deputy.

9.1.1.6. A commander should have 48 alerts as a commander to be eligible for evaluator or instructor duty.

9.2. New or Upgrade System Requirements. For new or upgraded missile systems, the unit training office will develop the training program to meet requirements within this instruction, AFGSCI 13-5301v3, *Rapid Execution and Combat Targeting (REACT) Crew Operations*, AFGSCI 36-283, *ICBM Training System Management*, and AFGSCI 10-604, *Global Strike Operational Weapon Systems Management*.

9.2.1. The OG/CC or designated representative will appoint a limited number of SMEs in writing. Document SME appointment on the individual's AFGSC Form 91. Forward the SME designation memorandum through the chain of command directly to HQ AFGSC/A3T and 20 AF/A3.

9.2.2. Upon completion of SME training, individuals will be CMR. The primary duty of the CMR certified SMEs is to develop technical documentation, training materials, and to conduct CMR training.

9.2.3. SMEs will be evaluated in accordance with AFGSCI 13-5301v2.

9.2.4. Where new operational programs will not meet Initial Operational Capability (IOC), HQ AFGSC will develop a proposal for that system's training program.

9.3. Command Change Process to AETC Course Curriculum. All change requests originating from AFGSC units which are of a major nature (a request which drives changes in

course training standard or resources such as manpower, facilities, cost, etc.) will be routed through the appropriate functional's chain to HQ AFGSC/A3TO for coordination.

9.3.1. The AETC training manager (TM) is the decision authority for determining if a proposed change is minor or major. No official direct communication concerning major changes is permitted with AETC training units except in gathering information necessary to properly staff the request.

9.3.1.1. This does not preclude official feedback channels such as the IST Graduate Training Verification Process, Graduate Assessment Survey, field evaluation questionnaires or field visits.

9.3.2. HQ AFGSC/A3TO coordinates approval of change requests through the wings and 20 AF. HQ AFGSC/A3T approves all formal requests to change AETC courses and submits to HQ USAF/A3/5 (Operations Plans and Requirements) for coordination.

9.3.3. Upon approval of a major change request by HQ AFGSC/A3T, HQ AFGSC/A3TO will route the change to HQ USAF/A3/5. HQ USAF/A3/5 will review and, if approved, will route to the Chief, Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence (C4I) and Space Training (HQ AETC/A3TI).

9.3.4. The 381 Training Group (TRG) will analyze the request to determine impact on manpower and training time and will return their cost estimate to HQ AFGSC/A3TO for proper staffing (e.g., manpower costs, training device requirements, etc.). HQ AFGSC/A3TO will notify the originating agency of the results of their request. For further information, refer to AFGSCI 36-283.

9.3.5. Changes to existing Specialty Training Standards and/or Course Training Standards require review and approval by the affected unit commander. Changes will be routed through the appropriate OSS or group to HQ AFGSC/A3TO for final review and approval, prior to 381 TRG/CC approval, signature, and publication.

9.3.6. AFGSC units will obtain a tracking number through their appropriate OSS or group in order to coordinate minor change requests directly with the 381 TRG. Coordination will only be done with the TM of the applicable training course.

9.3.6.1. Minor changes are interpreted to mean those of an administrative nature or those which do not have significant impact on training curricula or resources. In each case, the 381 TRG TM will determine if the request is of a minor nature or needs to be elevated to a major change. If the request is minor, the 381 TRG will implement the change at the earliest opportunity.

9.3.7. Changes originating from the 381 TRG TMs will be forwarded to the affected OSS or group for action, with a courtesy copy provided to HQ AFGSC/A3TO and 20 AF. Once the review is complete and OSS or group concurrence has been given, the change will be routed back through HQ AFGSC/A3TO for approval in accordance with the guidance above.

9.3.8. Deletions of 381 TRG courses are reviewed, approved, and forwarded by HQ AFGSC/A3T to HQ USAF/A3/5 for review and approval prior to routing to HQ AETC/A3TI. Request for course deletions must be forwarded from the appropriate group commander, through 20 AF/A3N, to AFGSC/A3T.

9.4. DELETED.

9.4.1. DELETED.

9.4.2. DELETED.

TIMOTHY M. RAY, Brigadier General, USAF
Director of Operations

Attachment 1

GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTIVE INFORMATION

References

AFGSCI 10-604, *Global Strike Operations Weapon System Management*

AFGSCI 13-5301v2, *Rapid Execution and Combat Targeting (REACT) Crew Standardization and Evaluation*

AFGSCI 13-5301v3, *Rapid Execution and Combat Targeting (REACT) Crew Operations*

AFGSCI 13-5301v4, *REACT Emergency War Order (EWO) Training and Evaluation Procedures*

AFGSCI 36-283, *ICBM Training System Management*

AFI 11-415_AFGSCSUP, *Weapons and Tactics Program*

AFI 33-360, *Publications and Forms Management*

AFI 36-2201, *Air Force Training Program*

AFI 44-170, *Preventative Health Assessment*

AFI 48-123, *Medical Examinations and Standards*

AFI 91-101, *Air Force Nuclear Weapons Surety Program*

AFH 36-2235v11, *Information for Designers of Instructional Systems Application to Unit Training*

AFMAN 33-363, *Management of Records*

AFMAN 36-2234, *Instructional System Development*

AFMAN 36-2236, *Guidebook For Air Force Instructors*

AFPD 13-5, *Nuclear Operations*

DoD 5210.42-R_AFMAN 10-3902, *Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program (PRP)*

EAP-STRAT Volume 16, *ICBM Code Component Control Policy and Procedures (U)*

Forms Prescribed

No forms are prescribed in this publication.

Forms Adopted

AF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*

AF Form 2096, *Classification/On-The-Job Training Action*

AFGSC Form 91, *Individual's Record of Duties and Qualification*

AFGSC Form 91A, *Record of Signatures*

Abbreviations

AAC—Assignment Availability Code

ACP—Alternate Command Post

AETC—Air Education and Training Command

AF—Air Force

AFGSC—Air Force Global Strike Command

AFGSCI—Air Force Global Strike Command Instruction

AFH—Air Force Handbook

AFI—Air Force Instruction

AFMAN—Air Force Manual

AFPD—Air Force Policy Directive

AFRIMS—Air Force Records Information Management System

ATEP—Annual Training and Evaluation Plan

BMC—Basic Mission Capable

BMK—Basic Mission Knowledge

BSQ—Basic System Qualification

C4I—Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence

CET—Crew Enrichment Training

CLCC—Controlling Launch Control Center

CMR—Combat Mission Ready

CTS—Course Training Standard

DMCCC—Deputy Missile Combat Crew Commander

DoD—Department of Defense

EMP—Electromagnetic Pulse

ETEPS—EWO Training and Evaluation Performance Standards

EWO—Emergency War Orders

FM—Facility Manager

FSC—Flight Security Controller

FY—Fiscal Year

GAS—Graduate Assessment Survey

HAB—High Altitude Burst

HHQ—Higher Headquarters

HQ—Headquarters

ICBM—Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

ICE—ICBM Center of Excellence

IG—Inspector General

IOC—Initial Operational Capacity

IQF—Individual Qualification Folder

ISD—Instructional System Development

IST—Initial Skills Training

IT—Individual Training

JPR—Job Performance Requirements

JPRL—Job Performance Requirements Listing

LCC—Launch Control Center

LCEB—Launch Control Equipment Building

LER—Launcher Equipment Room

LSB—Launcher Support Building

MAF—Missile Alert Facility

MAJCOM—Major Command

MCC—Missile Combat Crew

MCCC—Missile Combat Crew Commander

MCCM—Missile Combat Crew Member

MEP—Missile Enhanced Procedures

MEPCT—Minuteman Enhanced Procedures and Classroom Trainer (alternate name representing a configuration used for the MEP)

MFR—Memorandum for Record

MPT—Missile Procedures Trainer

MQT—Mission Qualification Training

MW—Missile Wing

NAF—Numbered Air Force

NUDET—Nuclear Detonation

OG—Operations Group

OIC—Operations Instructor Course

OPR—Office of Primary Responsibility

OSS—Operations Support Squadron

PCA—Permanent Change of Assignment

PCS—Permanent Change of Station

PHA—Preventative Health Assessment

PRP—Personnel Reliability Program

PT—Proficiency Training

Q1—Qualification Level 1

Q2—Qualification Level 2

RDS—Records Disposition Schedule

RQT—Requalification Training

RT—Recurring Training

SAV—Staff Assistance Visit

SCP—Squadron Command Post

SELM—Simulated Electronic Launch Minuteman

SME—Subject Matter Expert

SMOD—Space and Missile Operations Duty

SQ—Squadron

ST—Supplemental Training

TDY—Temporary Duty

TEPS—Training and Evaluation Performance Standards

TM—Training Manager

TRG—Training Group

TRS—Training Squadron

TTP—Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

UHF—Ultra High Frequency

UL—Unauthorized Launch

UT—Upgrade Training

UTW—Utilization and Training Workshop

WIC—Weapons Instructor Course

WSSR—Weapon System Safety Rule

Attachment 2

JOB PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENT LIST

A2.1. Comprising the JPRL.

A2.1.1. The *JPR* column contains the alphanumeric designation for each JPR.

A2.1.1.1. Area – A grouping of tasks that support the accomplishment of a single mission or multiple mission components.

A2.1.1.2. Task – An observable/measurable unit of work that independently forms a significant part of a duty and is selected to reflect mission needs.

A2.1.1.3. Subtasks – A subordinate unit of work derived from a task. Subtasks generally, but not always, focus on capabilities or reporting requirements that are utilized to accomplish a task.

A2.1.2. The *Description* column contains the task nomenclature.

A2.1.2.1. A description marked with a superscripted number indicates the JPR does not apply to all units. Superscript numbers are coded as follows: 0 = 392d Training Squadron (TRS), 1 = 341st Missile Wing (MW), 3 = 91 MW, 5 = 90 MW.

A2.1.3. The *Exposure* heading is supported by three columns indicating different methods of JPR exposure.

A2.1.3.1. The *TEPS* column indicates the task TEPS level that JPRs are to be trained and evaluated. Reference paragraph 6.4.2. for detailed explanations of the various TEPS/ETEPS levels.

A2.1.3.2. The *Training (TRNG)* column assigns a task type to a JPR which identifies the environment(s) where that JPR is required to be trained.

A2.1.3.2.1. If the exposure column is blank the task must be trained in the classroom and trained in the MPT.

A2.1.3.2.2. Classroom Tasks. A "C" indicates this JPR is only required to be trained in classroom. Classroom tasks are repetitive and may occur inherently in the MPT in order to accomplish another JPR. Classroom training is adequate; however, additional training may be accomplished in the MPT, self-study package or in the operational environment. There is no requirement to plan or track exposure of these JPRs outside the classroom environment.

A2.1.3.2.3. Self-Study Task. An "S" indicates a JPR that is only required to be trained through a self-study package. Training through a self-study package is adequate; however, additional training may be accomplished in the classroom, MPT or in the operational environment. There is no requirement to plan or track exposure of these JPRs outside the self-study environment.

A2.1.3.2.4. Operational-Only Task. An "O" indicates a task that cannot be trained in the MPT due to missing or nonfunctional equipment. All operational-only tasks must receive training in the classroom and in a self-study package. Additional training

may be accomplished in the operational environment unless the training interferes with operational tasks.

A2.1.3.2.5. Inactive Task. An –F" indicates a JPR that is inactive. Inactive tasks will not be trained. HQ 20 AF/A3NV will establish training requirements if an –F" task becomes active.

A2.1.3.3. The *Evaluation (EVAL)* column assigns a task type to a JPR which identifies the environment(s) where that JPR may be evaluated as well as the eligibility for that JPR to be evaluated.

A2.1.3.3.1. Required Evaluation Task. An –R" indicates a task that is required to be evaluated in the MPT or in the operational environment. Units are required to plan and track exposure of these JPRs.

A2.1.3.3.2. Optional Evaluation Task. An –O" indicates a task that is not required to be evaluated. Optional evaluation tasks may be scripted to facilitate scenario presentation or may occur inherently in order to accomplish another JPR. There is no requirement to plan or track exposure of these JPRs.

A2.1.3.3.3. Field Evaluatable Task. An –F" indicates a JPR that will not be evaluated in the MPT and will not be scripted for an evaluation in the operational environment. If an –F" task is performed during an evaluation in the operational environment, evaluate the task even though task coverage was not intended and, if applicable, document any errors or deviations committed.

A2.1.3.3.4. Inactive Task. An –F" indicates a JPR that is inactive. Inactive tasks will not be evaluated. HQ 20 AF/A3NV will establish evaluation requirements if an –F" task becomes active.

A2.1.4. Additional training and evaluation guidance for JPRs.

A2.1.4.1. With the exception of inactive tasks, all task types will be tested monthly in accordance with the ATEP.

A2.1.4.2. A new task entered in the JPRL is not required to be evaluated before performing the task on alert. Following completion of initial task training, the task should be emphasized in evaluations during a 3-month period. This period will start based on the operational factors and resource constraints affecting each unit's ability to execute the training necessary to achieve proficiency in the new task. The level of exposure should be great enough to provide a representative assessment of training effectiveness.

Table A2.1. MINUTEMAN JPRL.

JPR			DESCRIPTION	EXPOSURE		
AREA	TASK	SUBTASK		SEPES	TRNG	EVAL
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES						
A	01		Administrative Procedures			
		A	Manage Personal Operations T.O./Publications	C	S	R
		B	Manage Forms	C	S	R
		C	Comply With Air Force/Command Directives	C	S	R
		D	Comply With T.O. 21M-LGM30F-12	C		R
		E	Comply With Weapon System Safety Rules	C	C	R
		F	Comply With Nuclear Surety	C	C	R
		G	Comply With Missile Safety	C	C	R
A	02		Security Administrative Functions			
		A	Perform MEED Operation	B/C		O
		B	Accomplish Combination Change	C		R
LCC/MAF FUNCTIONS						
B	01		MAF Activities Coordination & Control			
		A	Perform MAF Activities	A/B/C		R
		B	Operate Blast Doors	A/C	C	O
B	02		Operating Practices			
		A	Operate Voice Communication Panel	C	S	R
		B	Perform Operator Entered Status	C	S	O
		C	Perform MIIDS Operation	B/C		O
		D	Perform Lamp Test	C	S	O
		E	Perform Action Pending Queue	C	S	R
		F	Perform LCC/LF Status Display	C	S	R
		G	Accomplish Miscellaneous Operating Practices	C	C	R
B	03		Inspections			
		A	Perform MCCC LCEB Inspection[0,1]	C	Ø	R
		B	Perform DMCCC LCEB Inspection[0,1]	C	Ø	R
		C	Perform LCC Inspection	C		R
B	04		Crew Changeover			
		A	Accomplish Crew Changeover	C		R
B	05		Squadron Realignment			
		A	Perform Timeslot/AFI Takeover/Deletion	B/C		R
		B	Perform Comm Grid Update	B/C	C	O

G-89

JPR			DESCRIPTION	EXPOSURE		
AREA	TASK	SUBTASK		TEPS	TRNG	EVAL
B	**06**		**LCC Data Management**			
		A	Check/Set/Synchronize Clocks	C	S	O
		B	Perform Alarm Clock Procedure	C	S	O
		C	Perform Crew Log Procedures	C	S	O
		D	Perform Cycling Status Procedure	C	C	O
		E	Perform Upload/Download Procedure	C		R
		F	Perform Change SIOP REV ID	C	I	I
		G	Perform Higher Authority Backup Control	C	C	O
B	**07**		**LCC Tests**			
		A	Perform LCC Subsystems Test	C	C	O
		B	Perform HA Subsystems Test	C	C	O
		C	Perform Bulk Store Tests	C	C	O
		D	Perform CDA/IPD Test	C	C	O
		E	Perform Alarms Test	C	C	O
		F	Perform Printer Test	C	C	O
		G	Perform FDD Test	C	S	O
		H	Perform OID Test	C	S	O
		I	Perform VDU Test	C	S	O
		J	Perform NED Test	C	S	O
		K	Perform CMPG-Line Seize Test	C	C	O
B	**08**		**LCC Maintenance and Support Function**			
		A	Perform Circuit Breaker/Circuit Protection Device Reset	B/C		R
		B	Perform Console Shutdown/Startup	C		R
		C	Perform Lamp Removal and Replacement	C	S	F
		D	Perform Console Printer Paper Replacement	C	C	F
		E	Perform Launch Control Panel Change	C	Ø	F
		F	Perform Launch Enable Panel Change	C	Ø	F
		G	Perform Keying Variable Loading	C	Ø	F
		H	Perform CEIU Startup/Shutdown Procedures [0]	C	Ø	F
		I	Perform Sequence Count	B		R
		J	Perform Manual Comm Monitoring	C	C	O
		K	Perform Overwrite WS BS/L	C	C	F
		L	Perform Overwrite WSP Memory	C	C	F
		M	Isolate LCC Shock Isolator System Leaks	C		R
		N	Operate Emergency Shutoff Valves	B/C	C	O

JPR			DESCRIPTION	EXPOSURE		
AREA	TASK	SUBTASK		TEPS	TRNG	EVAL
		O	Perform LCC Floor Adjustment[0]	C	Ø	F
		P	Perform Misc. Operator Maintenance[0]	C	S	F
		Q	Perform Diagnostic Data[0]	C	C	O
		R	Perform BS/L Disk Replacement[0]	C	C	F
		S	Perform WSP Load/Restart	B		R
		T	Perform KS-60 Status Query[0]	C	C	F
B	09		LCC Fault Procedures			
		A	Respond to Miscellaneous LCC Faults	C	C	R
		B	Respond to FDD Faults	C	S	O
		C	Respond to OID Faults	C	S	O
		D	Respond to Printer Faults	C	S	O
		E	Respond to SDU Faults	C	C	O
		F	Respond to PLC-B Lib CKSUM Incorrect	B		R
		G	Respond to Abnormal Indications	C	C	O
		H	Respond to ALL LNLOST	B		R
		I	Respond to COMM FAIL Faults	B		R
		J	Respond to GYRO CMVC Incorrect	C		R
		K	Respond to INPT LNLOST	B		R
		L	Respond to LCC Down	B		R
		M	Respond to LCC OOSYNC/SE CNT NECC	B		R
		N	Respond to AFI Updates	B		R
		O	Respond to SAHC Received	B		R
		P	Respond to WSP Restart Fails to Complete	B		R
		Q	Respond to WSP Restart	B		R
		R	Respond to AAP Faults	C		R
			LF FUNCTIONS			
C	01		LF Activities Coordination and Control			
		A	Perform LF Entry/Coordination	B		R
		B	Perform LF Activities Contingency Procedure	A/B		R
		C	Perform LF Weapon System Checks and Tests	B		R
		D	Direct Team Departure	B		R
C	02		Automatic/Manual Interrogations			
		A	Perform Computer Memory Verification Check	C	C	O
		B	Perform Interrogations GMI, MOSI, TVI, OSI	C	C	O

JPR			DESCRIPTION	EXPOSURE		
AREA	TASK	SUBTASK		TEPS	TRNG	EVAL
C	**03**		**LF Tests**			
		A	Perform SCNT	B/C		R
		B	Perform Enable Test	C		R
		C	Perform Missile Test	C		R
		D	Perform Inhibit Test	A/C		R
		E	Perform ALCS/UHF Radio Test	C		R
C	**04**		**LF Commands**			
		A	Perform ALCC Holdoff	A/C		R
		B	Perform Short ALCC Holdoff	B		R
		C	Perform Calibration (IMU, PHI, SAT)	C		R
		D	Perform IMU Performance Data	C	C	O
		E	Perform Overwrite	C		R
		F	Perform PIGA Leveling	C		R
		G	Perform Remote Missile Restart	B		R
		H	Perform Restart Alignment	B		R
		I	Perform LF Diesel Remote Start/Stop	C	S	O
		J	Perform Missile Launch Procedure	C	S	F
C	**05**		**LF Fault Procedures**			
		A	Respond to Misc LF Fault Indications	C		R
		B	Respond to LFDN	A/C		R
		C	Respond to Auto Restart	C		O
		D	Respond to RADDT Not Received During ALCS/UHF Test	C		O
		E	Respond to PGLV	C		R
		F	Respond to RAMO	A/B/C		R
		G	Respond to Unexplained IPCMD	C	C	O
		H	Respond to LFNA/LFOS	B		R
		I	Respond to Unexplained TGTCH or Unexplained PLCA/PLCB Received	B		R
		J	Respond to GMR	C		R
		K	Respond to MOSR	C		R
		L	Respond to MMD	C	C	O
		M	Respond to SBNG	B		R

JPR			DESCRIPTION	EXPOSURE		
AREA	TASK	SUBTASK		TEPS	TRNG	EVAL
			TARGETING AND PRE-LAUNCH PROCEDURES			
D	01		**Case Data Entry**			
		A	Perform Case Entry Library	B/C		R
		B	Perform Case Entry Buffer	C	C	F
		C	Perform FDM Processing Procedure	B/C		R
		D	Perform Case Input Library Procedure	C	C	F
		E	Process Invalid FDMs/WSCE	C		F
D	02		**Library Procedures**			
		A	Perform TGT/EP View	C	C	O
		B	Perform Case Input Library Checksum	C		R
		C	Perform PLC-B Library	C		R
		D	Perform PLC-B Library Checksum	C		R
		E	Perform Electronic TATD Procedure	C	I	I
D	03		**Stack Procedures**			
		A	Perform Active Stack	B		R
		B	Perform Monitor Stack	B		R
		C	Perform Generate Stack	B	S	F
		D	Perform PLC-B Stack	B		R
D	04		**Constants Set Status Procedure**			
		A	Perform Constants Set Status Procedure	C	I	I
D	05		**Preparatory Launch Commands**			
		A	Perform PLC-A	B		R
		B	Perform PLC-B	B		R
		C	Perform Individual Selective Enable	B	I	I
		D	Perform All-Call Enable	B		R
		E	Perform Multiple Selective Enable	B		R
D	06		**Targeting Procedures**			
		A	Perform Execute Option Generate	C	S	F
		B	Perform Pre-Launch Sequence	B		R
		C	Perform Pre-Launch Sequence Definition	B	C	O
		D	Perform Target Menu Options	C	S	O
D	07		**RDC Faults**			
		A	Respond to RDC Faults	B		R

AREA	TASK	SUBTASK	DESCRIPTION	TEPS	TRNG	EVAL
			CONTINGENCY AND SECURITY PROCEDURES			
E	**01**		**MCC Contingency Procedures**			
		A	Perform MCC Contingency Procedures	A/B/C		R
E	**02**		**Fire/Overheat Procedures**			
		A	Perform LCC Electrical Fire or Overheat Procedure	A/B		R
		B	Perform LCEB Fire or Overheat Procedure [1]	A/B		R
		C	Perform EHF Antenna Shelter Fire/Overheat Procedure	A		R
E	**03**		**LCC Equipment Shutdown**			
		A	Perform LCC Equipment Shutdown	A/B		R
E	**04**		**Inhibit/Anti-Jam Procedure**			
		A	Perform Inhibit/Anti-Jam Procedure	A/C		R
E	**05**		**RDC Halt**			
		A	Perform RDC Halt Command	A/B		R
E	**06**		**Crew Survival Procedures**			
		A	Emergency Evacuation Breathing Apparatus [0]	C	C	F
		B	Perform Escape Procedure [0]	C	Ø	F
		C	Perform LCC Manual Hardening Procedure	A/B		R
		D	Perform LCC Blast Valve Opening	B		R
		E	Perform Emergency Power/Air Procedure	A/B		R
		F	Perform Air Regeneration Procedure	C	S	F
		G	Perform LCEB Blast Valves Opening [0,1]	C	Ø	F
		H	Perform Diesel Manual Start [0,1]	C	Ø	F
		I	Perform Manual Diesel Fuel Transfer [0,1]	C	Ø	F
		J	Perform Environmental Control System Restart [0,1]	C	C	F
E	**07**		**Secure Codes Procedures**			
		A	Perform LCC Overwrite/Code Dissipation	B		R
		B	Perform Clear Unlock Code	B	S	F
		C	Perform Translate Code	B		R
		D	Perform Emergency Combat Capable Launch Procedure	B	C	F

JPR			DESCRIPTION	EXPOSURE		
AREA	TASK	SUBTASK		SEPS	TRNG	EVAL
E	08		**Security Procedures**			
		A	Declare Security Situation 1/Brief Location	A/B		R
		B	Declare Security Situation 2/Brief Location	A/B		R
		C	Declare Security Situation 3/Brief Location	A/B		R
		D	Declare Security Situation 4/Brief Location	A/B		R
		E	Declare Security Situation 5/Brief Location	A/B		R
		F	Declare Security Situations for LCC/LFs for which LCC has Secondary Responsibility / Brief Location	A/B		R
		G	Coordinate LF Guarding Requirements	B		R
E	09		**Code Handler Procedures**			
		A	Respond to Codes Violation	B		R
			EWO PROCEDURES			
F			*SEE CLASSIFIED SUPPLEMENT*			
			COMMUNICATIONS			
G	01		**Communications Procedures**			
		A	Perform LCC Communications Inspections	C	C	O
		B	Perform Communications Realignment and Equipment Frequency/Channel Change	A/B		R
		C	Communications Equipment Shutdown	C	C	F
		D	Perform Basic SKL Operations	C		O
G	02		**Perform UHF Radio Procedures**			
		A	UHF Radio Checkout ⁰	C	Ø	O
G	03		**VLF/LF Procedures**			
		A	Perform VLF/LF Checkout	C		R
		B	Perform VLF/LF Link Status Procedure	C		R
		C	Respond to VLF/LF Faults	B		R
		D	Perform VLF/LF Startup Procedure	B		R
		E	Perform VLF/LF Database Procedure	C	C	F
		F	Perform VLF/LF Key Management	C	C	F
		G	Perform VLF/LF Key Loading Procedure	C		O
		H	Perform VLF/LF Reset Procedure	B		R
		I	Perform VLF/LF Database Memory Card Replacement Procedure	C	C	F

JPR			DESCRIPTION	EXPOSURE		
AREA	TASK	SUBTASK		TEPS	TRNG	EVAL
G	04		**AFSATCOM/UHF MILSTAR Procedure**			
		A	Perform AFSATCOM Checkout	C		R
		B	Perform AFSATCOM Startup	B		R
		C	Perform AFSATCOM Troubleshooting Procedure	B		R
		D	Perform AFSATCOM Operating Parameters Check and Selection/Control-Indicator Mode Parameters	C		R
		E	Perform TSM Removal and Replacement	C	C	O
		F	Perform Time Transfer Mode Parameter Selection	C	S	F
		G	Perform UHF MILSTAR Reportback Cancellation	C	S	F
		H	Respond to UHF MILSTAR Faults	B		R
G	05		**SACDIN Procedures**			
		A	Perform SACDIN Checkout	C		R
		B	Perform SACDIN Operator Command Composition	C	C	O
		C	Respond to SACDIN Faults	B		R
		D	Perform SACDIN Startup	B		R
		E	Perform SACDIN System Troubleshooting	C	S	F
		F	Perform SACDIN IPL	B		R
		G	Perform SACDIN IPL EPU	C	S	F
		H	Perform SACDIN Message Retrieval	C	S	F
		I	Perform SACDIN System Restart	B		R
		J	Perform SACDIN Crypto Procedures	C	C	O
G	06		**EHF MILSTAR Procedures**			
		A	Perform EHF MILSTAR Checkout	C		R
		B	Perform EHF MILSTAR Crypto Procedures	C	C	O
		C	Respond to EHF MILSTAR Faults	B		R
		D	Perform EHF MILSTAR Startup Procedure	B		R
		E	Perform EHF MILSTAR Reset Procedure	B		R
		F	Perform Canister Load ID Procedure	C	S	F

JPR			DESCRIPTION	EXPOSURE		
AREA	TASK	SUBTASK		TEPS	TRNG	EVAL
G	07		**HAC/RMPS Operating Procedures**			
		A	Manual Text Extraction/Correction	B		O
		B	Perform CMCC Test	C		O
		C	Perform All Sortie Free Launch Schedule	B	I	I
		D	Process Invalid FDMs/HA	C		R
		E	Perform Message Transmission	C	C	O
		F	Processing Voice EAMs	B		R
		G	Respond to HAC / RMPS Faults	B		R
		H	Perform Message Composition	C		R
		I	Perform RMP(S) Restart/Load Procedure	B		R
		J	Perform RMPB Restart	C	C	O
		K	Perform Manual Restart (CI, TI)	C	C	O
		L	Perform RMPS Equipment/Tests	C	C	O
		M	Perform RMP Shutdown	C	C	F
		N	Fail Extraction On/Off	B/C		R
		O	Clear Backup CI HA Message Buffers	C	S	O
		P	Perform COMM Test to Disk Procedure	C	C	O
		Q	Perform Set Squadron Procedure	C	S	O
Note: 0 = 392 TRS, 1 = 341 MW, 3 = 91 MW, 5 = 90 MW						

Attachment 3

LEVEL A TEPS FOR MINUTEMAN III WEAPON SYSTEM

Table A3.1. B01A - PERFORM MAF ACTIVITIES

CONSTRAINTS	
1. If performing this task to put MIIDS in secure mode when all personnel are clear of protected areas, evaluate to Level B. 2. When performing this task for other than an FSC evacuation for a tornado or LCC/LCEB fire evaluate to Level C. 3. SCC door open latch release mechanism will operate (except for AAP fire/overheat condition). 4. Firefighting teams will be aware of all tunnel junction warnings and notes.	
PERFORMANCE	**STANDARD**
1. Unlock service lift room door and grant personnel entry.	1.1. Within 3 minutes from notification when FSC is ready to evacuate for a tornado.
2. Obtain VCN, unlock service lift room door, and grant personnel entry.	2.1. Within 3 minutes from time team is ready to respond to LCC/LCEB or tunnel junction fire/overheat.

Table A3.2. B01B - OPERATE BLAST DOORS

CONSTRAINTS	
1. If performing procedure for other than emergency LCC evacuation, evaluate to Level C. 2. If evaluating to Level A, do not present a condition restricting blast door operation.	
PERFORMANCE	**STANDARD**
1. Configure and open LCC Blast Door, evacuate the LCC, close LCC Blast Door.	1.1. Within 3 minutes from presentation of a hazardous situation and personnel safety is jeopardized.

Table A3.3. C01B - PERFORM LF ACTIVITIES CONTINGENCY PROCEDURE

CONSTRAINTS	
1. If scenario requires this task and A02A to be evaluated, immediate contact will be available over a valid means of communication. 2. If performing this task and E04A or E08F, evaluate to Level B. 3. If performing this task post execution, evaluate to Level B.	
PERFORMANCE	**STANDARD**
1. Attempt contact by all available means and request first authentication.	*1.1. Within 3 minutes from weapon system indications if affected LF is penetrated. *1.2. Within 5 minutes from weapon system indications if affected LF is manned.

G-98

Table A3.4. C03D - PERFORM INHIBIT TEST

CONSTRAINTS	
1. No unrelated status or indications may be introduced during the Inhibit Test. 2. No more than one LF will report an abnormal response. 3. If performing this procedure and no LF is scripted to fail the Inhibit Test, evaluate to Level C. Evaluate to Level A when a sortie fails to respond as expected.	
PERFORMANCE	**STANDARD**
1. Request LF that failed to respond to the inhibit test be manually safed.	*1.1. Within 10 minutes from receipt of INC APQ entry complete.

Table A3.5. C04A - PERFORM ALCC HOLDOFF

CONSTRAINTS	
1. If performing this procedure for post LF maintenance or WSP fault flow actions, evaluate to Level C.	
PERFORMANCE	**STANDARD**
1. Accomplish ALCC Holdoff command.	* 1.1. Before receipt of AHC 0 MIN WG. * 1.2. Before any LF reports RAMO. * 1.3. Before unsafing an LF reporting RAMO.
2. Accomplish ALCC Holdoff command upon receipt of an unexpected RAMO APQ Entry.	*2.1. Within 3 minutes from receipt of RAMO APQ entry.
3. Direct/notify the first LCC to initiate ALCC Holdoff command for accomplishment of sequential commands.	*3.1. Within 3 minutes from receipt of AHC APQ entry complete and LF(s) report(s) as exception(s).
4. Request LF that failed to respond to the sequential ALCC Holdoff command be manually safed.	*4.1. Within 10 minutes from receipt of latest AHC APQ entry complete and LF report(s) as exception(s). *4.2. Within 15 minutes from receipt of RAMO.

Table A3.6. C05B - RESPOND TO LFDN

CONSTRAINTS
1. Do not clear an LFDN indication after 1 minute (normal mode) or after 2 minutes (anti-jam mode), until expiration of Level A TEPS.   2. If performing task for LFDN that clears, prior to 1 minute (normal mode) or prior to 2 minutes (anti-jam mode), evaluate to Level C.   3. If performing this task for an LF that is safed, was previously reporting LFNG, or is being penetrated by a maintenance team that authenticated correctly, evaluate to Level C.   4. If scenario requires this task and E08A/B/C/D to be evaluated to Level A standards, time

concurrently.	
PERFORMANCE	**STANDARD**
1. Request sortie reporting LFDN be manually safed.	*1.1. Within 15 minutes from LFDN indications.

Table A3.7. C05F - RESPOND TO RAMO

CONSTRAINTS
1. If performing this task for an LF that is safed, was previously reporting LFNG, or is being penetrated by a maintenance team that authenticated correctly, evaluate to Level C. 2. If scenario requires this task and C04A to be evaluated, evaluate to Level B. 3. Sortie must be in a state where a RAMO condition could occur.

PERFORMANCE	**STANDARD**
1. Request LFs reporting RAMO be manually safed, as applicable.	*1.1. Within 10 minutes from receipt of RAMO indications.

Table A3.8. E01A - PERFORM MCC CONTINGENCY PROCEDURES

CONSTRAINTS
1. Hazardous situations must be clearly recognizable (e.g., bomb threat, fuel spillage, damage to nuclear weapons, disaster that involves nuclear weapons, toxic chemicals, missile propellants, entry to the scene cannot be controlled, uncontrollable fire, personnel safety is jeopardized, or medical assistance required). 2. If performing in conjunction with security situation(s), evaluate to Level B. 3. If performing for any non-hazardous situation, evaluate to Level C.

PERFORMANCE	**STANDARD**
1. Coordinate with on-site personnel; evacuate personnel from the scene; and notify wing command post of the hazardous situation, required assistance, and the location of the incident; each as applicable.	1.1. Within 10 minutes from notification of the situation.

Table A3.9. E02A - PERFORM LCC ELECTRICAL FIRE OR OVERHEAT PROCEDURE

CONSTRAINTS
1. Do not present a scripted change in LCC power or air until all fire isolation actions are complete. 2. FM or qualified personnel will be immediately available to perform circuit isolation. 3. Personnel will identify location of fire using equipment name in the appropriate circuit protection chart when contact is established with the FM or qualified personnel. 4. For a console fire/overheat, the fire will not continue after entire console is properly isolated. 5. The requirement to accomplish performance 7 will be clearly identified.

G-100

6. For Distribution Box, Motor Generator (on emergency power), or [1] NECS fire<, evaluate to Level B.

7. For MG fire, do not evaluate the release of hazardous fumes.

8. Evaluate post LCC evacuation actions for fire isolation to Level B.

PERFORMANCE	STANDARD
1. Electrically isolate affected equipment with fire/overheat condition in accordance with the LCC Circuit Protection Chart.	1.1. Within 2 minutes from initial fire indications. 1.2. Within 3 minutes from previous isolation if for subsequent isolation actions.
2. [3/5] Electrically isolate Facility Alarm Protection Assembly. 2.1. Direct FM/qualified team to accomplish isolation actions. 2.2. Direct FSC/qualified team to accomplish isolation actions.	2.1.1. Within 30 seconds from establishing LCEB contact if FM/qualified team topside when fire began. 2.1.2. Within 2 minutes of initial fire indications if previous fire isolation actions are N/A. 2.2.1. Within 30 seconds from establishing contact. 2.2.2. Within 3 minutes of initial fire indications if previous fire isolation actions are N/A.
3. Notify FSC and request FM/qualified team to respond to fire/overheat indications, if the FM/qualified team is not present in the LCEB.	3.1. [3/5] Within 2 minutes from receiving fire indications or last isolation action.
4. Direct FM/qualified team to accomplish appropriate isolation actions in accordance with the LCC Circuit Protection Chart	4.1. [1] Within 2 minutes from indications. 4.2. [3/5] Within 2 minutes from initial indications if FM/qualified team is already present in LCEB. 4.3. [3/5] Within 30 seconds from establishing LCEB contact if FM/qualified team is topside when fire began.
5. Close, or simulate closing, cooling air dampers.	5.1. Within 4 minutes from last isolation.
6. Simulate application of fire extinguisher.	6.1. Within 2 minutes from last isolation attempt.
7. Perform, or simulate performing, remaining power removal steps, consistent with personal safety, before LCC evacuation.	7.1. Within 1 minute from requirement to evacuate.

Table A3.10. E02B [WINGS 3/5] - PERFORM LCEB FIRE OR OVERHEAT PROCEDURE

CONSTRAINTS	
1. Manual dampers will function normally. 2. Personnel in LCEB will identify location of fire using equipment name in the LCEB Circuit Protection Chart. 3. For battery bank or if an uncontrollable fire occurs and personnel safety is in jeopardy evaluate to Level B.	
PERFORMANCE	**STANDARD**
1. Notify FSC and request FM/qualified team to respond to fire/overheat indications, if the FM/qualified team is not presently in LCEB.	1.1. Within 2 minutes from cooling air obtained from manual hardening. 1.2. Within 2 minutes from presentation of initial fire/overheat indications if manual hardening was not required.
2.1. Brief warnings and direct fire/overheat isolation actions, if proper fire-fighting team is in the LCEB.	2.1.1. Within 3 minutes from obtaining air from manual hardening. 2.1.2. Within 3 minutes from initial fire indications, if manual hardening was not required. 2.1.3. Within 2 minutes from previous isolation action for subsequent isolation direction.
2.2. Brief warnings and direct fire/overheat isolation actions, when the FM/qualified team arrives in the LCEB.	2.2.1. Within 2 minutes from establishing LCEB contact. 2.2.2. Within 2 minutes from previous isolation action for subsequent isolation direction.
3. Brief warnings and direct personnel to configure equipment for a diesel engine fire or diesel fuel on fire.	3.1. Within 2 minutes from establishing LCEB contact.
4. Direct use of fire extinguisher.	4.1. Within 2 minutes from last isolation action.

Table A3.11. E02C - PERFORM EHF ANTENNA SHELTER FIRE/OVERHEAT PROCEDURE

CONSTRAINTS	
1. FM or qualified personnel will be immediately available upon request. 2. FM or qualified personnel may or may not have technical data to fight the fire.	
PERFORMANCE	**STANDARD**

1. Isolate through the EHF System CB.	1.1. Within 2 minutes from notification or indications of fire/overheat in EHF Antenna Shelter.
2. Complete checklist through determining status of fire/overheat condition.	2.1. Within 3 minutes from isolating the EHF System CB.
3. Direct FM to fight the fire in accordance with their technical data if the FM has technical data.	3.1. Within 1 minute from FM determining status of fire and fire is not out.
4. Direct FM to apply fire extinguisher if the FM does not have technical data.	4.1. Within 1 minute from FM determining status of fire and fire is not out.

Table A3.12. E03A - PERFORM LCC EQUIPMENT SHUTDOWN

CONSTRAINTS	
1. If performing procedure for other than inability to obtain cooling air, Motor Generator fire, or Distribution Box fire, evaluate to Level B.	
PERFORMANCE	**STANDARD**
1. Electrically isolate all power supply group circuit breakers if for inability to obtain air.	1.1. Within 2 minutes from last valid attempt to obtain air.
	1.2. Within 3 minutes from last fire isolation action resulting in an inability to obtain air.
2. Complete LCC equipment shutdown through removal of DC power to the Motor Generator when: 2.1. MG on emergency power when fire started. 2.2. MG on primary power when fire started.	2.1. Within 4 minutes from indications of fire.
	2.2.1. Within 8 minutes from positioning [3/5] CB 14-16-18 / [1] CB 20-22-24 to OFF.
3. Complete LCC shutdown through opening [3/5] CB 14-16-18/ [1] CB 20-22-24 for Distribution Box fire.	3.1. Within 4 minutes from identification of fire location.

Table A3.13. E04A - PERFORM INHIBIT ANTI-JAM PROCEDURE

CONSTRAINTS	
1. Only one squadron LF can fail to respond to inhibits. 2. For scenarios with multiple critical status, limit a single enable at a sortie followed by ELC to that same sortie. ELC may be presented at any time following nEN. 3. For performance 4, if an LF is safed, or is being penetrated by a maintenance team that authenticated correctly, evaluate to Level C.	
PERFORMANCE	**STANDARD**

1. Enter anti-jam mode and initiate first encrypted inhibit.	* 1.1. Within 2 minutes from indications or directions received.
2. Initiate first encrypted inhibit if already in anti-jam mode.	* 2.1. Within 30 seconds from indications or directions received.
3. Accomplish 8 encrypted inhibits.	* 3.1. Within 8 minutes from requirement to accomplish inhibits.
4. Request LF be manually safed.	4.1. Within 15 minutes from all INC APQ entries reporting complete and LF reports as an exception.

Table A3.14. E05A - PERFORM RDC HALT COMMAND

CONSTRAINTS	
1. If performing task for other than unauthorized RDCT sole survivor indications, evaluate to Level B.	
PERFORMANCE	**STANDARD**
1. Initiate RDC Halt Command.	* 1.1. Within 2 minutes from receipt of indications.

Table A3.15. E06C [1] - PERFORM LCC MANUAL HARDENING

CONSTRAINTS	
1. Do not present EACU malfunctions until LCC is fully hardened. 2. If requirement to perform this task is due to E08A or E08B indications, TEPS begins for E07C upon completion or expiration of TEPS for E08A or E08B. 3. If procedure is being performed for other than E08A, E08B or NECS fire, evaluate to Level B. 4. FM/qualified personnel will be available to perform fire isolation.	
PERFORMANCE	**STANDARD**
1. Configure, monitor, and operate equipment to close blast valves and simulate closing of ESOVs.	1.1. Within 5 minutes from time indications are received if normal pressure. 1.2. Within 8 minutes from time indications are received if increased pressure required.
2. Engage blast door latch.	2.1. Within 3 minutes from ESOVs closing. 2.2. Within 3 minutes from blast valves closing if ESOVs were previously closed. 2.3. Within 3 minutes from declaration of security situation or TEPS expiration, if blast valves and ESOVs were previously closed.

G-104

| 3. Configure, monitor, and operate equipment to close blast valves (when accomplishing for NECS fire). | 3.1. Within 5 minutes from initial fire indications. |

Table A3.16. E06C [3/5] - PERFORM LCC MANUAL HARDENING

CONSTRAINTS
1. Do not present EACU malfunctions until LCC is fully hardened.
2. If requirement to perform this task is due to E08A or E08B indications, TEPS begins for E07C upon completion or expiration of TEPS for E08A or E08B.
3. If procedure is being performed for other than E08A, E08B or NECS fire, evaluate to Level B.

PERFORMANCE	STANDARD
1. Close ESOVs.	1.1. Within 2 minutes from status presentation if blast valves were previously closed. NOTE: If blast valves are open, include this performance in the Level A timing standard of performance 2.
2. Configure/reconfigure equipment and close blast valves.	2.1. Within 4 minutes if blast valves will close with CLOSE VALVE pushbutton. 2.2. Within 5 minutes if blast valves will close with DCV hydraulic control valve. 2.3. Within 6 minutes if required to manually close blast valves.
3. Engage blast door latch.	3.1. Within 3 minutes from ESOVs closing if blast valves previously closed. 3.2. Within 3 minutes from blast valves closing. 3.3. Within 3 minutes from declaration of security situation or TEPS expiration, if blast valves and ESOVs were previously closed.

Table A3.17. E06E - PERFORM EMERGENCY POWER/AIR PROCEDURE

CONSTRAINTS
1. Complete loss of power to the MG will not be presented while MG is operating on emergency power.
2. For performance 3, blast valves must be open prior to presenting the scenario.
3. Do not present performance 3 with EACU electrically isolated.
4. If performing procedure for other than the listed performances, evaluate to Level B.

PERFORMANCE	STANDARD

1. Position [3/5] CB 14-16-18/ [1] CB 20-22-24 to OFF.	
1.1. For a complete loss of primary and emergency power to the MG, and MG was previously on commercial power.	* 1.1.1. Within 5 minutes from status presentation.
1.2. For a complete loss of primary and emergency power to the MG, and MG was previously on standby power.	* 1.2.1. Within 45 seconds from status presentation.
1.3. For MG brush surging or chattering.	* 1.3.1. Within 1 minute from status indications.
2. Attempt to start EACU by turning Emergency Operation switch SW-108 to Hand or pressing Emergency Fan Overload Relay pushbutton.	2.1. Within 2 minute from loss of cooling air or last valid attempt at regaining cooling air.
3. [3/5] Attempt NECS restart by turning Emergency Operation switch SW- 108 to Auto and pressing ECS Restart switch SW - 106.	3.1. Within 2 minutes from notification that NECS operation has been restored and EACU is not operating.
NOTE: Valid attempt is defined as an attempt to start or restart the EACU where the action could reasonably be expected to start the EACU (based on weapon system knowledge and expected indications).	

Table A3.18. E08A - DECLARE SECURITY SITUATION 1 / BRIEF LOCATION

CONSTRAINTS
1. If a security situation exists at the same LF/MAF, team or convoy, changes in security status or additional security indications of lower priority must be relayed to the FSC/MSC, as applicable, and will be evaluated to Level B. If indications of a security situation of higher priority are received, evaluate to Level A.
2. Attack indications will be limited to: armed individuals attempting to gain access, explosives found on site, chemical attack, or individuals firing at personnel or resources even if they have not gained access. .
3. Dispatches will be immediately available upon request if not already present.
4. If C01B is also being evaluated to Level A, time sequentially.
5. If scenario requires this task and C05B to be evaluated to Level A standards, time concurrently.

PERFORMANCE	STANDARD
1. Declare Security Situation 1A-1G and brief location to FSC or MSC.	* 1.1. Within 3 minutes from notification of attack or receipt of weapon system indications.

G-106

Table A3.19. E08B - DECLARE SECURITY SITUATION 2 / BRIEF LOCATION

CONSTRAINTS
1. If a security situation exists at the same LF/MAF or convoy, changes in security status or additional security indications of lower priority must be relayed to the FSC/MSC, as applicable, and will be evaluated to Level B. If indications of a security situation of higher priority are received, evaluate to Level A.
2. Duress indications will be limited to the actual passing and receipt of the primary or alternate duress code, no contact/loss of contact over all available means or non-compliance. Non-compliance will be limited to the following: failure to report as prescribed, using bogus or reversed call signs, or a team entering the wrong LF.
3. Dispatch information will be immediately available upon request if it is not already present.
4. For performance 3, if presenting no contact by all available means, provide no further contact with the team following the first attempt at contact.
5. If C01B is also being evaluated to Level A, time sequentially.
6. If scenario requires this task and C05B to be evaluated to Level A standards, time concurrently.

PERFORMANCE	STANDARD
1. Declare Security Situation 2A-2B and brief location to FSC or MSC.	* 1.1. Within 3 minutes of duress indications.
2. Declare Security Situation 2C-2F and brief location to FSC or MSC.	* 2.1. Within 5 minutes of duress indications.

Table A3.20. E08C - DECLARE SECURITY SITUATION 3 / BRIEF LOCATION

CONSTRAINTS
1. If a security situation exists at the same LF/MAF, changes in security status or additional security indications of lower priority must be relayed to the FSC/MSC, as applicable, and will be evaluated to Level B. If indications of a security situation of higher priority are received, evaluate to Level A.
2. Unauthorized/Unidentified indications will be limited to: unauthorized/unidentified personnel attempting entry to an LF/MAF, misauthentications, incorrect trip data (limited to information required to be verified by MCC or FSC), or MIIDS alarm.
3. Dispatch information will be immediately available upon request if it is not already present.
4. If C01B is also being evaluated to Level A, time sequentially.
5. If scenario requires this task and C05B to be evaluated to Level A standards, time concurrently.

PERFORMANCE	STANDARD
1. Declare Security Situation 3A at LF/NDA and brief location to FSC or MSC.	* 1.1. Within 5 minutes from notification of unauthorized or unidentified personnel on or attempting entry, or second misauthentication.

2. Declare Security Situation 3B-3D, 3G and brief location to FSC or MSC.	* 2.1. Within 5 minutes from notification of unauthorized or unidentified personnel on or attempting entry, or second misauthentication.
3. Declare Security Situation 3A at MAF, 3E or 3F, brief location to FSC or MSC and engage blast door latch.	* 3.1. Within 6 minutes from initial indications of MIIDS Alarm, notification of unauthorized or unidentified personnel on or attempting entry, or second misauthentication

Table A3.21. E08D - DECLARE SECURITY SITUATION 4 / BRIEF LOCATION

CONSTRAINTS
1. If a security situation exists at the same LF, changes in security status or additional security indications of lower priority must be relayed to the FSC/MSC, as applicable, and will be evaluated to Level B. If indications of a security situation of higher priority are received, evaluate to Level A. 2. Dispatch information will be immediately available upon request if it is not already present. 3. If C01B is also being evaluated to Level A, time sequentially. 4. If scenario requires this task and C05B to be evaluated to Level A standards, time concurrently. 5. If scenario requires this task to be evaluated in conjunction with a F0XX JPR, evaluate this task to Level B.

PERFORMANCE	STANDARD
1. Declare Security Situation 4B, and brief location to FSC or MSC.	* 1.1. Within 5 minutes from good authentications if affected LF is manned by a CAT V without SET, or a CAT VI team.
2. Declare Security Situation 4C, and brief location to FSC or MSC.	* 2.1. Within 5 minutes from LFDN indications if affected LF is unmanned.
3. Declare Security Situation 4C, and brief MSLA indications and location to FSC or MSC.	* 3.1. Within 5 minutes from LFDN and MSLA indications if affected LF is unmanned.

Table A3.22. E08E - DECLARE SECURITY SITUATION 5 / BRIEF LOCATION

CONSTRAINTS
1. If a security situation exists at the same LF, changes in security status or additional security indications of lower priority must be relayed to the FSC/MSC, as applicable, and will be evaluated to Level B. If indications of a security situation of higher priority are received, evaluate to Level A. 2. Dispatch information will be immediately available upon request if it is not already present. 3. If scenario requires this task and C01B to be evaluated to Level A, time concurrently.

PERFORMANCE	STANDARD

1. Declare Security Situation 5A and brief location to FSC or MSC.	* 1.1. Within 10 minutes from uncoordinated IZ indications.
2. Declare Security Situation 5B and brief location to FSC or MSC.	* 2.1. Within 5 minutes from IZ indications failing to report upon SCNT APQ completion.
3. For security situation 5C, attempt contact by all available means and direct or request first authentication.	*3.1. Within 5 minutes of notification of completion of weekly LF check.
4. Declare Security Situation 5E – 5H and brief location to FSC or MSC.	* 4.1. Within 5 minutes from receipt of weapon system indications.

Table A3.23. E08F - DECLARE SECURITY SITUATIONS FOR LCC/LFs FOR WHICH LCC HAS SECONDARY RESPONSIBILITY / BRIEF LOCATION

CONSTRAINTS
1. If a security situation exists at the same LF/MAF, team or convoy, changes in security status or additional security indications of lower priority must be relayed to the FSC/MSC, as applicable, and will be evaluated to Level B. If indications of a security situation of higher priority are received, evaluate to Level A.
2. Dial Lines will be operational.
3. If security procedures are required, indications of no LCC contact will be relayed by the FSC upon initial request. Additionally, no contact with the LCC will be available, by any means.
4. Manned LFs will only be occupied by CAT V without SET, CAT VI, or CAT VII teams.
5. Contact will be available with the FSC and MSC for the flight affected by the pending security situation.
6. For performances 3 and 4, trip dispatch information will be immediately available upon request if not already present.
7. Timeslots, AFI, and flight responsibilities will be normal at the time of status presentation.
8. If scenarios require this task and C01B to be evaluated, C01B will be evaluated to Level B.
9. If scenarios require this task and E08A, E08B, E08C or E08E, evaluate E08A, E08B, E08C and E08E to Level B.
10. Limit multiple security situations to the following performances.

PERFORMANCE	STANDARD
1. Declare Security Situations 2E and 2C and brief location to FSC or MSC.	* 1.1. Within 5 minutes from IZ and duress indications at primary LCC and no contact with team at affected LF.
2. Declare Security Situations 2E and 1C, 5E or 5F and brief location to FSC or MSC.	* 2.1. Within 5 minutes from IZ and duress indications at primary LCC and affected LF is unmanned.
3. Declare Security Situations 2E and 3C and brief location to FSC or MSC.	* 3.1. Within 10 minutes from IZ and duress indications at primary LCC and two misauthentications received from team at

	affected LF.
4. Declare Security Situations 2E and 5A and brief location to FSC or MSC.	* 4.1. Within 10 minutes from IZ and duress indications at primary LCC and IZ fails to reset within normal system reaction time after good authentication from team at affected LF.

Table A3.24. G01B - PERFORM COMMUNICATIONS REALIGNMENT AND EQUIPMENT FREQUENCY/CHANNEL CHANGE

CONSTRAINTS	
1. Award JPR credit when the crew performs or directs changes to communication monitoring equipment or communication monitoring matrix(s). Do not award JPR credit for updating or directing update to a communication outage chart. 2. If performing procedure in states of readiness that do not require launch reports per the launch reporting guide, evaluate to Level B. 3. If presenting scenarios where VLF/LF database realignment or UHF MILSTAR satellite change is required, evaluate to Level B. 4. If performing this task to start up a communication system, evaluate to Level B	
PERFORMANCE	**STANDARD**
1. In coordination with other LCCs, determine, select, and retune to required satellite/frequency/channel/parameters, as required.	1.1. Within 10 minutes from initial indications of loss of contact or LCC Down APQ entry, whichever occurs first. 1.2. Within 5 minutes from notification of communications degrade, outage or direction in accordance with command directives, SCP or controlling LCC.

G-110

Attachment 4

LEVEL B TASK CONSTRAINTS FOR MINUTEMAN III WEAPON SYSTEM

A4.1. A02A - PERFORM MEED OPERATION.

A4.1.1. Evaluate to Level B when performing in conjunction with Level A or B task.

A4.2. B02C – PERFORM MIIDS OPERATION.

A4.2.1. Evaluate to Level B when performing in conjunction with B01A.

A4.3. B05A – PERFORM TIMESLOT /AFI TAKEOVER/DELETION.

A4.3.1. Evaluate to Level B when performing in conjunction with Level A or B task.

A4.4. B05B - PERFORM COMM GRID UPDATE.

A4.4.1. If performing SDU encryption mode, evaluate to Level B when performing in conjunction with a Level A.

A4.5. B08A - PERFORM CIRCUIT BREAKER/CIRCUIT PROTECTION DEVICE RESET.

A4.5.1. Evaluate to Level B for all CBs effecting command, control, communication, power, and air.

A4.5.2. Presentation of circuit breakers tripping, other than in the LCC, will include confirmation by on-site personnel if asked by crew.

A4.6. B08N – OPERATE EMERGENCY SHUTOFF VALVES.

A4.6.1. Evaluate to a Level B when performing in conjunction with a F0XX task.

A4.7. C01C - PERFORM WEAPON SYSTEM CHECKS AND TESTS.

A4.7.1. Award JPR credit for accomplishing any portion of weapon system checks and tests portion of LF Activities.

A4.8. C03A - PERFORM SCNT.

A4.8.1. Evaluate to Level B for Security Forces release in multiple alarm situations.

A4.9. D01A - PERFORM CASE ENTRY LIBRARY.

A4.9.1. Evaluate to Level B for entry of minimum case.

A4.10. D05A - PERFORM PLC-A.

A4.10.1. If procedure is being accomplished in accordance with command directives, responses from LFs will be normal and consistent with sortie status at the time the sortie processes the PLC-A.

A4.11. E09A - RESPOND TO CODES VIOLATION.

A4.11.1. Present only in the primary flight area.

A4.11.2. MCC will have a valid dispatch for CAT II Code Handling Teams traveling in affected flight area if team is directly involved with the situation.

A4.11.3. Secure communications will be available or briefed.

A4.12. G07N - FAIL EXTRACTION ON/OFF.

A4.12.1. Evaluate to Level B when processing in conjunction with a F0XX task.

Attachment 5

LEVEL C TASK CONSTRAINTS FOR MINUTEMAN III WEAPON SYSTEM

A5.1. A01D - COMPLY WITH T.O. 21M-LGM30F-12.

A5.1.1. Evaluation of JPR must be in accordance with MAF Activities only.

A5.2. B05A – PERFORM TIMESLOT/AFI TAKEOVER/DELETION.

A5.2.1. Evaluate to Level C when deleting Timeslot or AFI.

A5.3. B05B – PERFORM COMM GRID UPDATE.

A5.3.1. If performing SDU encryption mode, evaluate to Level C when not in conjunction with a F0XX task.

A5.4. B06C - PERFORM CREW LOG PROCEDURES.

A5.4.1. Award JPR Credit for all crew log archives and crew log entries.

A5.5. B08A - PERFORM CIRCUIT BREAKER/CIRCUIT PROTECTION DEVICE RESET.

A5.5.1. Presentation of circuit breakers tripping, other than in the LCC, will include confirmation by on-site personnel if asked by crew.

A5.6. B09A - RESPOND TO MISCELLANEOUS LCC FAULTS.

A5.6.1. Award JPR credit for any LCC fault that does not have a corresponding JPR.

A5.7. B09G - RESPOND TO ABNORMAL INDICATIONS.

A5.7.1. Award JPR credit for any LCC indication that does not have a corresponding JPR.

A5.8. B09R - RESPOND TO AAP FAULTS.

A5.8.1. For AAP faults, do not present any simultaneous/unrelated faults. Only related power changeover indications/faults will be given on the AAP.

A5.9. C05A RESPOND TO MISCELLANEOUS LF FAULTS.

A5.9.1. Award JPR credit for any LF fault that does not have a corresponding JPR.

A5.9.2. Award JPR credit for any GMR and/or MOSR not listed in the LF fault matrix.

A5.10. C05J - RESPOND TO GMR.

A5.10.1. Award JPR credit when crew responds to GMR listed in the LF faults matrix.

A5.11. C05K - RESPOND TO MOSR.

A5.11.1. Award JPR credit when crew responds to MOSR listed in the LF faults matrix.

A5.12. D01C – PERFORM FDM PROCESSING PROCEDURE.

A5.12.1. Evaluate to Level C when accomplishing FDM totals.

A5.13. D01E - PROCESS INVALID FDMS/WSCE.

A5.13.1. Award JPR credit when crew processes invalid FDMs on the WSCE portion of the REACT console.

A5.14. G05B - PERFORM SACDIN OPERATOR COMMAND COMPOSITION.

A5.14.1. Award JPR credit when crew performs a command listed in the SACDIN Operator Command Composition checklist.

A5.15. G07D - PROCESS INVALID FDMS/HA.

A5.15.1. Award JPR credit when crew processes invalid FDMs on HAC/RMPS portion of the REACT console.

Attachment 6

DEFICIENCY CODES

Table A6.1. Deficiency Codes.

CODE	TITLE	EXPLANATION
DC01	Lack of Knowledge	Did not know or unable to discern requirement. May be indicated by failure to accomplish a required task/subtask or accomplishing an incorrect task/subtask.
DC02	Lack of Proficiency	Knew the requirement, but experienced difficulty because of a skill, ability, or expertise deficiency. May be indicated by failure to meet stated time standards.
DC03	Lack of Association	Did not associate the impact of various statuses. Could not correlate information.
DC04	Lack of Discipline	Inattention to detail, for example, skipped steps, misread clock, or did not detect status. May be indicated by poor checklist discipline.
DC05	Other	Any identifiable deficiency not otherwise listed. If this code is used, a complete description of the cause of the deficiency must be included in the remarks.
DC06	Faulty Prioritization	Accomplished task/subtask, but unnecessarily delayed a relatively more urgent task/subtask.
DC07	Inadequate Crew Coordination	May be indicated when one crew member had incomplete status or when the error was attributed to inadequate use of demand-response techniques.

Attachment 7

AIR FORCE PROFICIENCY CODES

Figure A7.1. Air Force Proficiency Codes.

PROFICIENCY CODE KEY		
	SCALE VALUE	**DEFINITION** The individual:
TASK PERFORMANCE LEVELS	**1**	Can do simple parts of the task. Needs to be told or shown how to do most of the task. (EXTREMELY LIMITED)
	2	Can do most parts of the task. Needs help only on hardest part. (PARTIALLY PROFICIENT)
	3	Can do all parts of the task. Needs only a spot check of completed work. (COMPETENT)
	4	Can do the complete task quickly and accurately. Can tell or show how to do the task. (HIGHLY PROFICIENT)
* TASK KNOWLEDGE LEVELS	**a**	Can name parts, tools, and simple facts about the task. (NOMENCLATURE)
	b	Can determine step-by-step procedures for doing the task. (PROCEDURES)
	c	Can identify why and when the task must be done and why each step is needed. (OPERATING PRINCIPLES)
	d	Can predict, isolate, and resolve problems about the task. (COMPLETE THEORY)
** SUBJECT KNOWLEDGE LEVELS	**A**	Can identify basic facts and terms about the subject. (FACTS)
	B	Can identify relationship of basic facts and state general principles about the subject. (PRINCIPLES)
	C	Can analyze facts and principles and draw conclusions about the subject. (ANALYSIS)
	D	Can evaluate conditions and make proper decisions about the subject. (EVALUATION)
EXPLANATIONS		
*		A task knowledge scale value may be used alone or with a task performance scale value to define a level of knowledge for a specific task. (Examples: b and 1b)
**		A subject knowledge scale value is used alone to define a level of knowledge for a subject not directly related to any specific task, or for a subject common to several tasks.

NOTE: Chart consistent with AFMAN 36-2236.

Attachment 8

INITIAL SKILLS TRAINING FEEDBACK

MEMORANDUM FOR 20 AF/ICE

FROM: XX MW/OSOT

Address
Address

SUBJECT: ICBM Operations Initial Skills Training Class XX-XX Feedback

1. Initial Codes Training.

Comments to be supplied by OSB instructor for new students. State any specific subject areas students did not understand, including problem scenarios. State the JPR, if applicable. Make any pertinent general comments. Do not merely state diagnostic test scores or pass rates.

Examples of desired comments:
E09A (Respond to Possible Code Compromise): All students were unfamiliar with how to report Possible Code Compromises. All students were unfamiliar with the organization of the Vol 16.

2. Mission Ready EWO Training.

Comments to be supplied by EWO instructor for new students. State any specific subject areas students did not understand, including problem scenarios. State the JPR, if applicable. Make any pertinent general comments. Keep unclassified or use a classified transmission. Do not merely state diagnostic test scores or pass rates.

Examples of desired comments:

Students were unfamiliar with non-IAD techniques.
No conceptual problems were noted.

3. MPT Performance/Weapon System Knowledge.

Comments to be supplied by MQT manager or primary MPT instructor for new students. State any specific subject areas students did not understand, including problem scenarios. State the JPR, if applicable. Do not merely report errors made by the new crew member and their commander because this does not necessarily indicate a problem with Initial Skills Training [e.g., the MCCC may have led the DMCCC into the error.] Make any pertinent general comments.

Example of desired comments:
C03A (Perform SCNT): Four students did not understand expected test results for manned site vs. penetrated site.

4. Direct any questions to (POC) at DSN ###-####.

JEFF FINCH, Capt, USAF
Duty Title

Air Force Global Strike Command

Published April 08, 2010

PRINT | E-MAIL

Air Force Global Strike Command, activated Aug. 7, 2009, is a major command with its headquarters at Barksdale Air Force Base, La., in the Shreveport - Bossier City community. AFGSC is responsible for the nation's three intercontinental ballistic missile wings, the two B-52 wings and the only B-2 wing.

Mission
Develop and provide combat-ready forces for nuclear deterrence and global strike operations-- safe, secure, effective -- to support the President of the United States and Combatant Commanders.

Vision
American Airmen with special trust and responsibility for the most powerful weapons in our nation's arsenal ... an elite, highly disciplined team ... a model command.

What We Value
- Individual responsibility for mission success
- Critical self-assessment of our performance
- Uncompromising adherence to all directives
- Superior technical and weapons system expertise
- Persistent innovation at all levels
- Pride in our nuclear heritage and mission
- Respect for the worth and dignity of every Airman
- Safety in all things large ... and small

Organizations
Approximately 25,000 professionals are assigned to six wings, two geographically-separated squadrons and one detachment in the continental United States and deployed to locations around the globe. Major units and bases include: 20th Air Force at F.E. Warren AFB, Wyo., the three ICBM wings under 20th Air Force -- the 90th Missile Wing at F.E. Warren AFB, Wyo.; the 341st Missile Wing at Malmstrom AFB, Mont.; the 91st Missile at Minot AFB, N.D. and the 625 STOS, which report to 20 AF.; 8th Air Force at Barksdale AFB, La. and the three bomber wings under 8th Air Force -- the 509th Bomb Wing at Whiteman AFB, Mo.; the 2d Bomb Wing at Barksdale AFB, La.; and the 5th Bomb Wing at Minot AFB, N.D. In addition, two squadrons, the 576th Flight Test Squadron at Vandenberg AFB, Calif., and the 625th Strategic Operations Squadron at Offutt AFB, Neb., fall under the command, as well an Air Operations Group at Otis Air National Guard Base in

G-120

Mass., and a detachment at Langley Air Force Base, Va.

Eighth Air Force is headquartered at Barksdale Air Force Base, in the Bossier City - Shreveport, La., metro area. The numbered air force is designated as U.S. Strategic Command's Task Force 204, providing on-alert, combat-ready forces to the President. The mission of "The Mighty Eighth" is to safeguard America's interests through strategic deterrence and global combat power. Eighth Air Force controls long-range nuclear-capable bomber assets throughout the United States and overseas locations. Its flexible, conventional and nuclear deterrence mission provides the capability to deploy forces and engage enemy threats from home station or forward positioned, anywhere, any time. The 8th Air Force motto is "Deterrence through strength, global strike on demand."

Twentieth Air Force, headquartered at F.E. Warren AFB, Wyo., also supports United States Strategic Command. A numbered air force for AFGSC, 20th Air Force is responsible for maintaining and operating the Air Force's ICBM force. Designated as USSTRATCOM's Task Force 214, 20th Air Force provides on-alert, combat-ready ICBMs to the President.

ICBM Capabilities

America's alert ICBMs are ready to launch on any given day, and America's ICBM team plays a critical role in maintaining global stability and ensuring the Nation's safety and security. 450 Minuteman III missiles provide a critical component of America's on-alert strategic forces. As the Nation's "silent sentinels," ICBMs, and the people who operate them, have remained on continuous, around-the-clock alert since 1959.

AFGSC is the Air Force's lead command for and largest operator of UH-1N Iroquois helicopters. The UH-1N supports ICBM operations in missile fields controlled by F.E. Warren AFB, Malmstrom AFB and Minot AFB.

Bomber Capabilities

The B-2 Spirit is a long-range nuclear and conventional stealthy bomber. The bomber can fly at high subsonic speeds at altitudes that can reach 50,000 feet. Its unrefueled range is at least 6,000 nautical miles. The B-2 brings massive firepower, in a short time, anywhere on the globe through the most challenging defenses.

The B-52 Stratofortress is a long-range, nuclear and conventional heavy bomber that can perform a variety of missions. The bomber can fly at high subsonic speeds at altitudes reaching 50,000 feet. It has an unrefueled combat range in excess of 8,800 miles. It can carry precision-guided ordnance with worldwide precision navigation.

History

Jan. 12, 2009 - Air Force officials officially established Air Force Global Strike Command (Provisional) at Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, D.C. with supporting detachments at Air Combat Command and Air Force Space Command, and commanded by Brig. Gen. James M.

G-121

Kowalski. The provisional command was responsible for implementing the Secretary of the Air Force's Program Action Directive and Programming Plan.

Aug. 7, 2009 - Air Force Global Strike Command stood up and was tasked to oversee all of the U.S. Air Force's long-range nuclear-capable bomber and intercontinental ballistic missile forces in a ceremony at Barksdale Air Force Base, La. The ceremony was officiated by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Gen. Norton A. Schwartz, and attended by both Louisiana U.S. Senators, the governor of Louisiana and about 1,000 Airmen and guests.

Dec. 1, 2009 - The command assumed the U.S. Air Force's Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile mission with the assumption of 20th Air Force and the 576th Flight Test Squadron. These units were previously part of Air Force Space Command.

Feb. 1, 2010 - The command assumed the U.S. Air Force's strategic long-range nuclear-capable B-2 Spirit and B-52 Stratofortress bomber missions with the assumption of the 8th Air Force mission. These units were previously part of Air Combat Command.

Command Emblem
The globe reflects the command's global capabilities and the golden wings represent the dominance in the air and reflect our lineage to the Army Air Corps. The blue field alludes to the sky, the primary domain of the Air Force. The star represents clarity of purpose to maintain readiness and deter adversaries. The red disc symbolizes past and present Airmen who have made individual sacrifices to achieve mission goals. The lightning flashes, symbolic of speed and power, represent our war-fighting mission should deterrence fail, and remind us of our lineage to Strategic Air Command.

Air Force Global Strike Command fact sheet banner. (U.S. Air Force graphic by Andy Yacenda, Defense Media Activity-San Antonio)

G-123

Air Force Global Strike Command Image provided by the Institute of Heraldry. In accordance with Chapter 3 of AFI 84-105, commercial reproduction of this emblem is NOT permitted without the permission of the proponent organizational/unit commander. The image is 7x7 inches @ 300 dpi.

PHOTO DETAILS / DOWNLOAD HI-RES

Air Force Global Strike Command web banner. (U.S. Air Force graphic by Andy Yacenda, Defense Media Activity-San Antonio)

G-124

FACT SHEET

U.S. Air Force Fact Sheet

341ST OPERATIONS GROUP

The 341st Operations Group, activated 1 Sept., 1 1991, is made up of more than 500 operators, administrators, helicopter aircrews, chefs, facility managers and support personnel. Together, they ensure the readiness of 15 missile alert facilities and 150 Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles spread across a 13,800-square mile missile complex; the largest such complex in the western hemisphere. The group is composed of three missile squadrons, an operations support squadron, a helicopter squadron, and a standardization and evaluation division. Maintaining proficiency for the critical and sensitive mission is of the utmost importance. The ICBM combat crews spend more than 20 hours in training with more than 200 hours in the field each month.

Each of the operations group's three missile squadrons is responsible for five Missile Alert Facilities and 50 Minuteman III ICBMs. The 10th, 12th and 490th Missile Squadrons are our fighting units. Each squadron has five missile combat crews on alert duty, 24 hours a day, every day, with the support of facility managers and chefs, and security forces from the 341st Security Forces Group.

341st Operations Group shield

10th Missile Squadron

The 10th Missile Squadron was originally constituted as the 10th Bombardment Squadron Dec. 22, 1939, and activated at Langley Field, Va., Feb. 1, 1940. It was assigned to Borinquen Field, Puerto Rico; Edinburgh Field, Trinidad; Lincoln Army Air Field, Neb.; Westover Field, Mass.; and Abilene (Dyess) AFB, Texas, before being deactivated June 25, 1961.

On Aug. 2, 1961, the Air Force reactivated the squadron as the 10th Strategic Missile Squadron and assigned it to Malmstrom AFB, Mont. By late Oct., 1962, the launch facilities comprising Alpha Flight were brought to alert status during the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis. A statement from President Kennedy referred to Alpha Flight as "America's First Ace in the Hole," giving the squadron its motto and tradition.

12th Missile Squadron

Originally constituted the 12th Bombardment Squadron Dec. 22, 1939, the 12th Missile Squadron also activated Feb 1, 1940 at Langley Field, Va. It served in St. Croix; Alamogordo, N.M.; Hartford, Conn.; and Dyess AFB, Texas, before it was deactivated in June 1961.

On March 1, 1962, the 12th transitioned to its current role as part of America's deterrent force when it became the 12th Strategic Missile Squadron. It quickly achieved the distinction of being the first Minuteman missile squadron to become 100 percent combat ready. While operating the Minuteman I weapon system, the crews of the 12th were nicknamed "Red Dawgs."

G-125

The squadron flag proudly displays the anti-submarine campaign streamer and five Outstanding Unit Awards. Today, the 12th Missile Squadron continues its deterrent role into the 21st century as one of the world's strategic war-fighting units.

490th Missile Squadron
The 490th Missile Squadron was activated as the 490th Bombardment Squadron (medium) Sept. 15, 1942, as part of the 341st Bombardment Group (medium), flying the B-25 Mitchell bomber in the China-Burma-India Theater of Operations.

The squadron's emblem of "Skull and Wings" adorned the fuselages of the 490th MS B-25s. After the war, the 490th MS was reactivated at Dyess AFB, Texas, in 1955. In 1962, the squadron was redesignated as the 490th Strategic Missile Squadron, assigned to the 341st Strategic Missile Wing at Malmstrom AFB, Mont It is the only squadron that has been continually assigned to the 341st since activation.

The 490th Missile Squadron missile alert facilities are deployed at the farthest sites in Twentieth Air Force; squadron personnel are known as the "Farsiders" and take tremendous pride in being the furthest from the support base.

341st Operations Support Squadron
The 341st Operations Support Squadron maximizes the operations group's combat readiness by training missile crews, missile alert facility managers and chefs. The 341st OSS provides emergency war order materials and missile launch codes for 15 MAFs and 150 ICBMs, manages ICBM crew schedules and maintains training documentation for more than 300 missileers. The squadron oversees wing battle staff training and operations and furnishes mission-critical intelligence support for the wing and its tenant units. Additionally, the 341st OSS provides weather services and information to the wing and DoD and civilian agencies throughout Montana.

40th Helicopter Squadron
The 40th Helicopter Squadron, assigned to Malmstrom AFB, Mont., began as Detachment 5 of the 37th Air Rescue and Recovery Squadron and was one of seven detachments in the 37th ARRS under Military Airlift Command. The 37th ARRS was activated during the Korean War when helicopters were first used for medical evacuation. After the Vietnam War, 37th ARRS was deactivated, only to be reactivated in December 1973.

The 37th ARRS has been in service since March 21, 1968 and has carried out numerous search and rescue operations in combat areas throughout Southeast Asia, participated in the evacuations of Phnom Penh, Cambodia, Saigon, Vietnam and also provided service during the assault on Koh Tang Island during the Mayaguez incident.

Malmstrom AFB has had helicopters assigned since December 1964 under the Strategic Air Command structure and the 40th Rescue Flight was activated on May 1, 1993. In April 1998, the unit was redesignated as the 40th Helicopter Flight, and in October, 2005, the unit was redesignated the 40th Helicopter Squadron.

The 40th Helicopter Squadron ensures strategic security by providing flexible, rapid-response helicopter airlift support to the 341st Missile Wing. The 40th also performs aerial surveillance of Department of Defense strategic weapon convoys and short notice emergency security forces responses; supports emergency war order taskings, and priority personnel and logistical transportation. The 40th Helicopter Squadron has a proud rescue history and currently conducts search and rescue missions in support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff National Search and Rescue plan.

The 40 HS currently employs the UH-1N "Iroquois" helicopter, commonly known as the "Huey," a name that stems from its original designation of utility. The aircraft can carry up to 13 passengers at a maximum gross weight of 10,500 lbs. It has a range of 300 miles and can travel at a maximum airspeed of 130 knots (approximately 145 miles per hour). To date the unit

G-126

has saved more than 395 lives and since 1973 has accumulated over 135,000 accident-free flying hours. The men and women of the 40th Helicopter Squadron are proud of their military heritage and continue to strive for excellence and better service for the 341st Missile Wing.

G-127

FACT SHEET

U.S. Air Force Fact Sheet

341ST MISSILE WING

The 341st Missile Wing, headquartered at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Mont., is one of three U.S. Air Force Bases that maintains and operates the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile. The 341st Missile Wing reports directly to 20th Air Force, F.E. Warren Air Force Base, Wyo., and is part of Air Force Global Strike Command, headquartered at Barksdale Air Force Base, La.

Mission
The mission of the 341st Missile Wing is to defend America with safe, secure, effective nuclear forces and combat-ready Airmen.

People
Approximately 4,000 people, including more than 3,300 active-duty and more than 700 civilians, comprise the 341st Missile Wing. Malmstrom Air Force Base is also host to a tenant unit, the 819th RED HORSE Squadron, which accounts for nearly 500 personnel.

Effective July 1, 2008, the 341st was redesignated a missile wing.

Organizations
The 341st Missile Wing is made up of a wing staff and five groups - the 341st Operations Group, 341st Maintenance Group, 341st Mission Support Group, 341st Security Forces Group and 341st Medical Group.

The 341st Operations Group consists of more than 500 operators, administrators, chefs and facility managers and is composed of three missile squadrons, an operations support squadron, one helicopter squadron and a standardization and evaluation element. Each of the operations group's three missile squadrons are responsible for five Missile Alert Facilities and 50 Minuteman III ICBMs. The units of the 341st Operations Group include the 10th Missile Squadron, 12th Missile Squadron, 490th Missile Squadron, 341st Operations Support Squadron and the 40th Helicopter Squadron.

The 341st Maintenance Group provides the maximum number of fully modernized, combat capable Minuteman III missiles and the command and control required to execute launch per higher command authority. The Air Force has made significant commitments to extend the service life of the ICBM force with nearly $6.2 billion committed to life-extension programs. Those commitments have worked their way down to the 341st Maintenance Group's level, resulting in tangible improvements to the combat capability of Malmstrom's Minuteman IIIs. The units of the 341st Maintenance Group include the 341st Missile Maintenance Squadron, the 341st Maintenance Operations Squadron and the 341st Munitions Squadron.

The 341st Mission Support Group provides world-class support to enable the deterrent mission of the 341st Missile Wing, while preparing and deploying expeditionary combat support forces in

G-128

support of the combatant commanders. The support group provides the war-fighting and peace-time support to the 341st Missile Wing. This includes supporting 43 units and tenants, resource protection, engineering and construction, disaster preparedness, personnel administration, communication services, recreation facilities, dining and lodging services and worldwide contingency mobility forces. The units of the 341st Mission Support Group include the 341st Civil Engineer Squadron, 341st Communications Squadron, 341st Logistics Readiness Squadron, 341st Contracting Squadron and the 341st Force Support Squadron.

The 341st Security Forces Group, the largest security forces group in the Air Force, ensures the most stringent security forces' support to the largest intercontinental ballistic missile complex in the world through effective management of all war-fighting and peacetime security taskings assigned to the 341st Missile Wing. The units of the 341st Security Forces Group include the 341st Security Forces Squadron, the 341st Missile Security Forces Squadron, the 741st Missile Security Forces Squadron and the 341st Security Support Squadron. The 341st Security Forces Group also has a Tactical Response Force unit.

The 341st Medical Group is responsible for all medical and dental care for nearly 15,000 beneficiaries throughout north-central Montana. The group's mission is to maximize 341st Missile Wing personnel health, fitness and readiness through comprehensive managed health care systems emphasizing health promotion and preventive medicine. The units of the 341st Medical Group include the 341st Medical Operations Squadron and the 341st Medical Support Squadron.

Resources

The 341st Missile Wing operates 150 Minuteman III missiles which provide the critical component of America's on-alert strategic forces. The 341st MW also operates 8 UH-1N "Huey" helicopters throughout a 13,800 square-mile missile complex. The helicopters are used as a force-multiplier in day-to-day security of the missile complex.

Malmstrom Air Force Base is also host to the 819th RED HORSE squadron. The Malmstrom squadron is the first "associate" RED HORSE squadron in the Air Force, approximately two-thirds active-duty and one-third Air National Guard (the Montana Air National Guard 219th RED HORSE Squadron). The 819th RED HORSE squadron was reactivated Aug. 8, 1997, at Malmstrom AFB, Mont.

History

The 341st Missile Wing's history dates back to Sept. 15, 1942, when it was activated as the 341st Bombardment Group. Following a period of redesignation and inactivation, the unit activated as the 341st Strategic Missile Wing at Malmstrom AFB, Mont., under Strategic Air Command.

The wing's first flight of Minuteman I missiles, assigned to the 10th Strategic Missile Squadron, became alert-ready Oct. 26, 1962, during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Two more strategic missile squadrons - the 12th and the 490th - became operational by July 1963, bringing the wing up to a full strength of 15 flights consisting of 150 missiles.

In August 1964, the Air Force announced the wing would replace its Minuteman I missiles with Minuteman IIs. This replacement program included the creation of a fourth strategic missile squadron at Malmstrom, the 564th. Construction on the 564th SMS began in March 1965. The fourth squadron gave the 341st a total strength of 200 missiles spread throughout a 23,500-square mile complex, making it the largest missile complex in the world. It covers nine Montana counties (Cascade, Choteau, Fergus, Judith Basin, Lewis and Clark, Pondera, Teton, Toole and Wheatland). The upgrade of the wing's Minuteman Is began in August 1967 and ended in May 1969.

In January 1975, the 564th began replacing its 50 Minuteman IIs with the newer Minuteman III missiles, which were declared operational in April 1975. For years, Malmstrom had the unique distinction of being the only base to operate Minuteman II and III systems simultaneously.

G-129

On July 31, 1991 George H.W. Bush and Boris Yeltsin signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, concluding almost ten years of strategic disarmament talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. President Bush announced a force drawdown in September 1991, and for the first time since 1962, all of the 341st's 150 Minuteman II missiles stood down. Only the 564th Missile Squadron and its 50 Minuteman III missiles remained on alert.

The wing began reducing the number of Minuteman IIs following the drawdown announcement, replacing the systems with the newer Minuteman III. The program was put on hold during the 1995 Base Realignment and Closure Commission, and Malmstrom had only 80 missiles on alert. The BRAC called for the closure of the missile field at Grand Forks Air Force Base, N.D. and the transfer of Minuteman IIIs from Grand Forks to Malmstrom. The 341st's last Minuteman II missile was removed in August 1996, and since then the wing has operated only the Minuteman III.

With the conclusion of the Cold War came the eventual transfer of all missile wings, including the 341st, from Strategic Air Command to Air Force Space Command in 1993 and the redesignation of the wing to the 341st Space Wing on Oct. 1, 1997.

On July 1, 2008, the wing returned to its previous designation as the 341st Missile Wing and in August officially inactivated the 564th MS bringing the number of missile squadrons down to three.

The 341st Missile Wing currently operates, maintains and secures 150 missiles, providing strategic deterrence for the nation as the wing has continuously done since 1962 - remaining America's "Ace in the Hole."

On Dec. 1, 2009, the 341st Missile Wing, along with all the other missile wings, were transferred from Air Force Space Command to Air Force Global Strike Command.

Last updated Aug. 6, 2013

Point of Contact
341st Missile Wing, Public Affairs Office: 21 77th St N., Bldg. 500, Rm. 151D; Malmstrom AFB, MT 59402-7538; DSN 632-4050, or (406) 731-4050.

G-130

Unit 1.1a

INITIAL SKILLS TRAINING (IST) ORIENTATION

Overview

- Introductions
- Local Area and Vandenberg's History
- Course Chain of Command
- School Contact Information
- Course Overview & Administration
- Student Feedback Program
- Instructional Material Types and Uses

Overview (Con't)

- Training Materials and Resources Conservation
- AF Fraud, Waste, & Abuse Prevention & Detection
- Sexual Harassment & Assault Reporting
- Professional/Unprofessional Relationships and Hazing
- School Policies
- Security
- Risk Management Considerations
- Safety
- Base Facilities

Objective

Discuss AETC and local orientation subject areas per AETCI 36-2203 and applicable supplements

---

INTRODUCTIONS

Introductions

- Name
- Hometown & Family
- College & Major
- Commissioning Source
- Interests & Hobbies
- Other

**LOCAL AREA &
VANDENBERG'S HISTORY**

Local Area

- Local Area Information
  - 55 Miles north of Santa Barbara
  - Closest neighbors are Lompoc & Santa Maria
  - Climate is mild lows mid 40s and highs in upper 70s
  - Always lots of A.M. fog in the summer

Vandenberg's History

- 1941: Camp Cooke was the US Army Armor & Infantry Training during WWII
- 1957: Transferred to AF
- 1958: Renamed Vandenberg AFB

Vandenberg's History (Con't)

- Present: Home of Western Range
  - US polar & retrograde orbit satellite launches
  - ICBM test range

COURSE CHAIN OF COMMAND

Course Chain of Command

- Chain of Command
  - Maintain good order and discipline
  - Attempt to resolve issues at lowest level
    - Class Leader
    - Instructor
    - Instructor Supervisor
    - AETC Form 736, Student Feedback
      - Available in classroom
      - Academic/Non-academic

Course Chain of Command (Con't)

- 532 TRS Chain of Command (Top-Down)
  - Squadron Commander
  - Squadron Director of Operations
  - Flight Commander
  - Instructor Supervisor
  - Classroom or MPT Instructor
  - Class Leader

Course Chain of Command (Con't)

(b)(6)

Lt Col (b)(6)

Course Chain of Command (Con't)

(b)(6)

Lt Col (b)(6)

Course Chain of Command (Con't)

- Class Instructor
  - Second level of classroom supervision
  - Directly concerned with training
  - Point of contact between student and leadership
  - Able to assist you with squadron/base resources

Course Chain of Command (Con't)

- Class Leader
- Appointment
  - First level of classroom supervision
  - Usually senior ranking student
- Responsibilities
  - Ensure policy compliance (read orientation!)
  - Classmates on time
  - Maintain conduct and decorum
  - Disseminate information
  - Enforce AFI 36-2903 compliance
  - Ensure classrooms and common areas are clean

SCHOOL CONTACT INFORMATION

G-133

School Contact Information

- Carry a class recall roster
- Call immediately if you are running late for any reason
- Commander Support Staff number
  - Personnel related issue only
  - Do not give out number
- Your study guide orientation lists important contact numbers

Interim Summary

- Local Area and Vandenberg's History
- Course Chain of Command
- School Contact Information

COURSE OVERVIEW & ADMINISTRATION

Duty Information

- 100 Training Days/20 Weeks
- 8-hr training day (400 contact minutes)
- M-F, except holidays
- Academic Classes 0730-1630
- MPT simulator hours vary by schedule

Initial Skills Training (IST) Overview

- Goal: Become the best of America's frontline nuclear professionals
- There are no student experts here
  - Take good notes
  - Ask lots of questions
- 90% achievement standard
- Exposure to classified material
  - Only write in materials approved for classified
  - You can NEVER take classified home or out of EWO

Initial Skills Training (IST) Overview (Con't)

- Homework
  - Unclassified work during non-duty hours
  - Classified work
    - Done in EWO after duty
    - When directed by instructor, to include weekend work
- Course is divided into 10 blocks
  - Varying lengths
  - Review study guide for breakdown

Convenience Breaks

- 50-minute lecture/10min break
- Restroom locations

Measurements and Tests

- Progress checks (PC)
  - Given after each unit objective
    - Test your knowledge/skills
    - Show you and instructor if material is understood
- Failed PCs will be taken again

Measurements and Tests (Con't)

- Written PCs
  - Selection type (multiple choice/T-F)
  - Supply type (short answer)
  - Time limits
  - Minimum passing is 90%
- MPT PCs
  - Performance based
  - Cannot exceed limits specified in objective/instructions

Measurements and Tests (Con't)

- Used to determine Distinguished Graduate
- Do not take PCs lightly; training can be extended!

Measurements and Tests (Con't)

- Block Tests
  - Written tests in blocks I-IX
  - Performance test in block X
  - Based on objectives in each block
  - Anything in lecture, slides, or student materials is testable
  - Block tests are two hours
  - Minimum passing is 90%
  - Test scores used to determine Distinguished Graduate and Academic Achievement
  - Can be removed from training for poor test performance

Academic Integrity

- Test 532 TRS Academic Integrity Standards
  - Integrity standards help develop the habits of an Air Force Officer
  - We maintain an academic environment that challenges the individual's knowledge and skill
  - Compromise of academic integrity denies the ability to accurately assess an individual's training and performance
  - AETC 36-2909 defines acceptable academic practices and prohibited behavior
  - Personnel engaging in prohibited behavior are in violation of Article 92 and/or 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice
- Academic Integrity
  - Uncompromising adherence to a code of ethics, morality, conduct, scholarship, academic standards and other values essential to academic activity
  - Academic Progress Checks (PCs) and block tests ensure students possess and retain acceptable knowledge to continue in training

Academic Integrity (Con't)

- Studying
  - Encouraged to study with other students
  - Do not discuss PC or test questions
  - Do not build study materials from PC or test knowledge for either personal or group study
- Source material
  - All source material for the course is provided to the student. This includes:
    - Technical Orders (T.O.'s)
    - Regulations
    - Instructions
    - Local Policy
    - Study Guides
    - Appraisals
  - Source material is accurately updated and maintained by instructors

Academic Integrity (Con't)

- Non-source study material
  - This material is not accurately updated or maintained by instructors
  - Students use at own risk:
    - Online sources
    - Previous student materials
  - Use of non-source materials is highly discouraged

Academic Integrity (Con't)

- Creation and distribution of study materials
  - Individual may create study materials for unclassified information for personal use
  - Individual may share their study material with other students, but must label the material with:
    - Name
    - Class number
    - Date it was last edited (verifies document validity and origin)
  - Material created with knowledge of PC or test that reveals actual/reworded questions or answers is prohibited
  - Present any suspicious or questionable material to your instructor or FLT/CC for approval prior to using

Academic Integrity (Con't)

- Electronic possession
  - Student is responsible for the physical or electronic information in their possession
  - Possession includes: computer systems, portable electronic devices, email accounts, websites, and other forms of social media
  - **All student owned electronic devices to include but not limited to: cell phones, tablets, cameras, or other devices capable of collecting and/or transmitting data are not allowed in any 532 TRS training facility**
- Test Conduct
  - Collaboration verbally, non-verbally, or electronically between students will not be tolerated
  - Do not make any effort to obtain answers from fellow students (glancing at answer sheets, etc.)
  - Do not bring any outside material to the testing room
  - Collaboration or any unauthorized studying material is considered cheating

Academic Integrity (Con't)

- Cheating
  - The act of intentionally providing and/or receiving improper assistance on academic assignments, examinations, or research efforts
  - Examples include, but are not limited to: plagiarism, misrepresentation; gaining unauthorized access to faculty materials that have not been released for student use; copying answers from another's work; using unauthorized texts, notes, materials, or other references for examinations or other assigned work; knowingly permitting another student to copy one's assignments, speeches, or briefing materials, or answers from an examination paper
  - If you observe cheating taking place you are responsible for immediately notifying the test proctor and leadership

Special Individualized Assistance (SIA)

- Mandatory if you fail block test or numerous PCs
  - Not punitive
  - Help you improve
  - May be placed on study plan
- May voluntarily enroll for help anytime
- Instructor may bring in on weekend if you are struggling
  - Do your homework
  - Ask questions in class
  - Seek SIA if needed

Awards

- Distinguished Graduate Award
  - Academic Average
  - Leadership and Professionalism
- Academic Achievement Award

Graduation Ceremony

- Family members encouraged to attend
- VIPs (O-5 or above, E-9) welcome to attend
- Please coordinate with instructor 2 weeks prior
- Will be in Service Dress

Course Elimination

- Fail to progress satisfactorily
- Training Review Board (TRB)
  - Re-test or washback to next open seat
  - Reclassify or eliminate from AF

STUDENT FEEDBACK PROGRAM

Training Evaluation Program (TEP)

- Training continuously evaluated for improvements
- Emphasis is on your performance after graduating
- Information will be solicited from your supervisor

Student Critique Program

- Used for course and outside agency feedback
- Make comment or suggestion now
  - Do not wait until the end of the course
- If a problem, try to pose solution
- AETC Form 736, Student Feedback
  - Location
  - May be anonymous
  - Turn in to instructor
- Do **NOT** use to comment on test material or classified

Spirit & Intent Briefing

OPR: 341 MW/PRP
Updated: 6 January 2014

This briefing is
UNCLASSIFIED

Overview

- References
- Significance of Personnel Reliability Program (PRP)
- PRP standards and removal
- Individual responsibility
  - Self-reporting
  - Peer review factors
- Orange sheet requirement for off-base medical care
- Over-the-counter medications
- Potentially Disqualifying Information (PDI) discussion

References

- DOD 5210.42-R, AFMAN 10-3902, IC 2 03 Nov 2010, AFGSC Supplement 5 Dec 2012

- 341 MW Guidance Memorandums

- PRP Personnel Service Delivery Guides (PSDM's)

Personal Reliability Program

- What - To ensure only those personnel who meet the highest standards of reliability perform nuclear-related duties

- Why - To prevent an act that could ultimately lead to an unauthorized launch of an ICBM or aircraft armed with a nuclear weapon or unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon

- Who – YOU are a critical player in PRP

Safety
Security
Control
Effectiveness

→ Nuclear Weapons ←

Policy implications
Military importance
Destructive power
and
Political consequences
of an accident or
unauthorized act

Nuclear Weapons Require Special Consideration

Individual PRP Standards

Positive attitude towards nuclear weapons duty and PRP

Job Performance

Physical competence
Mental Alertness
Technical Proficiency
Dependability
Flexibility
No Pending UCMJ

Traits

Positive Attitude
Social Adjustment
Emotional Stability
Personal Integrity
Sound Judgment
Allegiance

PRP is a continuous process to ensure reliability
Standards apply on- and off-duty

Individual Responsibilities

Certifying Official

Treatment facility or support agency

Self reporting and peer review factors

Personal, legal or financial issues

Supervisor

You have an obligation to report to your CO of any factor or condition (on or off-duty) that could impair you or a peer's performance

Individual Responsibilities

- Monitor your own reliability and the reliability of others performing PRP duties
  - This is a 24/7 responsibility

- Advise supervisors or CO of any factor that could have an adverse impact on your performance, reliability, or safety while performing PRP duties

- Inform support agencies of your PRP status before treatment or consultation

Removal from PRP

- Individuals will be removed from PRP duties any time their reliability is in question or because of circumstances, is not authorized to perform PRP duties.
  - Removal from PRP is non-punitive
- Three means of removal
  - Suspension
  - Temporary decertification
  - Permanent decertification

The ONLY person who can remove or return you to PRP duties from suspension/temporary decertification is the CO!

If you have any question about your PRP status... Contact your CO!!

Suspension

- Used to remove individuals from PRP duties when reliability is not in question, but because of circumstance, is not authorized to perform PRP duties.
- Suspension Reasons:
  - Off-base medical appointments
  - Medications
  - Personal issues
  - CO discretion
  - Other
- Initially 30 days, up to 120 days in 30 day increments
- Not used if facts dictated temporary or permanent decertification
- No automatic reinstatements

Temporary Decertification

- Shall occur if member is suspended and reaches 120 day point & cannot be returned to duty and permanent decertification is not appropriate
- Mandatory Temporary decertification reasons:
  - Diagnosed as alcohol abuse / dependent
  - Establishment of Security Information File
  - Withdrawn access to classified information
  - Suspended security clearance
  - Suspected attempt and/or threat of suicide
- Initially 270 days, up to 365 days in 30 day increments
  (three 30 day extension and one 5 day extension if necessary)
- Not used if facts dictate permanent decertification
- Notification via formal memorandum

Permanent Decertification

- **Shall Occur if member is temporary decertified & reaches the 365 days point and cannot be returned to duty or no longer meets reliability standards**
- **Mandatory Permanent decertification reasons:**
  - Diagnosed as drug abuse or drug dependent
  - Alcohol dependent/abuse and fails aftercare
  - Involuntary discharge
  - Security clearance revoked
  - Involved drug trafficking, cultivating, manufacture or sale of controlled or illegal drug
  - Use of drugs that could cause flashbacks
  - Militarily separates/discharged or terminated, reassigned for contractor personnel before temporary decertification is resolved
- **Notified via AF Fm 286A**

Return to Duty

The ONLY person who can remove or return you to PRP duties from suspension/temporary decertification is the CO!

You are down until the CO tells you "You are up"

If you have any question about your PRP status...
Contact your CO!!

Reportable Situations

- Stressful situations
  - Marital/Relationship problems
  - Financial problems
  - Death/Illness of family member/friend/pet
- Positive stressors
  - Wedding
  - New baby

Substance abuse
  - Alcohol – requires ADAPT treatment
  - Drugs

Reportable Situations

- Visits to: Chaplain, SARC and AF OneSource
  - Although confidentiality exists with these offices-if the issue affects your ability to perform your PRP duties it is your responsibility to notify your CO
- Hypnotism
- Legal issues
- Alcohol-related incidents
- Any other questionable situation or occurrence

Reportable Situations

- **Medical or Dental treatment**
  - **Prior to off-base medical/dental care, obtain medical release form "Orange Sheet" from unit POC** (i.e. CO/PRP monitor)
  - **In case of emergency** (to include after duty hours & care outside the local area)
    - **Contact your unit POC as soon as the emergency is under control**
  - **Return orange sheet to the 341 MDG PRP office within 24 hours of the medical /dental treatment during Return to Duty (RTD) hours (or next duty day if a holiday or weekend)**

Off-base Medical Appointments

Prescription Medication

- **You are responsible for taking prescription medication IAW the CMA's direction for the underlying condition which it was prescribed for and specified duration**
  (i.e. take 1 pill 3x a day for 10 days)
- **Any deviation from the prescription instructions must be discussed with the CMA**
- **Prescriptions from non-military providers to PRP individuals must be reviewed by a CMA**
- **Prescriptions are only authorized for the prescribed individual and non transferable (i.e. cannot take your wife/friends Rx if experiencing the same symptoms)**

Prescription Medication

- **Any "leftover" medication must be disposed of and not taken again in the future for similar symptoms without consulting a CMA first**

- **Medication can be properly disposed of at the following location:**

   Montana Highway Patrol (Outside Drop Box)
   812 14th Street North (behind Dante's Restaurant)
   Great Falls, MT 59401
   Phone: 406-453-1121

OTC Medications and Supplements

- Use of OTC medications and supplements are permitted

- The use of herbal medications and any supplements should be discussed w/CMA prior to use to determine intended use or underlying condition

- You MUST consult with the CMA whenever:

  - You are within 12 hours of reporting to PRP duties <u>and</u> you are using the product for the first time
  - You have any question about a product's use or potential side effects
  - You have ever experienced adverse reactions from a drug

OTC Medications and Supplements

- You are responsible for taking OTC medications and supplements IAW the manufacturers' directions for intended use
- That means you <u>must read</u> the directions for intended use
  - If the package states it may cause drowsiness, <u>do not</u> take if:
    - You are performing PRP duties
    - You are within 12 hours of performing PRP duties

CO Comments

PRP certification is a contract between you and me by which you acknowledge and agree to comply with your personal responsibilities under PRP

PDI Discussion

Do you have any additional PDI not already disclosed?

1

THE HONOR
CODE

JEANNE M. HOLM CENTER

The Honor Code

Affective Lesson Objective:

- Value the OTS Honor Code.

Affective Samples of Behavior:

- Adhere to the OTS Honor Code.

- Explain the major elements of the Honor Code.

- Describe the procedures for handling a suspected Honor Code violation.

- Identify Honor Code violations.

"We will not lie, steal or cheat, nor tolerate among us anyone who does."

Students first acquire awareness of the foundational concepts of the honor system, and thereafter continually expand their awareness and internalization of the principles of honor and character throughout their training. Our honor code is constructed to develop the highest standards of personal integrity and strength of character in our officers and to serve as a moral basis throughout his or her career. **"We will not lie, steal or cheat, nor tolerate among us anyone who does."** Through this code we want our officers to develop a strong sense of honor. But more than just adhering to the standard of the code, we expect our officers to live by the spirit of the code, to do their duty with honor, and to live honorably.

Honor is a fine sense of ethics, justice, and rightness with a willingness to apply it to one's own conduct. It is integrity. General John D. Ryan, former USAF Chief of Staff, once said, "Integrity is the most important responsibility of command. Commanders are dependent on the integrity of those reporting to them in every decision they make. Integrity can be ordered, but it can only be achieved by encouragement and example." The ultimate purpose of the code is to encourage officers to live honorably so as they continue their career as an officer they'll possess high standards of individual honor and integrity. The Honor Code as it stands today is designed as a minimum standard of conduct to be applied at all times.

The concept of integrity is stressed so strongly that, for an officer, it carries the additional weight of emphasis by implication in Article 133, Uniform Code of Military Justice, which reads in part: "There are certain moral attributes common to the ideal officer and the perfect lady or gentleman, a lack of which is indicated by acts of dishonesty and unfair dealing, of indecency or indecorum, or of lawlessness, injustice, or cruelty. Not everyone is or can be expected to meet ideal moral standards, but there is a limit or toleration below which the individual standards of an officer, cadet, or midshipman cannot fall without seriously compromising his/her standing as an officer, cadet, or midshipman, or his/her character as a lady or gentleman." An officer is prepared to uphold the spirit of this code of honor for as long as they serve in a commissioned status in the United States military, and they start by adhering to the Honor Code.

Aristotle, the noted philosopher and teacher to Alexander the Great, developed a theory of philosophy in terms of excellent character traits or virtues. He believed that one could become an excellent person only by performing excellent actions until doing so becomes habitual. This has been the foundation of most military precommissioning sources, including OTS, AFROTC, and the Air Force Academy. Even before Greek and Roman Empires, there was a rich oral tradition and written history describing deeds of service with noble intent of heroes long past including Gideon, King David, Moses, Greek Mythology figures, and many others. That tradition was rich and inspiring to military personnel to act with high principle, live honorably, and do their duty. This continued through codes of chivalry in medieval times to many examples of honor with our own traditions here in America. According to General Douglas MacArthur, the code of the warrior, with its emphasis on sacrifice, "will stand the test of any ethics or philosophies the world has ever

known [because] it emphasizes the things that are right and condemns the things that are wrong." James Toner, in True Faith and Allegiance, adds, "Codes are encapsulations of wisdom and virtue...they exhort us to act as we should, and at their best, stimulate us to investigate and discover more about the concepts they seek to promote."

Honor codes, concepts, and a variety of educational tools have been at the heart of the service commissioning sources since their inception. They have historically been the cornerstones to make character central to the development of tomorrow's military leaders. Codes or concepts define a minimum standard of ethical conduct. A code is not an end in itself, but rather a means to help develop strong and honorable character. The codes should not be feared, but used as tools to help develop one's character.

There are a variety of codes. A creedal code is a statement of fundamental beliefs of a particular profession. There are fighting codes that govern soldiers' behavior in combat and toward the enemy. There are prisoners' codes, like our Code of Conduct, that explain proper conduct during captivity. And there are internal codes (like our Honor Code) that govern the relationships among personnel within the organization in order to develop trust and cohesion among its members (Toner, 1995). It also provides an environment that will foster character development.

The military codes set the American military apart from most other institutions, because of their high standards and the strong focus on character development. A code (or concept) reminds us that: 1) There is a right and a wrong in most cases; 2) As future officers we have the responsibility to make moral judgments; 3) Just because there is diversity among different societies and cultures does not mean right and wrong is unknowable; 4) Finally, the codes help prevent us from falling down the slippery slope of ethical relativism (anything goes) that has been detrimental in developing character and counter to the professional military ethic.

The advantages of codes are they reflect the wisdom of the ages, they urge us to act honorably, and they capture some of the discerning judgment we would hope students develop. It is important to note that codes have limitations. Codes should never be substitutes for educational wisdom and virtue, but can be used as a primer or catalyst to stimulate character reflection and development (Toner, 1995). Character development encompasses more than just the Honor Code; it also includes the Air Force Core Values, human relations, ethics, and moral and spiritual development. Your OTS experience is designed to make character central to your development into tomorrow's Air Force leaders by:

- Instilling self-discipline, ethics, and accountability for one's actions.

- Investing leadership with a spirit of professional integrity as relevant to the future as it is today.

- Producing officers who have the knowledge, character, and motivation essential to leadership.

As professionals entrusted with the defense of this nation, we must exhibit a level of integrity that is beyond reproach. When this trust is broken, confidence in the military, in civilian leadership, and in our national defense can suffer greatly. To prepare us for this demanding aspect of life as commissioned officers, OTS has accepted the Honor Code as the minimum standard. Your success as an officer depends upon your integrity and honor, and if you are to be effective leaders you must diligently practice integrity and make decisions based upon that. Compliance with the narrow tenets of the Code is only a beginning. The Code requires you to be an honest person by avoiding lying, cheating, and stealing. The Code also requires you to undertake the professional responsibility of self-policing or non-toleration.

Each trainee is responsible to report suspected violations of our Honor Code. Not for personal gain, but rather for the good of the school to foster growth and character development of the individual. It is also our responsibility to the American public to maintain high ethical standards that will gain their trust. It is every trainee's duty to correct a situation that is wrong, whether or not it involves a violation of the Code.

HONOR CODE

"We will not lie, steal or cheat, nor tolerate among us anyone who does."

POSITIVE PRINCIPLES

Honesty, Respect, Fairness, Responsibility, Integrity, Duty, Living Honorably

AIR FORCE CORE VALUES

Integrity First, Service Before Self, and Excellence in All We Do

LIVING HONORABLY

Did I get all of the facts?

Did I apply ethical principles, precepts, and values?

Is it a selfish decision? Would I go public with my decision?

Am I treating others as I would want to be treated?

Am I gaining or allowing the gain of a privilege or advantage to which I am not entitled?

How would I advise my best friend?

Does this action attempt to deceive or allow anyone to be deceived?

Would I be satisfied if I were on the receiving end of this action?

Am I living up to the highest ethical standards - living honorably?

SCENARIOS

The following are similar to actual situations. Read each one and think about whether or not they should be labeled as Honor Code violations.

- 2d Lt Stomp is working on his graded letter. He's notified he has a phone call. He leaves the letter on his desk. He returns 15-minutes later to find his roommate, 2d Lt Mann, reading his final draft. Lt Stomp pulls the paper from his roommate's hands, bundles up the test booklet and all his papers and leaves the room. Realizing he was in the wrong for leaving the letter unsecured, Lt Stomp decides to keep the incident to himself. The FLT/CC, in grading the letters, notes numerous similarities between Lt Stomp's and Lt Mann's letters. He calls the two to his office to explore the coincidence. Both deny any knowledge of wrongdoing. Has an Honor Code violation occurred?

- 2d Lt Henry picks up "his" flight cap as he leaves the dining hall and joins his flight. When he arrives back at his room, he stores "his" cap. The next morning, OTS staff designates that BDU's are to be worn. During the day, his flight commander inspects to ensure that all items on display have appropriate laundry markings. She notices Lt Henry's flight cap has someone else's markings. She notifies Lt Henry's instructor, and the Squadron Commander that Lt Henry has stolen property on display. Has an Honor Code violation occurred?

- 2d Lt Becky Dodd and 2d Lt Thomas Kelly have developed a very close relationship while at OTS. Lt Kelly's wife is stationed at Moron AS, Spain. Lt Dodd's husband is stationed at RAF Lakenheath, England. 2d Lt Simpson, Lt Kelly's roommate, returned to his room and found Lt Dodd and Lt Kelly in an "embarrassing situation." Lt Simpson leaves the room and contemplates what he must do. The Lt's were cheating on their spouses, but he can't bring himself to turn in his roommate to the FLT/CC. He decides to remain silent, knowing no one other than the trainees in question knows he saw anything, and they won't say anything. Has an Honor Code violation occurred? What should Lt Simpson do?

- 2d Lt Green, on the way to the bathroom, realizes he forgot his toothpaste. He stops at 2d Lt Black's room and borrows his toothpaste without his knowledge. When he finishes, he returns the toothpaste. Has an Honor Code violation occurred?

- 1st Lt Coale, a missile launch officer based at Malmstrom AFB, Montana, is applying for Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT). His application form requests information about any previous flying experience, either civilian or military. Lt Coale lacks several hours to get his private pilot's license, but he feels having his license will better his chances for selection. The application deadline is tomorrow. Unfortunately, he isn't scheduled to receive his private pilot's flight check until next weekend. On the application form, he indicates he currently has his license because he knows the form will take several weeks to process. Has 1st Lt Coale violated the Honor Code?

Bibliography:
1. *Cadet Basic Training Honor Guide*, US Military Academy, June 1998.
2. Manual for Courts Martial. *Article 133*, 2012 Edition.
3. Officer Training School Manual 36-2202, *Trainee Operating Procedures*, 26 November 2012.
4. Toner, James H., *True Faith and Allegiance, The Burden of Military Ethics*, The University Press of Kentucky, 1995, Chapter 5.
5. *USAF Academy Cadet Wing Honor Code Reference Handbook*, USAFA, January 2013.

Honor Education Strategy

- **4-year education and training curriculum**
  - 33 lessons during 4-years
- **Emphasis on fourth/third-classmen**
  - 13 basic tng lessons focus on honorable living
- **Aligned w/Officer Development System principles**
- **Create and capture teachable moments**
  - Cross-mission element effort
- **Provide knowledge, experience, opportunities for reflection and a forum to discuss issues**
- **Focus on real vs abstract issues**

Objective 3

Know the AFROTC Honor Code

Required for: IMT

Overview: This lesson is designed to teach the Cadet Honor Code. It should be <u>taught by a cadre member, or a senior POC with cadre participation</u>. Ideally, it should be one of the first lessons presented to your new cadets. The lesson plan provided can be tailored from a 30 – 90 minute lesson, depending on how you see fit. If you use the shorter lesson, the case studies and role-playing scenarios could be used for a later LLAB session to re-emphasize the Honor Code.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

PART I

Lesson Title: Cadet Honor Code
Instructor: POC Cadet
Teaching Method: Informal Lecture/Guided Discussion
Time Required: 30 minutes (IMT/AS100)
Interrelated Information: Core Values
Visual Aids: PowerPoint Slides; Handouts
Student Preparation: Article *My Turn* (at end of lesson plan)
Certified by: Holm Center/CR (Dr. Charles Nath III)

PART IA

Cognitive Lesson Objective: Know the Cadet Honor Code.

Cognitive Samples of Behavior:
1. State the AFROTC Cadet Honor Code.
2. Define each element of the Cadet Honor Code.
3. Know procedures for reporting a suspected Cadet Honor Code violation.
4. Identify misuse of the Cadet Honor Code.
5. Recognize the difference between breaking a rule and violating the Cadet Honor Code.

Affective Lesson Objective: Respond to the importance of the Cadet Honor Code.

Affective Sample of Behavior: Actively participate in a discussion of the Cadet Honor Code.

PART IB

Strategy: The purpose of this lesson is to ensure cadets know the Cadet Honor Code. This lesson should be presented to IMT(AS100) cadets as early as possible in their first term to emphasize the importance of the Honor Code and living by it at all times. Cadets need to realize the benefits of living by the Code. Recommend this lesson be taught either by cadre personnel or a well-qualified cadet with a cadre member present.

Thirty minutes is the suggested minimum time requirement that must be spent on this objective. The material in this lesson plan may take up to 1.5 hours to present. You can either pick the parts you want to do during the 30 minutes, or spend more time on it as you see fit. Since you're only required to present a 30-minute lesson, explaining the essentials of the Honor Code (points A-C) is key to the lesson objective. You may opt to do any or all of the additional materials (points D-F) or use them for rainy day sessions at other times rather than teaching this all in one LLAB session.

The lesson plan provides additional material, including case studies, role-playing scenarios, and an article, "My Turn." For the case studies, students review them and discuss whether or not an Honor Code or regulation violation has occurred. Each case presents a different slant on the Honor Code. The essential teaching point is that Honor Code violations are different from

Objective 3-3

regulation violations; recognizing "which-is-which" is extremely important. The role-playing scenarios are designed to help students feel comfortable when confronting Honor Code violators. Finally, discussing the article, "My Turn," ties together the Core Values and the Honor Code.

Lesson Outline
A. The Intent and Purpose of the Honor Code
   1. Intent of the Code
   2. Purpose of the Code
B. The four elements of the Honor Code
   1. Lying
   2. Cheating
   3. Stealing
   4. Toleration
C. Procedures for Handling a Suspected Honor Code Violation
   1. Approach violator
   2. Alert first person available
D. Misuse of the Honor Code
E. Case Studies: We'll look at several cases and discuss which constitute Honor Code violations and which are regulation violations.
F. Role Playing Scenarios: Practice approaching suspected Honor Code violators.
G. The article, "My Turn": Identify how the Honor Code relates to our Core Values, as illustrated by the article.

PART II

INTRODUCTION

ATTENTION
(Suggested: *"We will not lie, steal or cheat, nor tolerate among us anyone who does."*

This is the Cadet Honor Code—can you live up to it? It's a code of Honor you're expected to live up to throughout your entire career—both on and off the job.)

INSTRUCTOR NOTE: Let the cadets study a written version of the Honor Code (either from slides or in book or written on board) for a minute or two. Once cadets have had an opportunity to study the code, explain that vocalizing is thought to help internalize information and have cadets repeat the code after you.

MOTIVATION
(Suggested: Why do we need an Honor Code? Trust and integrity are essential in the military. Without trust and integrity our credibility as a peacekeeping force would erode. The Air Force Honor Code establishes a standard of moral behavior we must accept. It provides the foundation of a personal code of ethics, which will last a lifetime.)

OVERVIEW
A. The Intent and Purpose of the Honor Code
  1. Intent of the Code
  2. Purpose of the Code
B. The four elements of the Honor Code
  1. Lying
  2. Cheating
  3. Stealing
  4. Toleration
C. Procedures for Handling a Suspected Honor Code Violation
  1. Approach violator
  2. Alert first person available
D. Misuse of the code
E. Case Studies: We'll look at several cases and discuss which constitute Honor Code violations and which are regulation violations.
F. Role Playing Scenarios: Practice approaching suspected Honor Code violators.
G. The article, "My Turn": Identify how the Honor Code relates to our Core Values, as illustrated by the article.

TRANSITION
(Suggested: First let's see if we can memorize the Cadet Honor Code.)

Tab H

Tab I

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND

26 February 2014

MEMORANDUM FOR AFGSC/CC

FROM: HQ AFGSC/JA

SUBJECT: Legal Review of the Investigating Officer's (IO) Report of Investigation (ROI) Concerning ICBM Testing Culture, Malmstrom AFB, MT and 20th Air Force (20 AF)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)..

(b)(5).

(b)(5),.

(b)(5)..

//signed//

Lt Col, USAFR
Assistant Staff Judge Advocate

(b)(5)..

//signed//

Col, USAF
Acting Staff Judge Advocate

5

Tab J

Tab K

Tab L

L-1